


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US ARMY
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QUARTERLY



VOL. XXIII NO. 1

SPRING 1993

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The Canadian Experience Joel J. Sokolsky

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Women in Combat, Homosexuals in Uniform: The Challenge of Military Leadership

RICHARD H. KOHN

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Bill Clinton's promise to end the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military, and the continuing furor over women in combat, threaten an ongoing civil-military battle that could damage military professionalism, alienate an otherwise friendly incoming Administration, and, ultimately, ruin the military effectiveness of the American armed forces for the foreseeable future. Military leaders who oppose these changes ought to consider some facts and principles that might change their minds.

First, history. Women have fought successfully, sometimes integrated with men, as in the World War II Allied underground, where they proved just as adept at slitting throats, leading men in battle, suffering torture, and dying, as men; sometimes segregated, as in Soviet air force units, which produced many female aces fighting the Germans. Homosexuals have for centuries served honorably and effectively, in the United States and abroad. Arguments against open service assume that proper policies and effective leadership will fail, even though the services succeeded in integrating African-Americans and women, switching to a draft military in 1940 and then back to an all-volunteer force after 1973, and adjusting to other very divisive social changes over the last half century.

Second, there is fairness. In times of emergency, service is a fundamental obligation no citizen should escape unless disqualified physically

or excused on religious or moral grounds, or because their skills need to be used in some other capacity. But also, participation in combat—dying for one's country—has historically enabled minorities to claim the full privileges of equal participation in society, something basic to our form of government. That is why African-Americans for generations "fought for the right to fight" and why combat and military service are so important to women and homosexuals. Combat and service promote equal protection of the laws and undermine prejudice and discrimination.

Third, the very real practical problems can be overcome. Without question, change will be complicated and costly and take time, and military efficiency will suffer in the short term. Unless carefully explained to the American people, these changes could harm recruiting, precisely in those areas and among those groups which have been traditionally supportive of military service. To accommodate women on combat ships and in flying units (few advocate women in ground combat units), facilities and perhaps weapon systems will need modification. There will be ticklish, perhaps intractable, problems of privacy and personal discomfort (there already *are* in the military). The services will be distracted from their primary peacetime duties of readiness, preparation, and modernization. Leadership at all levels will be challenged to maintain morale and effectiveness in circumstances where, historically, macho behavior and explicit sexual banter helped forge the personal bonds that enabled units to train and fight effectively.

Cohesion, the key to military success, will be more difficult without traditional methods of male bonding. The strict authority, harsh discipline, and instant obedience required for victory in battle have always been subject to abuse, and adding more women and ending discrimination against gay men and lesbians will increase the problem. To deal with it, military leaders will have to redouble their efforts to define appropriate conduct and to punish or expel those in the ranks who cannot or will not control their language and their behavior. The problem, as Tailhook so clearly reveals, already exists; the fundamental issue in the short run will not be attitude, but behavior, and the military can be extremely effective in controlling behavior. The services will have to review policies on acceptable conduct, on and off duty. Research on maintaining cohesion without scapegoating homosexuals and treating

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women as sex objects will have to be undertaken. The challenge to our military leadership, at all levels, will be enormous, and it will last as long as sexism and homophobia afflict significant portions of our population.

And yet, our military can adjust—once again. It is natural to resist because change poses a diversion from the primary purposes of preparing for and deterring war, and engaging in combat. That is why as outstanding a public servant as General George C. Marshall during World War II opposed racial integration, believing it divisive and concerned that the Army could not afford to act as a “social laboratory” during a national emergency. But civilian control means that our military will be organized and will operate according to the nation’s needs and desires. Historically our national security and our social, legal, and constitutional practices have had to be balanced. The services know that military efficiency and combat effectiveness do not always determine our military policies, and less so in times of peace and lessened threat.

If President Clinton follows through on the promise to let gay men and lesbians serve openly, and if, for reasons of fairness and justice, he permits women to fight in combat units at sea and in the air, then the American military must comply, and without resistance. To resist would only make the adjustment more time-consuming and disruptive, and would itself undermine military effectiveness.

In the long run, the services should find that their effectiveness, as in the experience of racial and gender integration, will be enhanced rather than diminished. The strength of our military depends ultimately upon its bonds to the people; the armed forces will be stronger the more they reflect the values and ideals of the society they serve. □

For perspectives strongly at odds with that of Dr. Kohn, see the articles following by Martin van Creveld and by R. D. Adair and Joseph C. Myers.

— The Editors

Why Israel Doesn't Send Women Into Combat

MARTIN VAN CREVELD

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The experience of Israel is often used to support the case for sending American women into combat. Israel, after all, has a reputation for military strength; if women have proved to be useful in combat there, it surely reinforces the argument for their inclusion in US combat forces. There is, however, a serious problem with this analogy. No Israeli woman has served in combat since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Even though the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has very often faced overwhelming odds, we in Israel are very proud that Israeli women have never deliberately been exposed to the risks of combat, not even in the most desperate situations.

The Myth of the Amazons

Women have never taken a major part in combat—in any culture, in any country, in any period of history. The myth of the Amazons is just that—a myth. The few women who did join armies and fight did so disguised as men, and when discovered were usually summarily discharged. A handful of such cases are known, including some during the American Revolution and the Civil War.

On the other hand, women have always taken part in rebellions and insurrections. In fact, as Marx once said and as the Vietnam War proved, the extent to which women are swept along is a very good index of whether a revolutionary movement will succeed. But once a revolutionary movement has succeeded, an established state does not send its women into combat. This rule holds true for the Israeli armed forces.

Before 1948 the Jewish community in Palestine fought the British to gain our independence. In that struggle, women played an important and active part. Women served in the Palmach, an underground paramilitary force. Women went on undercover missions, and often smuggled weapons because British soldiers were more hesitant to search women than men. Women often were used for carrying messages and for surveillance work. In fact it was the practice of Palmach to send a young man and woman together to do surveillance work. If caught, they could always play the role of loving couple. Thus, women did play a role in the underground before the establishment of the state. Even then, when Palmach undertook a larger military operation, for example, a retaliatory raid against some Arab village, the women would be left behind.

It was only when isolated settlements were attacked by Arab irregulars, and later by invading Arab armies, that women fought shoulder to shoulder with the men. This was a matter of home defense. When a remote kibbutz of 100 or 200 people was attacked by a regular force, it was a desperate situation that required everyone to fight. Even so, the number of women who actually handled rifles or threw hand grenades was very small. I am unaware of a single Israeli woman who has claimed, "I was in combat in 1948. I handled a rifle. I threw a hand grenade. I fired a machine gun." There may have been a few such women, but for the most part they existed only in the Arab imagination. More typically, women were kept very busy looking after the essential needs of combat, such as nursing, preparing and bringing up supplies, communications, and looking after the children; after all, these were civilian settlements under attack.

Basic Training for Women

The first thing the IDF did after it was established on 26 May 1948 was to exclude all women from combat. While women do serve in, and in fact are drafted into, the IDF, their role is to provide essential auxiliary services in order to free men for combat. Furthermore, the IDF does not have mixed units on the American model; rather, women form part of a separate Women's

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***"No Israeli woman has served in combat since
the establishment of the state of Israel . . ."***

Corps, known as CHEN. Originally CHEN was an acronym meaning Women's Corps; it also happens to mean "grace" in Hebrew.

For administrative and disciplinary purposes, women are subject to other women. Far from treating men and women draftees equally, the IDF has whole volumes detailing exactly what may or may not be done to or with women soldiers to prevent them from being harassed or otherwise maltreated. For example, women soldiers may be disciplined only by female officers; women soldiers may not be touched by male MPs; and women soldiers may not be treated by male doctors unless there is a woman present.

What weapons training women receive in the IDF is almost entirely symbolic. At best, they will receive enough training to enable them to defend themselves, if necessary, and even that is very often omitted. For example, my daughter, who is 19, spent only ten days in basic training. She was one of a select group of women pre-designated for certain slots because they had specific qualifications for these jobs. This group was put through a very short basic training course so that they could immediately go on to their jobs. True, most female draftees will spend considerably more time in basic training, but that is only because their ultimate assignments are not yet determined.

Women Draftees

Israeli women, like Israeli men, are subject to the draft. However, the draft is not applied equally to men and women. The IDF drafts about 90 percent of Israeli men between the ages of 18 and 21, but only about 60 percent of the women. This is because the IDF will take all men regardless of education, putting them through remedial courses if necessary; women who fall below a certain educational standard are simply not accepted.

Also, men serve longer than women—three years as opposed to two. Unless they are discharged for disciplinary reasons or are found unsuitable, both sexes are expected to serve out their term. In practice, however, the forces have a surplus of women draftees, so women are often given an early discharge.

Women who are married, pregnant, or have children are exempt from the draft. Further, as a rule, women who have served their term are not recalled for reserve duty, the main exception being a few vital hand-picked personnel.

Although women officially can be called up through age 34, very few serve in the reserves after age 25. Conversely, Israeli men are required to serve in the army reserves until age 51, and must report for one month of training each year until they reach that age.

Women who join the professional standing forces after their two-year conscript service are treated equally with men, with three exceptions. They are subordinate to the Women's Corps; they do not participate in combat; and, as a result, they cannot rise above the rank of brigadier general. These distinctions apart, the IDF treats its male and female career soldiers equally. It does not distinguish between women soldiers who are married or single, with or without children.

Because Israeli women do not serve in combat, and because the vast majority serve on rear bases on which they live or to which they commute, even pregnancy is not much of a problem. Most pregnant soldiers are able to go on with their jobs, just like civilian women who are pregnant and working outside the home. Also, Israel, like most Western countries except for the United States, grants women maternity leave. A woman, whether in or out of the military, is free to take up to a three-month leave either before or after childbirth. While on leave, 75 percent of her salary is paid by Social Security.

Duties of Female Soldiers

Apart from their work in the Women's Corps (that is, training and supervising other women), women in the IDF serve successfully in many varied and essential fields, including nursing, social work, clerical activities, psychological testing, intelligence, communications, and radar. Although there are no women pilots, the IDF does employ women as instructors in some combat-related activities, such as driving tanks and heavy self-propelled artillery pieces. This policy was first instituted during the late 1970s against a background of breakneck expansion and sharp manpower shortages.

Considered purely from a technical point of view, there is certainly no reason why a woman cannot learn and subsequently teach how to drive a tank. Male trainees, however, do not always readily take to female instructors who,

*"... an established state
does not send its women into combat."*

through no fault of their own, will never see combat and are unable to apply what they teach. As a result, the policy has not been an unqualified success.

Regular combat units deployed in the field—for example, the Infantry Brigade or the Paratrooper Brigade—usually have a very small number of women attached to them, two or three per battalion, who perform administrative work. Should fighting break out, these women are immediately evacuated from the combat zone—although not always successfully. When Israel came under surprise attack during the 1973 War, a few women were killed by missiles that hit bases in the Sinai. Generally, however, the IDF does its utmost to prevent such situations.

Women and War

The differences between the Israeli and American societies are numerous, deep, and striking. One of the most admirable things about American society is the way in which issues such as women in combat are debated publicly, in such depth, and on the basis of the best professional knowledge. Israel can't afford to do it in this way, at least not in the case of the military.

Asked about their impressions of women in combat, Israeli officers are united in their view that it is no place for them. This is because, unlike most Americans, Israelis are familiar with combat; they know that the favorite American method of breaking war down into Military Occupational Specialties distorts the issue. For example, women can certainly pilot an Apache helicopter as well as men. However, it is equally certain that their weaker physiques will put them at a disadvantage when it is a question of flying that helicopter eight times a day under enemy fire, with the chance of being shot down, wounded, and forced to make their way back on foot.

Combat, in other words, is not merely a matter of doing a job. It is the toughest, most demanding, most terrible activity on earth. It is far beyond the imagination of anybody who has not experienced it. The demands that it makes in terms of physical strength, endurance, and sheer wear and tear are horrendous.

Are there some women who are capable of performing well in combat? Undoubtedly. Are most women physically less capable of doing so than most men? Undoubtedly. And that, in fact, is the best possible reason for excluding women from combat. The added overhead needed to incorporate those few exceptional females would be so large as to make the whole exercise counterproductive. Israel is not the United States. Its defense budget is not \$300 billion a year, but only about \$5 billion. Nevertheless, the IDF maintains land forces that, once the United States carries out its projected defense cuts, will be larger than America's. Even so, experimenting with women in combat is a luxury Israel simply cannot afford. □

Admission of Gays to the Military: A Singularly Intolerant Act

R. D. ADAIR and JOSEPH C. MYERS

The United States armed forces are in the process of drawing down. There appears to be a national consensus in support of this drawdown, a broad realization that it is one of the tough choices needing to be made if we are to get at our difficult domestic challenges. It appears likely, however, that the American military and, indeed, all American citizens are on the verge of embroilment in what may ultimately prove to be an even more difficult challenge than that of force reduction. It will question our nation's values, beliefs, and societal norms. It will challenge us as a people and define us as an organized society. In fact, it threatens to divide the nation. This challenge is the integration of avowed homosexuals into the force.

The broad domestic conflict of which the homosexual issue is only a part is often described as a cultural war, and sometimes even a cultural civil war. It is being fought now, as it has been fought over the past generation, on a number of fronts. The Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, multiculturalism, publicly funded art, affirmative action, and the content of public school curricula have been just a few of the issues vigorously debated over the past decade.

James Carville, the media consultant for President Clinton, said that the 1992 election was about "the economy, stupid!" And indeed, according to a number of exit polls, the economy may have been the deciding factor. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that economic issues are always paramount. In the United States, politics often divides Americans along cultural lines too—along lines of region, race, ethnicity, religion, and personal values.¹ The military services, never immune to the spillover effects of society's cultural divisions, may now confront the intractable problem of homosexual integration. In the present article, we shall argue against such a policy.

This question is at once moral, philosophical, and political. For while the state of the economy may ebb and flow with the fluctuations of the business cycle, the ideas by which we define our culture endure. Ideas have

consequences. As intellectual historian Christopher Dawson put it: "It is clear that a common way of life involves a common view of life, common standards of behavior, and common standards of value."² What Dawson says applies doubly to military life, where mission accomplishment depends to a great extent on the molding to common purpose of millions of individual soldiers. The idea of homosexual integration, so divisive in its implications, thus presents profound questions and practical considerations for the institution.

We believe there exists a cultural divide in our society, an ideological chasm between competing views of morality. In many instances this is a conflict between a traditional view of morality on one side and an opposing view which holds that there exist *no* objective standards of morality. However one chooses to view morality, it is safe to say that it is a unique aspect of our human nature, one which separates man from the animal world. And whether it has been workers' safety regulations, the repeal of slavery, or modern-day civil rights legislation, our laws have found their basis in moral judgments—this despite what may have seemed like sound economic or rational arguments against their enactment.³ As Judge Robert Bork pointed out in his book *The Tempting of America*, it is a "common yet wholly fallacious" cliché to say that "you can't legislate morality."⁴ On the contrary, that is precisely what we do legislate—otherwise we would be free to rob, steal, swindle, and kill without fear of legal sanction. It is clear that most people understand and accept the concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, and live by such creeds, morals, and laws on a daily basis. Some may argue theoretically that morals are relative and subjective, but they rarely live that way. A civilized community cannot long bear the anarchy inherent in such a view. If the statement that one man's moral judgment is as good as another's were taken seriously, it would be impossible for law on any subject to exist. After all, one man's larceny would become another's just redistribution of goods.⁵

In our democracy we handle our moral differences through mutual toleration. We can tolerate a range of undesirable practices or beliefs while recognizing the bad or falsehood in them. In recognizing our human failing,

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the vices within us all, toleration precludes the resort to the totalitarian impulse of imposing a single virtue over society.⁶ Ill-fated attempts to create a "new man," an inherent goal in all manifestations of totalitarianism⁷—from the mass slaughters of Stalinism to the carnage of Pol Pot—testify to the difficulties of that approach.

It must be recognized, however, that toleration, by definition, is inherently judgmental, permitting some morally questionable practices of fellow human beings while simultaneously recognizing that those practices constitute a deviation from the established norm. It respects and recognizes the rights, opinions, and practices of others, while still allowing us to discriminate between right and wrong in establishing desirable norms of conduct and behavior.⁸

The "new morality" of the last 30 years, however, goes much further; it demands *neutrality* (as opposed to toleration) toward competing views of moral life.⁹ It does not accept judicious discrimination. In fact the very word "discrimination" now carries with it a negative connotation, regardless of the purpose or goal involved. Surprisingly few people understand that the notion of discrimination is in fact central to the function of government—especially with regard to the legislative role. That is to say, Congress discriminates on a daily basis, setting up standards of discrimination to determine eligibility for benefits, services, jobs, etc. It is, after all, discrimination to decree that Social Security payments are only for people over 62, just as it is, say, to decree that those citizens who are only 17 years old cannot vote, or to decide that families earning over \$50,000 per year cannot receive food stamps. What we seek to avoid in trying to create a more just society is *irrational* discrimination. Toward that end we have eliminated legally sanctioned discrimination based on certain demographic classifications such as race, ethnicity, religion, color, national origin, and so forth.

Historical analysis suggests that homosexuals have not been characterized as a group until relatively recently—and even that has been a result of their own organized lobbying to be recognized as such. For, unlike demographic groups, they have been distinguished not by physical characteristics, place of birth, or creed, but by individual behavior. But the banding together of individuals, united by shared behavior or lifestyles, to seek redress does not make it incumbent on government to acquiesce in legally sanctioning their particular behavior. Otherwise there would be no preventing other people from forming associations based on other shared behaviors—no matter how far removed from societal norms—and obtaining "rights" based solely on discrimination against them.

Lobbyists for "neutrality," however, demand that the government not discriminate against one view of life—one "valid lifestyle" as it were—over another.¹⁰ By this approach, the "gay" lifestyle becomes just as valid a manifestation of human existence, and presumably just as vital to the continuation of

family and of mankind, as heterosexuality. However, without the ability to distinguish, to discriminate, or to recognize differences, then the concept of equality of treatment before the existing law is debased to mean, in effect, that all individuals—regardless of their behavior—are “the same.” But this idea of equality is a radical one, egalitarian in design. It turns on its head the notion of individual equality before the law to one where law that makes moral distinctions itself becomes invalid before equal individuals. This tactic results in “the legal disestablishment of morality.”¹¹

Power, Social Morality, and Personal Values

Some researchers have sought to find a genetic or physiological root to homosexuality to lessen or remove moral judgments about it. But the jury is still out on the degree to which prenatal (as opposed to postnatal) determinants affect sexual orientation.¹² On the other hand, some homosexuals maintain that homosexuality is a behavior of choice, “a political statement”—or as PBS’s “Tongues Untied” described it, “the revolutionary act.” This dynamism, then, this energy and force that characterize the homosexual movement in America, places the question of the avowed homosexual’s integration into the armed forces in a new light: the issue is about power, political power, and revolutionary change. As columnist Samuel Francis writes, it is about who determines “the norms by which we live, and by which we define and govern ourselves.”¹³

Who decides these questions for the military services? Tradition? Religion? Congress? The President? Ultimately, service mores are a reflection of values held by the civil society from which service members are drawn. Roger H. Nye explains: “Military courses in ethics and professionalism teach a lengthy process of reasoning one’s way through moral dilemmas. But the decisions of junior commanders reflect less of what they have been taught as soldiers and more of the moral characteristics they brought with them into the Army from their teachers, parents, and childhood environments.”¹⁴ Our leadership must understand that simply declaring a new morality by executive or legislative fiat does not automatically imbue soldiers and officers with a new professional ethic concerning issues of right and wrong, particularly if it is seen as an overtly political act.¹⁵

What about rights? Excessive talk about rights tends to polarize debate between absolutes and does not allow for political consensus-building. Does anyone have an unconditional right to be in the Army (or in any of the services)? The historical answer is clearly no. The Army routinely discriminates when recruiting soldiers, enrolling ROTC cadets, or considering appointments to West Point. The Army must consider not only skill requirements and the educational level of applicants, but such factors as personal histories, past criminal behavior, and overall mental and physical aptitudes. It is simply a fact that some of these discriminators are based in part on the

negative impact some people would have on the ability of the Army to "preserve good order and discipline" and accomplish its missions. Some will say that these same arguments were made against the integration of minorities and women, but the fact is that race and gender are not behavior. Sexual conduct is. We all have choices to make in life about who we want to be. By these choices we define and limit ourselves from being other things. A homosexual can no more claim an absolute right to admission to the Army than can anyone else who fails to meet the standards that the Army and society deem optimum for building the force.

The argument is sometimes heard that the proposed policy would embrace the notion of demonstrated behavior only. That is, homosexuals would be incorporated into the force, but only on the condition that they never engage in homosexual activities. In other words their Army lives would be celibate, or, more properly, chaste. This notion appears to be a remarkably hopeful one, for it contemplates a degree of sexual discipline imposed on one set of young men and women that is but a forlorn hope in the secular community at large. It denies that which is perhaps the most powerful of human drives. Thus, to argue with a straight face for chastity as a condition for service membership by homosexuals is either fatally naive or cynically disingenuous.

But there are more serious objections. If this policy is to be strictly behavior-based, then we would, in effect, be adopting a policy of partial legitimization. If those supporting homosexual integration are sincere in their behavior-based policy proposals, then the signal that we contemplate sending is essentially this: homosexual soldiers, as a matter of legal right, may now serve, but they must understand that that right is limited. Yes, they can serve, but they cannot have a spouse or act out the very lifestyle which is the basis of their newfound rights in the first place. All of this begs an obvious question: Is the lifestyle or sexual orientation (or whatever term might be used in an executive order or act of Congress) legitimate or not? If it is, then why delimit anyone's rights that flow from that lifestyle? It seems difficult to imagine our leadership sending a mixed message of this kind to any group, at least for very long. One may understand the suspicions of those opposed that "behavior" is being used only to sell a policy, and that once implemented behavioral restrictions will inevitably erode.

Consequences of Integration

What would be the practical consequences for the Army if given the order to integrate homosexuals? The Uniform Code of Military Justice, which now proscribes sodomy (Art. 125), codifies the institutional service morality. In addition to Article 125's specific prohibition against sodomy, Article 133 proscribes "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman," and Article 134 proscribes all forms of conduct that "prejudice good order and discipline" or

"bring discredit upon the armed forces."¹⁶ What if these limitations were removed or reinterpreted, and the term "alternative lifestyle" were made the standard by which we judge behavior? There would be little to restrain any kind of alternative lifestyle which a consenting adult may wish to assert as his or her right. Concern for off-duty behavior may have to become a thing of the past.

Would polygamy or consensual open marriage then constitute an alternative lifestyle? Would adultery, now punishable under the UCMJ (and not infrequently punished), still be grounds for punishment? Before quickly answering "no" to the first question, and "yes" to the second, one must review the standard by which those conclusions are reached and compare it with those standards that would be used to give legal sanction to the homosexual lifestyle. Acceptance of the neutrality principle of the new morality loosens the underpinnings not only of societal norms, but of many of our legal concepts. Once we slip the shackles of "antiquated legal and moral notions," we find ourselves suddenly in the broken field of moral relativism. The oft-repeated cliché "I'm okay, you're okay" can then come to be applied to all the standards that govern the manner in which citizens of a civilized society conduct themselves.

If avowed homosexuals are allowed in the armed forces, would homosexual marriage be recognized for the purpose of conferring survivor pay and benefits? Homosexual "spouses," officially or informally, would inevitably be a part of Army life. Would we recognize a homosexual couple as parents? Would they be assigned government quarters on military installations? How would Army service community organizations be affected? Would officers' and noncommissioned officers' spouses' clubs open themselves to the significant other of homosexual members? This new "civil right" could hardly be limited to lower-ranking soldiers—OCS, ROTC, and the service academies would all be affected as well.

If integration occurs, would the "privacy" of behavior then be the new standard for judging conduct, or, going further, would the privatization of morals lead to their disappearance altogether? Would the Army protect the privacy of heterosexuals vis-à-vis homosexuals in the same way it now protects the privacy of gender, with separate sleeping quarters, showers, and latrines? Or would this simply be a one-way street, with homosexuality emerging as a newly recognized, constitutionally protected right which overrides privacy concerns by heterosexuals both male and female? Before saying no, the reader must consider that the advocates of these new policies seek the same rights and privileges which accrue on the basis of race, color, and creed.

The implications are endless. How, for example, is the Army to defend itself against charges of imputed bias in the case of promotion passovers, SERBs, RIFs, nonselection for coveted schools, undesirable assignments, etc. that occur with avowedly homosexual personnel? We all know the story: disproportionately low minority representation among select groups is often

construed as prima facie evidence of discrimination. Within a very short period after the new policy's implementation, we could well see tacit floors, quotas, and other affirmative action devices to assure that homosexual personnel receive their "fair share" of benefits. These and similar results represent the logical extension of an integration order on the Army, which like other political policies may have unintended or unanticipated second- and third-order effects.

What would be the impact on readiness, deployability of units, and the Army health care system? Study of this issue would be incomplete without a realistic risk assessment with regard to AIDS. According to Alfred Kinsey, whose figures remain remarkably current based on later assessments, the average homosexual has 1000 sex partners in a lifetime. *Village Voice* put the figure at 1600.¹⁷ No one debates the linkage between male homosexual behavior and this the most serious disease of the generation. It is generally conceded that homosexuals account for 65 to 70 percent of all AIDS cases in the United States. When intravenous drug-users, hemophiliacs, and Haitians are deducted from the population figures (a valid adjustment because of the reduced likelihood of these groups serving in the armed forces), homosexuals account for between 90 and 95 percent of cases.¹⁸ An article appearing in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*¹⁹ reported the average direct medical cost of the earliest group of AIDS cases to be \$147,000 per patient. Using Consumer Price Index averages, that cost will grow to some \$386,000 per patient by the year 2000, and almost \$639,000 by 2008, 15 years from now.²⁰

Assuming the frequently heard claim that homosexuals represent ten percent of the American population is true, and that policy changes currently under consideration are made, an active duty military force with some 140,000 to 150,000 gays within the next ten to 15 years can reasonably be posited.²¹ What would be the effect on the military medical system if there were, say, 10,000 (about three percent of the expected male homosexual accessions)²² new full-blown AIDS cases among active duty personnel through the first several years of the next century? This is a conservative assumption considering that some 5.8 percent of male homosexuals in the United States have already tested positive for HIV.²³ Can the Department of Defense afford outlays of nearly \$6.5 billion (\$639,000 times 10,000 cases) just for AIDS-related costs by 2008? Can the Department of Veterans Affairs? What effect would such additional costs have on care for other active duty personnel? On family members? On retirees? On the CHAMPUS system? What would be the cost of replacing the Military Occupational Specialties lost by AIDS casualties?

But that is not the whole story. Over 50 percent of syphilis cases in the United States occur in homosexual men.²⁴ Fifty to 75 percent of gay men have or have had hepatitis B (a highly contagious disease, potentially devastating to a military unit),²⁵ while 90 percent demonstrate chronic or recurrent viral infections with herpesvirus, cytomegalovirus, and the same hepatitis B.²⁶ The

implications for the Army blood supply, particularly in combat situations, are obvious. War is a bloody business, and the adverse impact on individual morale and unit cohesiveness of encountering potentially AIDS-infected blood while handling or treating war-wounded comrades should not be lightly brushed aside.

The Role of Leadership

Soldiers must depend on and have confidence in the decisions of their leaders. There exists a vital link between trust and morale. Good staff work, sober study and reflection, and common sense are prerequisites to command decision. In the heat of crisis, of course, arms and equipment may be placed in service without being thoroughly tested. But that is a calculated risk soldiers understand. They intuitively accept the state's right to impose risk. But trust presumes that such risk is firmly related to, and bears directly on, operational necessity.

With regard to new social policy in the armed forces, however, no such risk is justified. A rush to judgment on this issue may take its toll in the confidence that soldiers feel toward their leadership. Our leadership must not sacrifice that trust by appearing to act quickly and politically. Too much is at stake. A drastic change in the social fabric of the Army such as that now being considered must be closely analyzed in terms of its effects on cohesion, teamwork, and, yes, trust and confidence. Our leadership should seek answers to the quite natural questions being raised. Failing satisfactory answers, it is the duty of our leadership to urge restraint.

Such a course will take courage, a different kind of courage from that required on the battlefield. For we live in an age of increasing intolerance in American politics. It is an age of rhetorical excess, which recalls the totalitarian penchant for linguistic polarization²⁷ which some have likened to verbal terrorism. In the issue at hand, opposition to recognition of homosexuality as a constitutionally protected classification is automatically termed "homophobia." This is a favorite media shibboleth, though etymologically inaccurate. A phobia is "an abnormal or illogical fear of a specific thing or situation." To attack someone's mental state as "phobic" simply because he has a moral reservation or opposing view is not unlike the approach used in the old Soviet Union where dissidents were diagnosed as requiring psychological treatment and placed in "mental hospitals." The two approaches are closely related: one who disagrees with proposed policy changes is ridiculed as having a mental disorder.

Philosophically construed, one of the main purposes of the present essay is to urge that the majority deserves toleration as well as the minority. Societal norms now in effect are indeed those of toleration. All but a tiny minority, the likes of which infect every society, are willing to live and let live. With few exceptions the American people show no inclination to interfere in

the private lives of homosexuals, transsexuals, transvestites, and others regarded as deviant. It is quite another thing, however, to say that because of the lifestyle a minority chooses to adopt, it can demand legal reform that impinges adversely on the lives and security of the majority.

The Army as an institution, imperfect as it is, should aspire to our highest values. The most tolerant approach would be to recognize the practical and moral consequences of this proposed change on the Army and its members. As currently constituted, the integrity and cohesion of the Army as an institution are intact. It can continue to defend the nation, defending a common way of life that can tolerate the uncommon. But to impose a neutral legal standard and a new moral view of homosexuality on the Army would be a singularly intolerant act, striking at the heart of cohesion and institutional morality. It would be a remarkably divisive decision.

The decision to integrate, should it occur, should be taken only as the logical result of a "positive" finding: a determination that the integration of homosexuals would in fact strengthen the force and lay the groundwork for the superb military team the challenges of the 21st century will require.

Columnist George Will has written, "The alternative to waging the cultural war is acquiescence in the atrophy of democratic processes."²⁸ The pressures on the Army leadership to acquiesce in the "politically correct" position on the homosexual issue (as well as others) are enormous. But since the final decision does not rest with the services, our leaders' legacies will be determined not by the final decision itself, but rather by the quality of their advice, their representation of the Army's and services' interests, and their stewardship with regard to future readiness. Thus if our leadership merely fulfills its responsibilities for ascertaining the facts and making a considered policy recommendation, then it will have done its duty.

While serving as President of the Naval War College, Admiral James Stockdale lamented the ethical decline in the military during the Vietnam era. He said this:

Society as a whole has adopted the judicial process as its moral yardstick and forfeited common sense and personal responsibility. . . . Too many have become relativists without any defined moral orientation. Too many are content to align their value systems with fads and buzzwords, and mindlessly try to obey what amounts to a hodgepodge mixture of inconsistent slogans. . . . However, if anything has power to sustain an individual in peace or war, regardless of occupation, it is one's conviction and commitment to defined standards of right and wrong. . . . Each man must bring himself to some stage of ethical resolution.²⁹

Surely, as we approach a decision on the vexed issue of admitting avowed homosexuals into the force, adherence to Admiral Stockdale's appeal to principle represents the ultimate tolerant act.

NOTES

1. Michael Barone, *Our Country* (New York: The Free Press, 1990) p. xi.
2. Christopher Dawson, quoted in William J. Bennett, *The Devaluing of America: The Fight for Our Culture and Our Children* (New York: Summit Books, 1992), p. 25.
3. Robert Bork, *The Tempting of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), pp. 115-26.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
6. John Gray, *The Loss of Virtue* (New York: National Review Books, forthcoming).
7. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger), pp. 15-27, 183-202.
8. Gray.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.* For an excellent brief debunking of propaganda asserting the moral equivalence of the homosexual and heterosexual lifestyles, see George Will, "Respect OK, Not Indifference," *The Sentinel* (Carlisle, Pa.), 7 December 1992, p. B3.
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13. Samuel Francis, cited in Patrick Buchanan, "Yes, Governor Cuomo There is a Cultural War," *Conservative Chronicle*, 23 September 1992.
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15. Enrique T. Rueda, *The Homosexual Network: Private Lives and Public Policy* (Old Greenwich, Conn.: The Devin-Adair Company, 1982), p. 139.
16. *Manual for Courts-Marital, United States, 1951*, pp. 447, 449.
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18. S. L. Sivak and G. P. Wormer, "How Common is HTLV-III Infection in the United States?" *New England Journal of Medicine*, 313 (1985), 1352-53, as cited in Gene Antonio, *The Aids Cover-up? The Real and Alarming Facts about AIDS* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 132.
19. Hardy et al., "The Economic Impact of the First 10,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (1986), 209-11. Cited in Antonio, p. 132.
20. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1991* (New York: Pharos Books, 1990), p. 113. The 1985 cost of \$147,000, compounded annually using the CPI medical cost inflation rate through 1989, and assuming a 6.5% rise in each year thereafter. (6.5% is the lowest annual rise for the medical cost component of the CPI between 1985 and 1989.)
21. The plan currently in place calls for an FY95 DOD end strength of 1,644,000. Then-President-elect Clinton indicated he would go "some 200,000 beyond that." An eventual DOD end strength of between 1.4 and 1.5 million appears to be a reasonable planning figure.
22. According to the *Defense 92 "Almanac"* (September/October 1992), accessions have averaged approximately 14.3% of the average annual DOD end strength. While this percentage has fallen since 1989, we assume that over the next 15 years the ratio of accessions to end strength will reflect historical levels. Based on the lowest planning figures, total accessions between 1993 and 2008 would be approximately 3,468,000. Assuming a constant rate of 10.96% female (the current figure), 3,088,000 men will be recruited or commissioned over the next 15 years. According to Gay Rights organizations, approximately 308,800 are likely to be gay.
23. Michael Fumento ("Do You Believe in Magic?" *American Spectator*, 25 [February 1992], 16-21) cites statistics from the Center for Disease Control indicating that approximately one million Americans have contracted HIV (100,000 have died). According to Fumento, some 700,000 of these are homosexual males. Again, assuming that 10% of the male population are gay (12 million), this would mean that approximately 5.8% have already been infected with HIV. Since approximately 26% of males are under 18, the adult homosexual infection rate would be approximately 8%.
24. Pearl Ma and Donald Armstrong, *The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Infections of Homosexual Men* (New York: Yorke Medical Books, 1984), p. 6, as cited in Antonio, p. 54.
25. Jeanne Kassler, *Gay Men's Health: A Guide to the AID Syndrome and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 38, as cited in Antonio, p. 45.
26. David G. Ostrow, Terri A. Sandholzer, and Yehudi M. Felman, *Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Homosexual Men* (New York: Plenum Medical Book Co., 1983), p. 204, as cited in Antonio, p. 45.
27. Robert Jay Lifton, "Death and History: Ideological Totalism, Victimization, and Violence," in *Totalitarianism Reconsidered*, ed. Ernest A. Menze (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1981), p. 227.
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But It Does Take a Leader: The Schwarzkopf Autobiography

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A review essay on *The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero*. By H. Norman Schwarzkopf, written with Peter Petre. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

It *Doesn't Take a Hero* is an extraordinary book about a remarkable leader of great courage and exceptional talent. In a few short weeks in the winter of 1991, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf captured the imagination of the world and became not only an American hero but an international hero as well. Coauthored with Peter Petre, a professional writer and editor, this is a well-organized, well-written book. It makes good reading. It is also a money-maker, reportedly bringing General Schwarzkopf an advance of several million dollars. Almost as soon as it was published, the book was selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club and made the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* non-fiction best-seller lists, remaining Number 1 for several weeks before being bumped by Madonna's *Sex*.

Like many autobiographies, this book reflects an enormous ego. General Schwarzkopf tells his complete life story in his own words with a capital "I." In the preface, he professes his admiration for Grant's memoirs, probably the finest military memoirs ever written in the English language, but, as Schwarzkopf acknowledges, his book bears no resemblance to that classic. Those segments of the book covering his "growing up" years, his service during the Vietnam War, and his role in the Grenada intervention of 1983 are especially interesting, but the most fascinating, most significant part is his account of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.



The defining influence on General Schwarzkopf's life was no doubt his father, a West Point graduate, Class of 1917, who instilled in his son at an early age the ideals of the US Military Academy—Duty, Honor, Country—and encouraged him to follow in his father's footsteps at West Point. The younger Schwarzkopf stood high in his Class of 1956 and could have chosen assignment to any branch of the Army, including the Corps of Engineers, but to his credit he chose the infantry—the heart and soul of any great army.

Long before he became a second lieutenant of infantry, however, Schwarzkopf had seen a lot of the world beyond his family home in New Jersey. Shortly after his 12th birthday in August 1946, he went to Tehran to live with his father, then Colonel Schwarzkopf, who was a special advisor to the Shah of Iran. Attending the Presbyterian Mission School in Tehran with other foreign students, he was exposed to the vastly different ways of the Islamic world as well as the customs of the Arab countries neighboring (Persian) Iran. In 1947 he went to Geneva to attend L'Ecole Internationale, whose students were children of diplomats in the region. Here he became fluent in French. (He was already familiar with German, his family being of

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German descent.) In Switzerland he was exposed to another wide spectrum of nationalities as well as to kids from the other side of the political fence, young Marxists and communists. In 1948, when his father was transferred to Germany, he attended successively the Frankfurt and Heidelberg American high schools, graduating in 1950. After spending that summer in Rome with his family, he returned to the United States to attend Valley Forge Military Academy before entering West Point.

Schwarzkopf's unusual background was to stand him in good stead throughout his military career. It seems as though he had been destined to become the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility included the Persian Gulf area and much of the Middle East. Nearing the end of his Army service, he chose CENTCOM over two other four-star commands he was offered.

Given his overpowering personality, it is not surprising that Schwarzkopf likes to brag about himself, at times exaggerating his story beyond the substantiated facts. He also tends to monopolize credit for some of the contributions and accomplishments of others. Nevertheless, his refreshing candor adds credibility to his story, even though he can be unthinking and can hurt people unnecessarily. When it comes to his beloved soldiers, however, he is very caring.

Unfortunately, Schwarzkopf's bent toward magnifying his own role at the expense of others has gotten him into hot water with Lieutenant General (Prince) Khalid bin Sultan, a senior member of the ruling royal family of Saudi Arabia. General Khalid, who was co-commander of coalition forces participating in Desert Storm, wrote a scathing article titled "Schwarzkopf Falls Short In Writing History," which appeared in *Army Times* on 2 November 1992. Khalid declared that "there are so many inaccuracies and slanted remarks in [Schwarzkopf's] book that I feel I must set the record straight Many . . . events described in *It Doesn't Take a Hero* will be remembered differently in Riyadh and in the capitals of other coalition partners." This controversy will no doubt boost book sales, but regrettably it is bound to hurt US relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, an area of vital importance to the entire world.

Despite General Khalid's unhappiness, nothing can detract from Schwarzkopf's magnificent performance in Desert Storm as a US and allied commander. Bringing together in harmony the many disparate allied and US forces involved, fitting them all in the right place where each could make the most valuable contribution to the overall effort, and committing them to battle in a cohesive, synergistic manner led to a brilliant success.

In an earlier part of the book, addressing Schwarzkopf's first tour in Vietnam (1965-66), one is struck by a curious omission. As a junior officer, Schwarzkopf served as an advisor to Colonel Ngo Quang Truong, an outstanding leader in the Airborne Brigade (later expanded to a division), an elite element of the South Vietnamese army. Schwarzkopf tells us he came to

admire Truong as an exemplary fighting leader he could never forget. But Truong is never mentioned again. Schwarzkopf seems to be unaware that Truong went on to command a division, then a corps in the Delta, and then another corps in the north, all with great distinction. Indeed, he became one of the most admired military leaders in South Vietnam. When that nation collapsed in 1975, he was evacuated to the United States. Thus it is difficult to understand why Schwarzkopf did not recognize this great soldier further in his book.

Another curiously incomplete picture is found in his account of his second tour in Vietnam (1969-70), when he commanded a battalion in the Americal Division located in the northern part of the country. His division commander was Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey (now retired), a highly experienced and decorated combat leader, wounded five times in actions previous to the Vietnam War. Schwarzkopf speaks disparagingly about Ramsey's headquarters at Chu Lai, singling out the officers' mess for being too plush for a war zone. (The way the war was fought, all of South Vietnam was a war zone! Moreover, Schwarzkopf, on his first tour in Vietnam as a junior officer, lived in a villa in Saigon when he was not out in the field with his South Vietnamese counterpart.) Ramsey inherited the headquarters at Chu Lai from a succession of previous division commanders; he had to live somewhere, if not at the division's established command post. But, unaccountably, Schwarzkopf does not mention what happened to Ramsey. On 17 March 1970, his helicopter crashed in a remote jungle area, and after every available helicopter in the division was tasked to find the crash site, a chopper with Schwarzkopf aboard found Ramsey. Badly injured, Ramsey had been unconscious or semiconscious for some 18 hours when he was rescued. He was evacuated to the United States and miraculously lived to tell the tale. Again it is difficult to understand why Schwarzkopf made no mention of this dramatic episode. In the book, moreover, Ramsey's successor as the division commander is incorrectly identified as Major General Stan Meloy when in fact it was Major General A. E. Milloy. Assuming that Schwarzkopf knew the correct name of his division commander, such an egregious error does not reflect well on the editing of the book.

The composite picture of Schwarzkopf as a personality that emerges from his story is a complex one. Perhaps the strongest impression is that of a man with raw courage and an overweening ambition, but with a hair-trigger, explosive temper that often got him into trouble. In his first tour in Vietnam, for example, as a captain and a MACV advisor, Schwarzkopf blew his stack and got away with flagrant insubordination toward a US Army colonel that should not have gone unnoticed. He wasn't even verbally reprimanded by his senior in the MACV advisory chain of command. During the Grenada intervention of 1983, now Major General Schwarzkopf lost his cool and threatened to court-martial a Marine colonel in a situation that could have been better handled with

a little finesse. During the Persian Gulf crisis, General Schwarzkopf owes much to General Colin Powell, the JCS Chairman, who served as an indispensable buffer in Washington, keeping Schwarzkopf and his famous temper from damaging relations with the Secretary of Defense and the President, not to mention shaking their confidence in him.

To complete the portrait, it should be added that Schwarzkopf is a superb briefer, talented speaker, and consummate actor. Although he apparently does not care for the media and goes out of his way to keep them out of his hair, he knows how to use television effectively and can con the media when he has to. But above all, Schwarzkopf is a charismatic leader who was favored by Lady Luck and knew how to exploit good fortune.

Although it is fortunate that this book was written while things were still fresh in Schwarzkopf's mind, it still leaves some unanswered questions. One hopes that after he has had time to reflect and mellow, he will sit down and write a more contemplative sequel, or at least an article or two. Meanwhile, here are some lingering, unanswered questions to ponder. They are not intended to detract from Schwarzkopf's brilliant record in the US Army, but rather to bring to light important areas that for reasons unknown were not addressed in the book.

- *Grenada, 1983:*

Overall joint planning for Urgent Fury, as the operation was called, was apparently finished at Headquarters CINCLANT with all major commanders present. What guidance did the JCS provide? How were special operations melded into the plan? Were they conducted independently from the main H-Hour show? How were they coordinated with the main operations plan? Who had ultimate responsibility for determining their feasibility? (Most of these pre-H-Hour operations failed, resulting in a bad beginning for the main event.) What were the major planning lessons?

Why wasn't an individual designated in advance to take command of the various ground forces—82d Airborne, Marines, Rangers, Special Forces, etc.—after they had been inserted on land? (This is normal joint and service doctrine.) In Grenada, after the JTF Commander, Vice Admiral Metcalf, had in effect made Major General Schwarzkopf his deputy commander, why didn't the latter take over ashore? He roundly criticizes the 82d Airborne Division for being slow and timid in its advance on its objectives—why didn't he assert himself and get the 82d moving?

- *Desert Shield, 1990:*

General Schwarzkopf's command, CENTCOM, had a good grasp of the situation in the region just before Iraq invaded Kuwait in early August 1990 and indeed had predicted the invasion, but did not believe that Saddam would seize all of Kuwait. However, why did CENTCOM and the intelligence

community so grossly overestimate Iraq's military capabilities? Mere size and numbers of troops, tanks, aircraft, etc. are meaningless in themselves. As any student of military history knows, time and again far smaller forces have decisively defeated much larger enemy forces. What counts is the *quality*—the fighting heart and will of an army. For several decades, Israel with much smaller forces had decisively defeated any combination of Arab forces opposing her. The question of quality applied in spades in the case of Iraq, greatly weakened by enormous casualties during its eight-year war with Iran, a conflict that had indeed demoralized Iraqi forces. Why then did the United States make the Iraqis out to be ten feet tall? In the event, the Iraqi air force declined to fight and even the vaunted Republican Guard was no match for US forces. How could Iraq possibly be expected to vie successfully with the world's only superpower reinforced with strong allied contingents? Moreover, how could Iraq possibly be a nuclear or chemical threat to the United States? Saddam was *not* crazy enough to use such weapons, assuming in the first place that he had the capability to deliver any, knowing full well that US retaliation would be devastating. In sum, it seems reasonably clear, not just in hindsight, but with the knowledge of Iraqi capabilities possessed at the time, that the United States could have decisively defeated Iraq with a smaller force buildup and accomplished this at an earlier date and at lesser cost.

• *Desert Storm, 1991:*

In hindsight, it does seem clear that the 100-hour ground battle was ended prematurely when our top leaders in Washington, feeling the heat of public pressure to stop the "wanton killing" of the enemy, persuaded General Schwarzkopf to agree to a cease-fire before he could be reasonably certain of the destruction of the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf had exhorted his forward battle commanders to make every possible effort to assure total destruction, emphasizing that anything less was not acceptable. Yet at the crucial moment, General Schwarzkopf gave in and agreed to a cease-fire at a time when only a few more hours might have allowed his field commanders, all of whom wanted to press the attack, to accomplish their mission. Perhaps Schwarzkopf was influenced by the possibility that our Arab allies might not like to see the Iraqis crushed to the point of upsetting the balance of power in the region. But the fact remains that some half of the Republican Guard escaped, leaving Saddam still entrenched in power. In any event, hopes for a decisive military victory, which had been within the grasp of US forces, appear to have been thwarted. Only time will tell how this outcome is to be judged. It was not the first time, however, that political considerations have taken precedence over military objectives.

Finally, have our armed services thought long and hard enough about the role of air assets in this particular, perhaps unique, case? Blinded by US multi-service air power and immobilized by an unrelenting air attack, Iraq

could not maneuver her forces and in effect was almost helpless. What are the implications for all US services in the future, not only with respect to their roles and missions, but also for service and joint operational doctrine?

In Conclusion

In the opinion of this reviewer, there is one major flaw in the book—the absence of any strategic overview that puts things in a larger perspective. In referring to the Vietnam War, for example, General Schwarzkopf seems unaware that the President, not the military chiefs, decided the policy on how the United States would fight the war. From the beginning, starting with President Truman and followed by five successive American Presidents, the decision was to support South Vietnam, but to avoid expanding the conflict; later, when US forces were committed, we were to fight in effect a limited war. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union, a superpower, and by China; the risk of another world war was very real. South Vietnam, outmanned and outgunned by the North, could not have survived without outside assistance. Had the United States not committed major ground forces in 1965, South Vietnam would have disappeared as an independent state that year. By the same token, had the Soviet Union opposed military action against Iraq in 1990, there would have been no UN ultimatum against Iraq, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm would not have occurred. In other words, there is a vast strategic difference between the 25-year struggle in Vietnam and the six-month crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Pursuing this strategic vein, in the broad sweep of history that occurred during the four-decade period between World War II and the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies succeeded in containing the Soviet Union and in preventing any major territorial communist gains other than China. The presence of NATO forces in Europe, and the prosecution of the Korean and Vietnam wars, were together largely responsible for this triumph of the Free World. Thus it can be said with conviction that the sacrifices of our young men and women in those two distant wars were *not* in vain. Sooner or later, the American people will come to this realization. Schwarzkopf's book would have served readers better had he paused at the end of his distinguished 35-year military career to link our post-World War II conflicts into a coherent geostrategic *weltanschauung*.

The United States remains blessed with unsurpassed young American men and women in our armed forces who will carry out the orders of their Commander-in-Chief with no questions asked and without complaint. Likewise, our country continues to produce leaders worthy of the trust of our fighting forces. Indeed, these young people serving in our armed forces know what the motto, "Duty, Honor, Country," truly means. And so does General Schwarzkopf. □

The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare

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External events are stimulating our armed forces to think creatively about the future. Although the services are focusing primarily on how to cope with force reductions, the prospect of dramatically smaller forces should also prompt the military to think about ways to improve and increase capability to help offset loss of mass and combat power. Maneuver warfare is one way to increase combat effectiveness without increasing force size or budget outlays. However, many sincere and knowledgeable professionals view maneuver warfare with skepticism.

This essay seeks to clarify and refine the maneuver warfare debate. Many prominent figures, both in and out of uniform, have expressed reservations about maneuver warfare. Their criticisms deserve a substantive response. If the times do indeed demand fundamental change, the price of failure requires the most searching examination before we move to replace current methods and theories of war with new ones.

Much of the criticism of maneuver warfare does not seem to be based on a careful reading and analysis of maneuver warfare as a body of thought or set of concepts. In the past decade, a number of erroneous conclusions were drawn about maneuver which are now commonly accepted as fact. To fairly judge maneuver warfare on its merits, it is necessary to address some of these common misconceptions or "myths" which surround it. First, however, before addressing these misconceptions, it may be useful to inquire into the basic assumptions which inform the maneuver warfare argument.

Assumptions

For many military professionals, the label "maneuver warfare" itself evokes a certain measure of hostility. This is a product of the contentious debates of a decade ago, when the so-called "military reform movement" took

on the military establishment and asked it to revisit what was widely perceived to be a uniquely American style of war.¹ In the views of the military's critics and many historians, the American approach to war focused on a few simple themes: mass, fires, an overwhelming logistical effort, and a centralized and relatively methodical approach to battle²—or, aggregately, what we can call “attrition” warfare.

The first assumption, then, is that attrition warfare has been the American style of war. Of course, American forces have not always sought victory through massed fires and overwhelming force. We have had our share of Anthony Waynes, Nathan Bedford Forrests, Ranald S. Mackenzies, and George C. Pattons. But these outstanding American fighters were remarkable, perhaps, precisely because they departed from the military norms of the day. Yet, if one looks closely, it is possible to see in them and in others the outlines of a different way to fight, another way to look at war.

A second basic assumption, AirLand Battle doctrine notwithstanding, is that the emphasis on massed fires and the linear battlefield still retains a powerful hold on the institutional consciousness of the American military. The historical record supports this view, and so does a review of our performance at the National Training Center. Moreover, a first look at the analyses coming out of the Gulf War suggests that “victory through superior firepower” remains central to the American way of war.³ At least empirically, there is much to suggest that the physical destruction of the enemy by massed fire systems remains central to our style.⁴

A third assumption is that the American military is capable of evolutionary and even revolutionary change in its approach to war, contrary to the views of some detractors. We are not necessarily wedded to techniques, doctrines, and routines which descend from our defining experiences in northwest Europe in 1944, or the amphibious campaigns in the Pacific, or the strategic bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan.⁵ All militaries change over time. In the coming decade we may have no choice but to change, to

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reach out for new concepts which offer hope of maximizing the capabilities of what all agree will be a much smaller military establishment.

Such change is necessary and normal and natural. But what kind of change will it be? We have already begun to look at this question and attempt to formulate some answers. Before his retirement, General John Foss at the US Training and Doctrine Command published a series of papers which described a different kind of battlefield. He foresaw a future battlefield characterized by smaller forces, greater lethality, more mobility, and increasing complexity, and he called it the nonlinear or fluid battlefield.⁶

Against credible opponents, an ordered or methodical view of the battlefield probably will not reflect reality—if it ever did. As Clausewitz argued so tellingly a century and a half ago, the battlefield is a place of friction, of chaos and uncertainty, of error and bad weather and missed opportunities. Those who believe otherwise—and there are many these days who see perfect transparency and perfect target acquisition just over the horizon—are engaging in an old, familiar game. They see, in the next technological advance, or perhaps in the next doctrine, a way to bring about what all combat leaders desperately want: a tactical and operational universe that is ordered and understandable. They want a linear battlefield.

There may be times when the battlefield assumes a linear character. But even if this is so, we can be confident that the human dimension of battle will retain its traditional importance despite the age of rapid technological change. This is not to suggest that technology is not of great importance in war. But an emphasis on technology that neglects the role of human factors is fundamentally misplaced.

If the world is fated to remain a dangerous place (and all militaries are founded on the supposition that it is) and if the battlefields of the future continue to be dominated by friction and a relative absence of order, how can a smaller, less-robust force prevail? Maneuver warfare provides one promising answer. In its exploitation of the fluid nature of modern war, its recognition of friction, and its potential for rapid victory without the high casualties and enormous consumption of wealth which can attend modern war, maneuver warfare offers one answer to an increasingly compelling dilemma.

The Mythology of Maneuver

Keeping in mind these assumptions and observations, let us examine the more common criticisms of maneuver warfare.

- *Myth-Number 1: Maneuver warfare is nothing more than another set of rules.* All theories are based on a set of organizing concepts. For maneuver warfare, these include: emphasis on how to think, not what to do; targeting the opponent's will to resist, not just his physical resources; a preoccupation with decisive battle; and the application of strength against weakness.

However, it is difficult to find a school of thought that argues so strongly against set rules as a guide to battlefield behavior. This does not mean that AirLand Battle imperatives or the principles of war, for example, should be ignored or that they are unimportant. It does mean that all rules, principles, precepts, or whatever we may choose to call them are meaningless except in the context of the present operation.

Combat situations cannot be solved by rules. The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form new patterns of physical encounter. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be approached on its own merits.⁷

Maneuver warfare eschews absolute rules absolutely. At Chancellorsville, Lee divided his force and divided it again, trusting to speed, deception, and a certain moral ascendancy over Hooker to retrieve his exceedingly dangerous situation. At Tannenberg, the Germans left a single cavalry division to oppose the Russian First Army while redeploying three full corps southward to envelop and crush Samsonov. They took the principles of concentration on the one hand and economy of force on the other to new heights. They did not think along methodical, tidy lines as Montgomery or Hodges might have done, but instead reckoned that the intangibles—speed, resolution, shock, and the enemy's lack of imagination—would work in their behalf. At Chancellorsville and Tannenberg, the situation, not the rules of the game, was supreme.

Maneuver warfare preaches the futility of formulaic rules more strongly than any theory of war. It is based on an intellectual tradition which stresses "how to think," not "what to do." The use of strength against weakness to break the enemy's will is the analytical framework which provides a guide to action. Possession of experience, talent, intelligence, will—and, above all, character—is the precondition for applying this thought process to local conditions. These essential characteristics distinguish those who can adapt the principles of war to the local situation and win, from those who will apply them by rote and lose—or win at great and unnecessary cost.

• *Myth Number 2: Maneuver warfare exalts the bold thrust while ignoring firepower.* Understanding the relationship of fire to maneuver is central to understanding war. Fundamentally, this relationship is not a function of the relative "quantity" of one vis-à-vis the other. Despite direct quotations from the literature stating unequivocally that "the importance of firepower in maneuver warfare cannot be overemphasized,"⁸ critics persist in the belief that maneuverists ignore or neglect the role of fires.

It is time to put this charge to rest. Armies fight with fires. Period. But some armies emphasize the use of massed fires to physically destroy

enemy forces for the purpose of assisting maneuver units in the occupation of terrain. Other armies use discrete fires to facilitate decisive maneuver against weak points in order to cause the collapse and disintegration of the enemy forces. Some armies do both, whether by accident or not. But generally speaking, armies fight in the spirit of the former—as France did offensively in 1914 and defensively in 1940, and as we did in Korea and Vietnam—or in the spirit of the latter—as reflected in the operating styles of the *Wermacht*, the Israeli Defense Force, and the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong.

What is different in maneuver warfare is the *relationship* between fire and maneuver. In maneuver warfare, the object of maneuver is not to position fires for the ultimate destruction of the enemy. Ideally, fires are used to create conditions which support decisive maneuver—that is, movement of combat forces in relation to the enemy so as to destroy his will to resist. In the 1973 and 1982 wars, the Israeli Defense Force used battalion-sized units as a base of fire to support maneuver by other forces moving to deliver a decisive blow. But overall they possessed many fewer artillery systems and tanks than their opponents.⁹

Local conditions (for example, a holding operation) may dictate something different. But under normal circumstances the technique of choice should be decisive maneuver supported by fires, and not the reverse. Armies that emphasize maneuver will require a lesser degree of fire support because the objective is not the physical annihilation of enemy forces and equipment. Instead of the brute massing of fires, concentration and timing become the keys to effective fire support. Fire systems must of course exist in reasonable numbers, but it should not be necessary to overwhelm the enemy with artillery. It is illuminating that large numbers of massed fire systems breed in the Army's institutional mind a confidence that our maneuver capability does not.

• *Myth Number 3: Maneuver warfare is inconsistent with American military culture.* This is a favorite bromide with many critics who argue that America's predilection for "industrial" warfare is a cultural imperative. It can be summarized in the quaint allegation that the American military won't change because it can't.¹⁰

Whether or not this critique seems supported by history, we cannot conclude that other armies have somehow cornered the market on such qualities as boldness, initiative, decisiveness, or strategic and operational vision, leaving none for the plodding Americans. We rapidly absorb new technologies. Racial and gender integration in the Army and impressive progress in joint and combined doctrine demonstrate our capability to move beyond entrenched organizational routines. And so far as our own history is concerned, it yields abundant evidence of our propensity for innovation, flexibility, and initiative. These virtues remain an integral part of our organizational culture. They refute

the charge that American soldiers are hostage to a historical determinism that denies them the capacity for progress and change.

As an institution we have shown ourselves capable of absorbing the lessons of the past and applying them to the present. There is no reason why a military as professional as ours, with the kind of intellectual resources we dispose and the caliber of soldiers and leaders we can boast, should remain wedded to the practices of the past. If we as a profession see a path to a better way, our reach need not exceed our grasp.

- *Myth Number 4: Maneuver warfare promises bloodless war.* In conventional conflicts, the ideal outcome is the rapid collapse of the opponent without protracted combat. The United States and its coalition partners achieved such an outcome in the Gulf War, it can be argued, largely through the application of maneuver warfare at the operational level of war. But in a contest between rival states, where the contending parties are roughly equivalent and armed with modern, lethal weaponry, maneuver warfare promises no free ride.

The 1866 Prussian-Austrian War, the 1940 invasion of France, and the 1967 Six Day War each brought about the humiliation of worthy foes by rivals of approximately equal strength. In each case victory was achieved quickly and decisively. But these victories were not bloodless. Some victorious units suffered terribly, and strategic success overshadowed many tactical defeats and reverses. No doctrine, no methodology, no art can fairly promise overwhelming victory without cost.

Yet these three campaigns stand out in military history as brilliant examples of what can be accomplished through the dislocation in time and space of an opponent otherwise equal in numbers and weaponry. By avoiding known enemy strengths and striking at sensitive and vulnerable centers of gravity, the victors achieved the collapse and disintegration of their opponents' field forces in short order. They avoided a protracted series of debilitating battles, each with its inevitable casualties through grinding exhaustion, sanguinary fire, and head-on collisions with enemy force. While no war is bloodless, maneuver warfare offers the possibility of reduced casualties through the rapidity of operational and strategic success.

- *Myth Number 5: There is no such thing as attrition warfare.* One sometimes hears that no such school as attrition warfare actually exists, and thus that maneuver warfare throws its intellectual punch at empty air. Certainly there are few advocates of attritional warfare as such. Remembering the awesome meatgrinder campaigns like the Somme of World War I, few soldiers or commentators are willing to step forward and say with pride, "I am an attritionist." But there is a mass of historical data pointing to the existence of an endemic focus on firepower and attrition at the expense of maneuver.

Only in the past decade has published doctrine explicitly addressed this imbalance, and we cannot yet know how well we have absorbed the

philosophy of AirLand Battle. While its outlines seem clearly visible in Operation Desert Storm at the operational level of war, at the tactical level combat very much resembled traditional smash-mouth warfare, with huge quantities of firepower being poured on enemy formations in lieu of maneuver.

This is not necessarily a bad thing if our forces can quickly switch doctrinal gears in circumstances where such techniques are not effective. The historical record suggests, however, that many American commanders, with notable exceptions, could not. A maneuver-focused force can adapt when faced with equal or superior firepower. A mass-focused force cannot.

It is perfectly true that there is no systematically articulated or codified theory of attrition warfare. Yet the continuing outlines of an industrial approach to war, decade after decade and conflict after conflict, suggest that the mass vs. maneuver debate is both relevant and real.

• *Myth Number 6: Maneuver warfare is "just fighting smart."* Certainly there is nothing new or even particularly original about maneuver warfare. What is new is the attempt to organize successful concepts from the past around a unifying theme and then articulate that theme so it can be understood and applied more readily. Ardant Du Picq warned that while technology changes, human nature, and its influence in battle, does not. And while use of maneuver is indeed fighting smart, it is a whole lot more.

Most leaders have been schooled to solve battlefield problems through the application of techniques and a standard repertoire of tactical solutions. These solutions presuppose near-perfect control. The desire for control is nothing more than a natural desire to impose order on disorder. When we lunge for a flank we are trying to do the same thing. We have been taught that flanks are vulnerable places and we should go for them, thus imposing "order" on war by rule.

The problem is that often flanks are not vulnerable, as the Germans discovered to their chagrin at Kursk. The ability to discern strength from weakness is not a programmed response. It is largely an art, developed by years of thinking about such things, and it is mastered by some better than others. But it is, in fact, an intellectual discipline, practically derived.

In battle, many leaders will do one of two things. They will bring heavy fires to bear and attack frontally, or they will suppress the enemy and maneuver to a flank. Both options are conditioned responses. They reflect patterned behavior. When and if they succeed, we call it "fighting smart." Neither response, however, is based upon a bona fide thought process. Most leaders use the commander's estimate, the staff planning process, and mission analysis to plan an operation. While these are useful and necessary mental checklists, they are at best a mechanical planning process—a way to organize one's time and ensure the completion of necessary planning tasks—but not a true thought process. They do not provide a mental framework for the analysis

and solution of battlefield problems. They do not represent a theory or philosophy of warfighting, unless we consider the reduction of warfare to target lists, phase lines, and timetables a philosophy.

What, then, is the thought process he should employ? At a crude level, the process goes something like this: identify a decisive weakness, find or make a gap, ruthlessly exploit it, and continue to do so until the enemy collapses. The means used to do this—fires, maneuver, reconnaissance, intelligence, the will and vision of the commander, the courage and initiative of subordinates—are means to achieve the enemy's collapse. They are not ends in themselves. The terms we use are not important (for convenience I call it "maneuverist," but other terms could serve). What is important and defining is the thought process behind the methodology and the results achieved.

- *Myth Number 7: Maneuverists see maneuver as an end in itself.* This is a persistent claim whose origin is difficult to trace. Presumably it is a response to the label "maneuver warfare" and to criticism directed against the promiscuous use of firepower. A close reading of military history and of maneuver literature, however, quickly reveals the true end of maneuver operations.

Running throughout the memoirs of successful German generals of the First and Second World Wars is a preoccupation with decisive action. One cannot read Von Mellenthin, Von Manstein, Rommel, or Guderian without being struck by the constant emphasis on the decisive battle. Whereas attrition or industrial warfare "seeks battle under any or all conditions, pitting strength against strength to exact the greatest toll from the enemy,"¹¹ maneuver warfare seeks battle only under advantageous conditions *where a decisive result can be achieved*.

This obsession with forcing a decision is the defining characteristic of maneuver warfare. It undoubtedly descends from the experiences of the Prussian, German, and Israeli armies, which, when faced with superior numbers and enemies on all sides, developed a theory of war to compensate for numerical inferiority with intellectual and moral vigor. These armies could not afford to become locked in attritional exchanges where mass could dominate. Instead, they sought to create conditions where speed, tempo, focus, and initiative could be used to score a knockout.


These armies and others like them did not see maneuver as an end in itself, nor do maneuverists tout maneuver as an end in itself. To seek and gain the decision—as rapidly, vigorously, and economically as possible—is the true end of battles and campaigns. The Marine Corps' doctrinal discussion of the conduct of war in its principal warfighting manual captures the essence of maneuver warfare simply and succinctly: "This is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary."¹²

- *Myth Number 8: We're already doing maneuver warfare.* This claim derives from the publication of doctrinal materials, chiefly the Army's FM

100-5, *Operations*, and the Marine Corps' FMFM1, *Warfighting*, and FMFM1-1, *Campaigning*, which incorporate a number of themes commonly associated with maneuver warfare. This doctrinal incorporation of maneuver concepts and thinking continues in the pending revision of FM 100-5, supported by other doctrinal publications and discussion in professional military journals.

Our recent experiences with armed conflict in Panama and Kuwait suggest that we may have grasped maneuver warfare at the operational level but not at the tactical. Furthermore, there is much to suggest that technology, among other things, will make maneuver warfare at the tactical level even less likely to take hold in the American military.¹³ And while maneuver warfare at the operational level of war represents a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the American military in the field, its absence at the tactical level forces us back to the familiar paradigm of mass and fires—whether or not this approach can work in a given theater, against a given opponent, or at a given point on the spectrum of conflict.

What is the evidence that the United States practiced maneuver warfare operationally during Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm? The strongest indicator in both cases was an evident determination to strike swiftly at an identified center of gravity and avoid force-on-force engagements with large enemy units, except on favorable terms. A distinctive feature in both operations was the attempt to stun or paralyze the enemy's ability to command



VII Corps SGM Martin Shupe

Abrams tanks and other armored vehicles speed north into Iraq during Desert Storm. "Our recent experiences . . . suggest that we may have grasped maneuver warfare at the operational level but not at the tactical."

and control his forces—to shock the enemy's nervous system at the outset and prevent a coordinated response. In both campaigns, the operational plan sought to create conditions that would force a decision quickly, without the need for extended combat.¹⁴

At the tactical level, however, American forces seem to have performed in the traditional manner. US soldiers were well trained and fought courageously. Their leaders proved themselves masters of the art of coordinating fire support, movement, and logistics. Allied officers serving in the Gulf were stunned at the ability of large US heavy forces to organize for combat and mass overwhelming combat power. One British officer observed: "At the big-unit level the Americans are simply not to be believed. Only a fool would get in their way."¹⁵

While US forces may have carried traditional methods, techniques, and doctrine to new heights, they have not absorbed maneuver warfare at division level and below. Command and control remained rigidly centralized. Units moved in strict conformance to planned control measures. Fire control of artillery and close air support was consolidated at high levels; much was planned in advance.¹⁶ Units moved primarily to mass fire systems against enemy forces and expressed a clear preference for the use of fires over maneuver.

These methods worked well against a passive enemy. But they do not reflect the spirit of AirLand Battle doctrine at the tactical level, and they do not reflect a conceptual grasp of maneuver warfare.

• *Myth Number 9: Maneuverists have failed to define their terms.* This myth is sometimes colorfully packaged, as in the following: "Many discussants held that reformers had done their cause a great disservice by failing to identify and clarify the most significant empirical referents of the maneuver notion."¹⁷ This kind of criticism is effective for at least two reasons. First, it deflects discussion from the real issues. Even though first-order concerns ("Is there substance to the critique of attrition?") and basic terms ("Maneuver is purposeful movement in relation to the enemy")¹⁸ are well defined, haggling over questions of precise definition, particularly when the critics do not agree among themselves on the definitions of many common terms, trivializes the debate. Second, the charge of "lack of clarity and precision" often masks an unfamiliarity with the literature or a failure to grasp the essentials of the maneuver warfare argument.

The study of war becomes more useful and relevant as its students strip away the peripheral to come to grips with the true nature of human conflict. Real progress becomes possible only to the extent that students and practitioners of the military art can focus on this essential concern objectively. Soldiers and scholars (as well as those who are both) have important roles to play in what is fundamentally a dynamic, Hegelian process. Neither has a monopoly on the truth.

By now, the important assumptions and the organizing concepts of maneuver warfare are well known and well articulated. There is a substantial body of literature on the subject and no lack of advocates and critics on both sides of the issue. Experts may disagree on the validity or applicability of maneuver warfare as a theory of war. But the charge that it has never been adequately defined is thin indeed.

- *Myth Number 10: If you've never done it, you can't theorize about it.* Regrettably, many of the early debates about maneuver warfare focused on personalities. While civilians and academics charged senior military leaders with lacking a real understanding and historical grasp of their profession, military professionals responded with harsh criticism of the reformers' lack of combat experience and understanding of the realities of modern warfare. In the exchange, both sides sometimes failed to listen to the other; both missed opportunities to further the study of the profession.

No civilian theorist or historian-unbloodied by fire can answer the charge that he lacks practical experience in war. No officer who has never marched to the sound of guns can rebut the criticism that he has not commanded troops in combat. Nevertheless, the charges laid against such thinkers are criticisms of individuals, not of their intellectual contributions to the debate. These latter must stand or fall on their own merits, not on the resumes of their proponents.

Military history is replete with examples of outstanding military figures, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, Wade Hampton, and Joshua Chamberlain, who possessed a flair for command but lacked practical experience or professional training. Others, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ardant du Picq, Liddell Hart, and Clausewitz himself, distinguished themselves as outstanding military theorists despite a lack of impressive credentials as wartime commanders. Their example suggests that it is vigorous debate carried on in a collegial and constructive manner—and not ad hominem barbs at the participants—that is most essential to the furtherance of the military art.

Conclusion

In this decade, budget realities and a rapidly changing strategic environment¹⁹ place extreme pressures on the military services. The motto of an earlier day—"More bang for a buck!"—may well regain its currency. But a smaller, poorer military might not be able to squeeze much more performance out of the force without changing some of the rules. The time is right to take a hard look at changing the rules—by looking at ways to improve the capabilities of those forces that survive the deep cuts which now appear inevitable.

It is natural to view the current organizational climate as a time of crisis. But it may also provide striking potential for positive change. Fundamen-

tally, maneuver warfare is not about personalities or politics. It is about a better way to fight. It deserves mature consideration and reflection as we look at the defining challenges and opportunities that await us in the coming century.

NOTES

1. A partial list of well-known figures who comment on American preference for mass and firepower includes Russell Weigley, S. L. A. Marshall, Max Hastings, Michael Michaelis, Samuel Huntington, T. R. Fehrenbach, John English, Arthur Hadley, Robert Doughty, and William Lind. J. F. C. Fuller was perhaps most outspoken in denouncing the American style of warfare as "ironmongery."
2. See Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), and Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976," *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 1 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1979).
3. *The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington: Department of Defense, April 1992) provides a good general overview of the Gulf War. The author also bases this conclusion on numerous interviews, personal conversations, and written correspondence with a large number of Army and Marine Corps officers from the ranks of captain to lieutenant general. Analyses of tactical methods used in the Gulf War support the view that American emphasis on firepower and attrition is alive and well: "Maneuver commanders directed that when lead maneuver elements detected an Iraqi position, the artillery was to stop and plaster it with devastating fire. The object was to pound them to jelly." Paul F. Pearson and Glenn K. Otis, "Desert Storm Fire Support," *Association of the United States Army Landpower Essay Series*, No. 91-2, June 1991, p. 1.
4. "I saw the US mass firepower better than any other nation in the world. . . . Maneuver merely got our firepower assets into position to annihilate the Iraqis, whether on the ground or during the preparatory air offensive—it's the American way—in spite of AirLand Battle Doctrine!" Letter from a field-grade armor officer who participated in the 1991 Gulf War.
5. Carl Builder, *Masks of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989).
6. See Stephen Silvasy, Jr., "AirLand Battle Future: The Tactical Battlefield," *Military Review*, 71 (February 1991), 3.
7. *Infantry in Battle* (Washington: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), p. 1.
8. William S. Lind and M. D. Wyly, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 21.
9. Interview with Colonel Giora Eiland, Israeli Defense Force, January 1986.
10. Samuel Huntington, "Playing to Win," *The National Interest* (Spring 1986), 8-16.
11. US Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, FMFM1 (Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1989), p. 28.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
13. See Robert Leonhard's *Art of Maneuver* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991), p. 120.
14. The Department of Defense official after-action report for Desert Storm cites the following statement of commander's intent, published by Commander-in-Chief Central Command prior to the commencement of the offensive ground campaign: "Maximize friendly strength against Iraqi weakness and terminate offensive operations with the Republican Guard Forces destroyed and major US forces controlling critical lines of communications in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations." See *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, p. 317.
15. Interview with a British troop commander of the 17/21st Lancers detached for service with the British armored division in the Gulf War, 27 July 1991.
16. A number of field-grade officers interviewed for this paper reported that in the Gulf their battalion commanders were unable to call for artillery fires, as fires were planned or reserved for use at higher levels. See also Leonhard, p. 286: "From my own observations and my interviews with officers from the 3d Armored Division, 24th Mechanized Division, 1st Armored Division, and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, battalions in battle had virtually no integrated fire support during the four-day operation."
17. "The Military Reform Debate," *Final Proceedings: Senior Conference XX* (West Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy, 1982), p. 37.
18. Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987), p. 93.
19. For a discussion of the shift in national security paradigms, see the author's "The Future of Conventional Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, 45 (Summer 1992), 78-88, with Ricky L. Waddell. See also *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, August 1991).

Recasting the Flawed Downsizing Debate

DENNIS M. DREW

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Everyone has an opinion about the proper size and structure of the US military in the new world order. No one, however, has been able to build a consensus among the key decisionmakers or the public at large. The maneuvering opened after the Berlin Wall came down, with the military proposing a 25-percent force reduction and a new "Base Force" organizational scheme.¹ The plan received generally high marks as both workable and practical. In the wake of the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself, Congressman Les Aspin and others have branded the proposed reduction as too timid and out of touch with the changed world.

Representative Aspin bases his vision for the future military on equivalents of Desert Storm, Just Cause, and Provide Comfort. Each of these is an interpretation of the size and structure of forces that led to quick success in, respectively, the Gulf War, the Panama invasion, and the Kurdish relief effort following the Gulf War.² Although a novel concept, Aspin's vision also has received considerable criticism. Other participants in the debate have more radical force reductions in mind. This is particularly true of those who envision the so-called peace dividend as panacea for the multitude of social and economic ills plaguing the nation.

The core issue in the debate is the disappearance of our long-standing principal adversary, the Soviet Union. As a result, the military has felt itself constrained to identify other threats and produce theoretical scenarios that would justify future force structures. This approach is doomed to defeat in the current political environment by those who will brand all potential threats and scenarios either as too pessimistic or as outlandish, self-serving fantasy.

The truth is, the simplistic identification of a principal enemy—the foundation of Cold War military policy—no longer works. It is a systemically flawed procedure based on assumptions that consistently proved wanting even during the Cold War. Further, the vain search for an enemy has so dominated

the defense debate that important issues that should affect the debate have been all but ignored.

What follows is an explication of the flaws in the "traditional" method, a proposal for a more rational approach, and a discussion of some important submerged issues which have not yet been uncovered by the shallow digging of the current debate.

Problems With Threat-Based Force Structure

What is wrong with identifying the enemy as the first step in the traditional defense decision process? The answer is twofold. First, such an approach seeks short-term guidance to solve a long-term problem. International power politics are volatile. Yesterday's adversary becomes tomorrow's ally, and vice versa. But building a competent and effective military organization is a long-term process often extending over decades. Modern armies, navies, and air forces are extraordinarily complex organizations which take considerable time to fashion into effective fighting forces.

Consider, for example, that it requires two years to train a pilot to *minimum* combat proficiency in modern, high-tech aircraft. Yet minimum combat proficiency does not easily translate to victory and generally results in very high casualty rates. Consider the lowly infantryman who, unlike his counterpart in earlier wars, now must master and use some of the most sophisticated equipment imaginable—satellite-based positioning systems and night vision systems, for example. The days in which we could just put a carbine in an infantryman's hands, give him some target practice, and send him off to war have long since passed.

Consider, too, the amount of time it takes to build modern weapon systems. Even discounting research, development, and procurement time (sometimes stretching over a decade), sophisticated aircraft, ships, and tanks take a great deal of time to produce. With the decline in our industrial base, even in an emergency we could not produce these weapon systems with the speed and in the numbers we might have earlier associated with industrial mobilization.

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Finally, consider the time required to educate and season military leaders—both commissioned and noncommissioned officers. War is as much a mental struggle as a physical contest. Educating military officers in the complexities of modern warfare is a time-consuming task. Seasoning those officers to lead forces in battle effectively and confidently or to plan complex military campaigns requires even more time. If this corps of officers does not already exist when the fighting starts, there will be precious little time to produce these leaders.

All of these factors—procurement, training, education, and seasoning—compound the time problem. They explain why it took more than a decade to build from the hollow force of the mid-1970s to the robust force the United States fielded in Desert Storm.

On the other side of the equation is the enemy we identify. Predicting who will be tomorrow's adversary, or where and when the civilian leadership will commit military force, is a risky business. We were not very successful making these predictions even during the Cold War, when we were confident we had accurately identified the enemy.

Consider the following examples. As little as six months before the outbreak of hostilities in 1950, no one in a position of authority, including the Secretary of State, seems to have considered that we might be drawn quickly into a war against North Korea.³ In 1958 few imagined that within a decade over half a million Americans would be fighting the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Who could have imagined in the late 1980s that we would shortly be involved in a major shooting war against Iraq—whom we had supported in its war against Iran? Who could dream we would join a coalition with Syria, a long-time US political adversary?

Two of these examples took place during the height of the Cold War when we had a clearly defined enemy (the Soviet Union) and had assumed from the beginning that the critical flash-point was in Europe. We should remember that beyond the two "hot" wars the United States fought during the Cold War (Korea and Vietnam), we also used or threatened to use force in the Straits of Formosa, Lebanon (twice), Grenada, Panama, and Libya, to name but a few examples. None of these situations directly involved the Soviets, and none took place in Europe. So much for the accuracy of our predictions.

The second problem in basing force structure on a definitively identified enemy is that it promotes worst-case planning based on faulty assumptions. Such was the case during the Cold War. With the Soviets identified as the enemy, the United States built a military establishment to deter or defeat the worst possible case—a nuclear confrontation or an invasion of Western Europe. That was a natural and logical policy. However, implicit in the policy was the general assumption that if we were prepared for the worst case, we were automatically prepared for lesser cases.⁴ The war in Vietnam demonstrated that our military must also be prepared for *different* cases, not

just lesser cases. Although possessing far superior technology and firepower, we were woefully unprepared for the kind of war waged in Vietnam.

Predicting the long-term adversaries of the United States is a difficult, if not impossible, proposition. Moreover, it is a dangerous exercise in that it may leave us unprepared for the kind of conflict actually encountered. The United States needs a longer-term strategy that considers both the unpredictability of international politics and the full range of threats we might face. The key to this strategy is *what* the United States will face rather than *whom*.

Defining the Threat

Even in the face of an uncertain future, we can say with great confidence that the US military must be prepared to deal with three fundamentally different kinds of warfare.⁵ Each requires its own strategy, force structure, operational methods, equipment, and training. The generalized (and clearly oversimplified) descriptions of these kinds of warfare that follow illustrate their fundamental differences.

Conventional Warfare

Americans are most familiar with conventional warfare. In this century the Gulf War, the various Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean War, and both World Wars were prominent examples of conventional warfare. What did these very different conflicts have in common? Operationally they emphasized large-unit operations and a heavy reliance on firepower. Maneuver was based on the mechanized mobility of large units. As with all conventional wars, strategies revolved around perceived "centers of gravity" of the antagonists.⁶ Both sides in each struggle deployed and maneuvered their forces to defend their own centers of gravity and to attack those of the enemy. Each of these struggles continued the trend that has been present for at least the past two centuries in the Western World—strategy, operations, tactics, and technology were designed to bring an enemy's center of gravity under attack faster and more effectively. The military objective in conventional warfare is to bring the struggle to a quick, decisive conclusion.

Insurgent Warfare

Insurgencies are wars of the weak against the strong—of those out of power against those in power. They are revolutionary civil wars generally fought for political control of the state in question. Although there are many insurgent strategies they all have much in common, and they all turn conventional strategies on their collective ear.⁷

Insurgencies use a sophisticated mix of political, economic, psychological, and military operations to drain support away from the government and build support for the insurgents. The military portion of the mix often plays only a supporting role, and therein lies both a dilemma and an advantage.

The insurgent needs to win *either* the non-military or the military struggle to achieve victory. The government must win *both* the military and non-military aspects of the struggle.

Time is a key weapon for the insurgent. Rather than providing quick victory, insurgencies are protracted affairs—every day that the insurgency survives heaps more discredit upon the government. The very survival of an insurgency provides the impression that the government is not in control of its future.

On the military front, guerrilla tactics are the norm for the insurgent because the insurgent generally cannot compete directly with the military forces of the government in power. Guerrilla tactics dictate that insurgent military maneuvers be based on the mobility of the individual soldier rather than the mechanized mobility of large formations.

The most important difference between insurgent and conventional warfare is that the centers of gravity for both sides are the same—the population of the nation under siege. Insurgents cannot survive without significant support from the people, nor can the government. This fact brings into question the basic military strategy of attacking the enemy's center of gravity by putting fire and steel on target.

Nuclear Warfare

Though the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation has significantly subsided, nuclear weapons will not cease to exist and thus their threatening nature will continue. Many commentators have postulated that the spread of nuclear weapons to new potential antagonists will only heighten the threat.

Nuclear warfare is fundamentally different from other types of war on at least two counts. The first is the potential destruction that could result from the detonation of even a single nuclear weapon. As a result, the declared policy of the United States for nearly 50 years has put the deterrence of nuclear warfare as the first national security priority.⁸

Another important difference between nuclear warfare and all other forms of conflict is the ignorance of those who wage it concerning the ultimate consequences. Setting aside the isolated, unilateral strikes against Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of World War II, there has never been a nuclear war. We have no empirical evidence as to what might happen once the first nuclear detonation takes place against an enemy who possesses the means to retaliate in kind. Can escalation be controlled? What would constitute victory? What would bring the enemy to his knees? Why would one use such weapons, given the potential risks? For these and a thousand other questions, ranging from the grand strategic to the tactical, we have no evidence and no answers, only opinions.

Even more troubling is the notion that traditional concepts of deterrence may not apply to some new members of the nuclear club. The Soviet Union was a very good enemy in its day! Deterrence concepts seemed to work. Will they also work against nations that have much less to lose, or against

nations motivated by religious, ethnic, or nationalistic fervor only dimly understood in the West?

Using the Defined Threats

Armed with an understanding of the three fundamental types of warfare with which our military forces may be forced to deal, we can begin to estimate the size and kinds of forces we will need. The most rational approach—in view of the volatility of international power politics—is to analyze each of the types of warfare we may face (conventional, nuclear, insurgency) in the light of those forces extant in the world that could realistically wage a particular type of warfare against us—*no matter who possesses those forces*. The key is what—not who—may cause the problem in an uncertain future.

This approach is not new. Before World War I, the British sized their fleet—which they considered crucial to the maintenance and defense of their global empire—using a similar process. The British policy was to maintain a fleet equal in size to the two next largest fleets combined.⁹ One can argue whether this was a prudent decision. But it was an approach that recognized political volatility. The British policy also recognized that military decisions, particularly those involving navies, are decisions for the ultra-long term. Finally, the two-power standard provided a logical rationale for adjusting the size of the Royal Navy, over time, based on something more than temporary budgeting problems or passing political whims.

A similar example can be found in the construction of the Washington Naval Treaties negotiated during the 1920s. In those instances, the great naval powers established size ratios for their respective navies without reference to specific enemies.¹⁰ Again, whether ultimately successful in their purpose or not, these ratios provided a rationale for force size without regard to current enmities.

The point is, of course, that rational decisions for the long term have been and can be made without identifying specific national actors as the “threat.” That process, however, still leaves the question of the decisions themselves. What guidelines should the United States use to develop a modern version of the British two-power standard? Guidance can be found in some issues that have yet to surface in the public debate.

The Hidden Issues

The shallowness of the debate and its misguided focus on threat identification have prevented discussion of several crucial issues that bear on the problem. These hidden issues fall into four broad categories: lead time, force structure, force quality, and consequences of error.

Lead Time

Time, once squandered, cannot be reclaimed. This is particularly significant to defense policy for at least two reasons. The first has to do with

the peculiar nature of the American democracy. Americans have traditionally viewed war as an aberration in human affairs. As a result, there has often been a reluctance to respond to growing threats. A prime example of this phenomenon took place in 1941 when the world was already in flames. The Germans had overrun western and central Europe. The Soviets reeled under the blitzkrieg. Axis troops rummaged around North Africa and threatened to make the Mediterranean Sea their private lake. Passage through the North Atlantic was hotly contested. In the Pacific, Japan continued its endless war in China and made threatening noises toward the entire Pacific region. Even in the face of these obvious threats, the US House of Representatives managed to pass a renewal of the Selective Service Act by only a one-vote margin. Just over two months later, the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor.

With the demise of the Soviet threat, there is the distinct possibility that we might slip back into the kind of myopia that gripped much of the nation before World War II. It would be foolhardy to base our military preparedness on the assumption that future threats will present themselves unambiguously and that they will conveniently provide a reluctant democracy with enough time to build sufficient forces. Strategic warning is more often lost in the background noise of world affairs, ignored for a variety of reasons, or frittered away in the laborious decisionmaking processes of the US government. Response time is a crucial element, and the ability to respond in time can be heavily influenced by the size and structure of standing armed forces.

The difficulty of recognizing a growing threat and mobilizing the political will to meet it is magnified by the time-related problems discussed earlier. Effective military forces cannot be designed, procured, trained, and educated quickly. A standing force made too small, a shrunken defense industrial base, a reluctance to recognize an emerging threat, and a prolonged decision to react could combine to give an aggressive adversary an insurmountable lead in military capability. The results could be catastrophic. Time, in all its ramifications, must remain a central element in the defense decisionmaking process.

Force Structure

The structure of the future US force is at least equal in importance to its size, but there is insufficient informed discussion of structure in the current debate. Any decision must consider the factor of which kinds of warfare will likely confront us in the future. The strategies, tactics, weapons, training, and organization appropriate for one type of warfare are not necessarily appropriate for the others. The sweeping maneuvers of heavy armored forces would be of little use against insurgents using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics in a jungle. Nuclear-tipped ICBMs may have little effect on the conduct of conventional or counterinsurgent operations.

Another factor influencing force structure is geography. The United States is essentially an island nation with few threats to its territorial integrity.

But the United States has far-flung national interests reaching into virtually every corner of the world. No one can predict which of those interests might become so important in the future that, when threatened, their defense would warrant the use of military force.

At the same time, the American body politic shows some signs of wanting to retrench to Fortress America, or something close to it. If that comes to pass, future employment of American arms will be in far-off places, requiring massive and rapid deployment efforts. An expeditionary armed force in that scenario—one not reliant on forward pre-positioning of troops and equipment—must be highly mobile, quickly transportable, and have large amounts of high-speed, long-range air and sea lift. Further, it should be able to put fire and steel on targets quickly and over extreme distances to discourage, slow down, and possibly defeat an adversary, or to prepare the battlefield for other forces being deployed.

Future force structure is crucially important lest the United States be caught with the wrong force at the wrong time, and unable to get to the right place. Close attention to the kinds of warfare we will face and where we will face them is essential to produce an effective force structure regardless of size.

Force Quality

Adversaries on both sides of the questions concerning the future of the American military probably can agree on one point. Whatever the size of the future force, and whatever its structure, it must be the best—the most effective force person-for-person and weapon-for-weapon in existence. Even with all sides in agreement, however, the quality issue (or non-issue, if you prefer) has significant implications for both the size and structure of the future force. For example, a quality force requires extensive infrastructure (including associated manning and funding) for intense and realistic training, and professional education of its commissioned and noncommissioned leaders. A quality force also requires a robust research and development program to produce superior technology for that force. The proper size of the future force is determined by much more than just soldiers in the field, rubber on the ramp, and keels in the water. The infrastructure of a quality force must be a prominent consideration in the defense debate.

The Consequences of Error

The final hidden issue in the defense debate concerns the consequences of error. Only the consequences of building a future military that is too large have been well vetted. Those consequences are important—money and manpower wasted that could have been better spent on other pressing national needs. But erring on the low side also leads to serious consequences.

The first and most obvious consequence of a too-small, ill-equipped, or ill-structured force is that it would tie the hands of policymakers. They

would find it increasingly difficult to deter threats to our national interests. They would be unable to defeat those who transgress. Indeed, such a predicament would likely encourage transgressions.

Another possible consequence is victory at a high price. This scenario would have US leaders committing forces to the battlefield even though they are too small, ill-equipped, or ill-structured. Many Americans would die unnecessarily—paying the price for errors on the low side—even though US forces managed to carry on and muddle through to eventual victory. This has been the story of American arms for much of the history of this nation. Such was the case in the Civil War, the two World Wars, and the Korean conflict. The ghosts of Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor, Kasserine, and Task Force Smith bear witness to the folly of this traditional US approach to defense policy.

Still another consequence of erring on the low side is a replay of the second, but with an even more tragic outcome. Again Americans would die unnecessarily, but this time in vain—we lose. Some would argue that this is what happened in Vietnam. The United States went to war in Southeast Asia with a military unprepared for the kind of war going on, and then compounded the error with poor decisionmaking at every level. In the future, the consequences for the United States could be much more severe than those stemming from our misadventure in Southeast Asia.

The point is that errors on the low side lead to consequences that are at least as unacceptable as errors made in building and maintaining a military establishment that is too large. This problem needs to be set firmly in the minds of our policymakers and well articulated in the defense debate. A nation that calls itself a superpower must have the armed forces of a superpower.

What Now?

Clearly, the current defense debate must be recast. The new debate framework must take into account the volatility of international politics and juxtapose that reality with the long-term consequences of defense policy decisions. Continuing to focus on the identification of an enemy as the basis for defense policy—i.e., seeking short-term solutions to a long-term problem—will likely result in a future strategy/capability mismatch.

The hidden issues must also come to the fore as primary modifiers to what otherwise might seem a straightforward, almost mathematical calculation. War and peace, victory and defeat, are not engineering problems that can be solved with calculator and computer. Nor can force size and structure decisions be calculated using Desert Storm, Just Cause, Provide Comfort, or any other equivalents. If one could construct such balanced equations, the task of providing for the common defense would indeed be simple. Nor should the reader conclude that the hidden issues discussed here are the only salient variables. This article has discussed only those issues that have been largely

ignored in the current debate. The number of issues that will and should bear on the problem remains imposing.

Of equal importance to recasting the framework of the debate are the participants in the debate. To this point, the informed debate has been among military professionals, politicians, and occasional columnists. We have not brought the public into the process. This is a crucial error. The need for national consensus is paramount when there are so many important competing demands for government resources. Further, the new Administration does not have a clear political mandate and needs broad consensus on issues of such magnitude. If we fail to fashion a national consensus, our plans for the future American military will almost certainly founder under pressure from competing domestic agendas.

NOTES

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: White House, August 1991), particularly p. 31; *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1992), pp. 17-25. For a critique of the Base Force concept see Rep. Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," a presentation to the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992. For a brief analysis of the Base Force concept see Kevin Lewis, "U.S. Force Structure: Post-Gulf, Post-Cold War," Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 8 October 1991.

2. Rep. Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era," unpublished paper released to the press 24 January 1992. Also see the Aspin reference in note 1.

3. In a speech to the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the forward defensive perimeter of the United States—excluding the Korean peninsula. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (rev. ed.; Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p. 18.

4. This concept approached its zenith in the 1950s. During 1956, Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles publicly stated, "It seems logical if we have the strength required for global war we could handle any threat of lesser magnitude." Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson turned opinion into policy when he told Congress in 1957, "We are depending on atomic weapons for the defense of the nation. Our basic defense policy is based on the use of such atomic weapons as would be militarily feasible and usable in a smaller war, if such a war is forced upon us." Quoted in Robert F. Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1967* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 227, 232.

5. The reader should not think that warfare has only three variations. Although there appear to be, at this point in history, three fundamentally different kinds of warfare, there are many variations on these three themes. Nor should the reader confuse tactics (e.g. guerrilla operations, terrorist operations) that are used in many different kinds of war with the kinds of wars themselves.

6. Carl von Clausewitz describes center of gravity in *On War* as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed" (pp. 595-96). He goes on: "The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity. . . . The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive" (p. 619). Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, tr. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).

7. Insurgency is, for most Americans, the most misunderstood form of warfare, and thus I have included a slightly expanded description in the text of the article. For further reference, see Douglas Pike, *PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986).

8. The importance of nuclear deterrence in overall US security strategy is unequivocal. "Even in a new era, deterring nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States," *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 25.

9. The British two-power standard originated in the 1889 Naval Defence Act when the principal pretenders to the supremacy of the Royal Navy were the navies of France and Russia. Later, of course, Germany's rising naval power became a concern. Concerning Germany, the First Sea Lord told the cabinet in 1902, "It is an error to suppose that the two-power standard . . . has ever had reference only to France and Russia. It has always referred to the two strongest naval powers at any given moment." Quoted in Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945* (Boston: Fontana Paperbacks, 1984), p. 139.

10. For concise discussions of the naval treaties concluded during the interwar period, see E. B. Potter, ed., *Sea Power: A Naval History* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 233-34; Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 3-13.

Spears vs. Rifles: The New Equation of Military Power

WAYNE K. MAYNARD

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The overwhelming success of the United States and its coalition partners in the Gulf War of 1991 was a demonstration of raw military power that shocked not just Iraq, but uniformed and civilian pundits worldwide. The efficiency, lethality, and, most of all, ease with which the UN coalition forces destroyed their enemy's ability to resist was unexpected. Iraq, possessor of the fourth largest army in the world and the best modern weapons it could buy, legally or illegally, had every right to anticipate causing heavy casualties to its opponents.¹ On paper, Saddam Hussein's large, battle-tested army and air force should have been a formidable force, able to give even as tough an opponent as the Americans a bloody nose.²

A number of reasons have been put forward for the surprising success of the US-led coalition. Almost all of them are at least partially true. What has been largely ignored, however, is the changed equation of military force demonstrated by the war, and the implications of that change. Almost unnoticed, the technology that drives the science of war has taken a giant leap forward, and the Third World has been left behind. In any conventional conflict in which the United States or any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the change is so significant that we have returned to the military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed with only shields and spears.

The March of Technology

In his book *Technology and War*, Martin van Creveld placed the beginnings of technology's impact on warfare at 2000 B.C. While Bernard and Fawn Brodie used a later point of departure in their survey *From Crossbow*

to *H-Bomb*, the importance of technology on armed conflicts remains a central thesis of the study of war.³ Further, all agree that there can be no stasis—technology marches onward.⁴ The Industrial Revolution marked the start of a continuing trend toward the substitution of firepower mass for manpower mass. This trend toward more and more lethality reached its ultimate exemplification in the detonation of a thermonuclear device by the United States in 1952. But by the early 1960s, such weapons had become so powerful as to render their use in war suicidal against an opponent similarly armed.

As a result, limited non-nuclear war became the focus of world conflict. Technology, while still important, lost much of its luster since the full potential of conventional weapons technology was impossible to demonstrate under the restraints imposed by a superpower rivalry played out in the shadow of nuclear annihilation. True, Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars, and Afghanistan were not without technological refinement, but they provided only glimpses of the total picture of improved conventional war capability.⁵ It was the momentous events of 1989-90 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, by freeing Western democratic states from the fear of Soviet intervention, that truly opened the door to the waging of technological war writ large.

The Gulf War of 1991, amply demonstrating the superiority of Western military technology and manpower, was the first war fought since 1945 free of the Cold War overlay. What remains is to explore the implications of this superiority for future conflict in the conventional arena.

The Third Industrial Revolution

Daniel Bell argues that there have been three technological revolutions.⁶ The first, about two hundred years ago, was the application of steam power to transportation, factory production, and extractive mining. The second, coming a century later, was the spread of electricity, with its implications for manufacturing, chemistry (synthetics, petrochemicals, aluminum), communications (telegraph, radio, TV), and our way of life (lighting, elevators and high-rise buildings, entertainment). The modern world as we know it is thus less than a hundred years old.

While both these revolutions had military implications, it is the third—the burgeoning of electronic applications (including computers, lasers, and robotics)—that is currently driving change in the military sphere. Barely

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30 years old, the third revolution has made the giant leap in military capabilities possible.⁷

The desire to substitute firepower for manpower, or what General James A. Van Fleet in the Korean War termed the desire "to expend fire and steel, not men,"⁸ has been the focus of US weapons acquisition policy at least since the 1920s. This basic American value—a high premium on the lives of our soldiers—led ultimately to an effort to develop an entirely new science of war. Conceived and developed in the 1970s and coming to fruition in the following decade, this approach was part of what former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called the "offset strategy," based on the need to counter the numerical advantages of Soviet forces in any Western European conflict. The aim was not simply to field better weapons than the USSR. Rather, as William J. Perry has pointed out, the offset strategy was intended to give American weapons a systems advantage by supporting them on the battlefield in a manner that greatly multiplied their combat effectiveness.⁹

It was electronics as reflected in the third technological revolution that made the offset strategy work so well in the Gulf War. The offset strategy's success is a direct outgrowth of the marriage between consumer electronics and military research and development. The equipment itself includes such items as the portable computers that manage everything from intelligence data to logistical information, the fire direction computers of the artillery, the communications equipment that ties together the command and control network, the locators tied to global positioning satellites, the navigation systems and bombing computers of USAF aircraft, the laser guidance systems of anti-tank missiles and smart bombs, the internal navigation systems of cruise missiles, and even the software that keeps the computer chips humming.

The key to success lay not just in possessing the equipment—Iraq itself had a great deal of sophisticated military hardware. The key lay rather in the way the hardware was applied.

The Personnel and Training Factors

While the US military is not alone among Western nations in devoting both resources and time to training its combat forces, the American effort is certainly unique in scale. With the creation of the all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War, the United States finally relaxed its hold on the principle of conscription it had long cherished. Although the reasons for the change relate to the trauma of involvement in Southeast Asia rather than rational calculation, the military has nonetheless fully embraced the concept of a professional military.¹⁰ The increasingly complex nature of American weapons, and the systems in which they are employed, require a degree of expertise and teamwork that would have been very difficult to achieve with the personnel turnover associated with the days of the draft.¹¹



VII Corps

Destroyed Iraqi T-72 tanks lie in the desert of northern Kuwait. "On paper, Saddam Hussein's large, battle-tested army . . . should have been a formidable force."

The training of the United States' well-paid and stable AVF has become a priority equal to that of weapons readiness (though one should not underestimate the turbulence in the armed forces being generated by the Selective Early Retirement Boards and other early-release programs incident to the force drawdown). The US Air Force, for instance, regularly conducts highly realistic tactical air warfare exercises in the area around Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. This continuing program incorporates the use of highly classified electronic warfare measures and stealth aircraft, and employs specially prepared and equipped opposing forces.¹² For its part, the Army has created the National Training Center, complete with a Soviet-style aggressor force, in California's Mojave Desert for the exercise of mechanized and armored units. There is a second center in the wooded hills of Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, for light infantry training. The Marine Corps has established its own facility at its base in Twentynine Palms, California—the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center—where it conducts advanced integrated training. The Navy has its now-famous "Top Gun" school for fighter pilots and continues to conduct extensive at-sea training exercises for its ships. In addition, the four services conduct regular joint and combined exercises under the command and control of the various area-specific unified commands.¹³ All such training is both time-consuming and expensive, but as Desert Storm showed conclusively, it pays off handsomely in combat.¹⁴

There is an additional factor to be considered with regard to the qualitative advantage in personnel enjoyed by the West—the ready availability

of technical and scientific education as embedded in modern industrial society itself. While many in America may denigrate their educational system, they do so only in comparison to other advanced industrial countries, not the Third World.¹⁵ Children in Western nations grow up accustomed to a sophisticated technological environment. Their ability to comprehend and employ modern weaponry effectively is taken for granted.¹⁶ There is no shortage of qualified applicants in the United States for aviation or armored vehicle mechanics. Yet most Third World countries must rely on foreign military or civilian technicians for much of their maintenance.¹⁷

As the complexity of weapons and weapon systems inevitably increases, education becomes an ever more important component of national security. The performance of the intelligent, well-trained, and highly competent soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in Operation Desert Storm exemplifies the importance of modern education to a force employing modern weapons. Discussing the interplay of training and modernity, Norman Friedman concludes his book *Desert Victory* with a fascinating lesson:

Third World countries are unlikely to defeat reasonably competently handled First World forces unless they modernize their societies—that is, unless they emerge out of the Third World. Mere purchases of sophisticated weapons will not do. They may have an impact, but only a temporary one.¹⁸

Steel and Fire

Technology and qualitative manpower improvements are thus what have made the offset strategy work. In order to fully understand the changed military equation, however, one must consider several supplementary factors.

The first of these is *mobility*, both strategic and tactical. So far as strategic mobility is concerned, air and sea power make it possible. No other nation on earth can equal the quality or quantity of the ships and transport aircraft of the US Navy and Air Force. Coupled with their overseas bases, which aid deployment, resupply, and protection capabilities, US strategic mobility was unique even before the demise of the USSR.¹⁹ Of course, we still lack sufficient strategic mobility assets to move heavy forces within the timeframe that may be required, but compared to other nations the United States is supreme.

This capability not merely to project power but to sustain it leads to the capability to achieve local air and naval superiority over any opponent.²⁰ This in turn provides free scope for the employment of tactical mobility both on the ground and through the air. With the end of the Cold War, the use of the skies, including space-based assets, is now an American perquisite. In war this translates to the disruption of enemy mobility, command, control, logistics, and intelligence, with attendant degradation of his combat capabilities.²¹

Air power will not win wars by itself, but it does make it easier to deal with the enemy on your own terms. Ditto for sea power, with its air component.²² There are those who say that the Gulf War, owing to the desert terrain, was an ideal environment for capitalizing on American technological supremacy, whereas other regions will not be as hospitable. The jungles of Vietnam and mountains of Afghanistan are often cited as prime examples. Such pessimism ignores several key Gulf War lessons. Air power in Vietnam was employed in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion yet was still devastating to the enemy whenever he was located.²³ Repeatedly it was the deciding factor in battles where US ground forces fought outnumbered, surprised, and even out-gunned. It was also without many of the technological improvements in use today.²⁴

The key part of a modern conventional war air campaign is the establishment of air superiority, which requires destruction of the enemy's air defense system. The Gulf War demonstrated decisively some of the major US improvements in this area. Particularly impressive was the close coordination of air and naval assets, including the use of cruise missiles.²⁵

A second factor in the force equation is *communications, command, control, and intelligence*. Only the Western nations have established a decentralized C³I network.²⁶ It links the elements of air, ground, and sea power, allowing their completely integrated employment. It handles not just tactical and operational instructions, but intelligence and logistical information as well. It converts individual aircraft, ground units, and ships into groups of self-sustaining and coordinated systems, ones that increase advantages and minimize weaknesses. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the new E-8A Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft, which mate high-tech sensors and communications with command personnel, are but two examples of this kind of C³I. Amphibious command ships like the USS *Blue Ridge* (LCC-19), a fleet flagship with a superb array of communications gear, are another.²⁷

A third factor is the sophistication of *munitions*. During the Falklands War, the inability of the Argentinians to properly fuse their simple iron bombs was a major factor in the survival of a number of British ships, greatly influencing the overall outcome.²⁸ Laser-guided artillery shells, TOW and Hellfire anti-tank missiles, heat-seeking air-to-air weapons, and cruise missiles—to mention just a few of our incredibly sophisticated repertoire—can tip the scales in war. But they are expensive, requiring special maintenance and often special testing before use. Though modern munitions are highly effective, they require care and skill that are beyond the ability of many Third World military personnel.

The force-enhancing factors mentioned above are not intended to be all-inclusive, but merely suggestive of how technological changes in the science of war, coupled with basic ingredients like personnel and training,

have given a tremendous advantage to the industrialized nations. Prior to the third technological revolution, advances in warfighting were like links in a chain—the whole being only as strong as the weakest link. The present capabilities of the US and Western militaries are different. The new advantages in conventional military power shown in the Gulf War are more like a woven nylon rope, where each individual strand has its own strength, but together they are stronger than the sum of their parts.

The New Military Balance

Memories of Vietnam bear much of the blame for the failure to recognize key events that foreshadowed the Gulf War. The images of a victorious force of poorly armed and pajama-clad Viet Cong, unbowed by the power of the mighty American Army; the vivid pictures of overloaded US helicopters taking off from the Embassy roof in Saigon only a few steps ahead of the triumphant North Vietnamese; the panic in the faces of US allies left behind—these scenes and more flood the remembrances of a war fought for the wrong reasons, in the wrong way, and in the wrong place. Forgotten is the fact that the US forces never really lost a battle, even when fighting on the enemy's terms. While Vietnam was indeed fought the wrong way for the wrong reasons, it was a defeat of American strategy, not military power.²⁹ Moreover, it was essentially a revolutionary civil war until Tet 1968, not a conventional limited war, and therein lies a crucial difference.

The Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982 presented the first clue that a qualitative difference in technical expertise, manpower, and C³I could have such a significant impact. All these factors were critical to the British success, helping to overcome both geographical disadvantages and near-parity in basic equipment.³⁰ The US actions in Libya in 1986, in Grenada in 1983, and in Panama in 1989 were also significant, for two reasons. On the political side they demonstrated that American presidents had put aside the memories of Vietnam and were willing to act with resolution when sufficiently aroused. These incidents also showed that public support for the use of force could be garnered by quick, decisive effort. On the military side, they were a warning that the United States could achieve tactical surprise and use overwhelming force to subdue and punish an opponent with minimal losses to its own forces.³¹

The Gulf War thus made clear what we should have already known—the military balance had shifted dramatically.

Key Lessons

- *Western industrialized nations need no longer feel helpless in the face of insults from Third World tyrants. Henceforth, despots tweak the lion's beard at their own risk. Access to Western technology and equipment by Third*

World nations is not enough to allow them to compete on the modern battlefield, no matter how much money is spent. Insurgency, terrorism, and various nonviolent forms of political competition may offer opportunities to Third-World nations in conflict with the West, but conventional war does not.

It has been argued that perhaps Saddam Hussein had more to gain from losing the fight than refusing it, since staying in power was his most important goal.³² But even this sort of strategy is increasingly risky. While no one will openly admit targeting a foreign leader, the US attacks on Muammar Gadhafi's compound in Libya in 1986, and the hurried development of special bombs to hit deep bunkers in Baghdad in the last days of the Gulf War, make it clear that enemy "military commanders" are fair game.³³ Tyrants beware.

- *The US strategy for offsetting enemy numerical superiority is successful.* Western equipment works, the people work, the C³I system works, and the whole is indeed stronger than the sum of its parts. That is not to say we have no weaknesses or areas for improvement—the need for more strategic lift comes to mind—but the decisions to invest in technology and people have paid off dramatically.

- *Military power is still useful as a diplomatic tool.* Military force has returned as a tool of diplomacy for the United States. It is a powerful tool. It restored national sovereignty to Kuwait and a balance of power to the Gulf region.

While the threat to the United States and its Western allies has assuredly diminished with the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War itself, as well as more recent events in what was formerly Yugoslavia and parts of the former Soviet Union, have vividly illustrated that the world still faces an uncertain future.³⁴ Thus the need for a continuation of the offset strategy should remain paramount in our thinking. True, the overall size of the American military can safely be cut, but cuts should be made carefully. Reductions in equipment and forces should not be based on the usual method of letting the individual services determine their own needs. They should rather be made on the basis of objective calculation of the forces required to meet present and future threats, arriving at a *systems mix* of air, ground, and naval combat forces, with appropriate inter- and intra-service logistics and C³I supporting complements.

The Clausewitz Factor

There is one final lesson that should be learned from the Gulf War: *Clausewitz was right—military as well as civilian leaders must always be mindful that wars are fought for political ends.* It is time that the cherished American myth of apolitical warfare ended. There are signs that it is. Saddam Hussein still resides in Baghdad because we recognized that a stable Iraq was a desirable political goal. But the bloody and disruptive Shi'ite and Kurdish

rebellions that followed the cease-fire in the Gulf served no possible political or military purpose. Both these incidents were predictable. Both were also counterproductive to the United States' avowed interests of peace and security in the region. The CENTCOM command group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Command Authorities themselves, all so well prepared for battle, were less ready for the peace that followed. In preparing itself for future conflicts, the US military should take this lesson of the Gulf War to heart along with the lessons that cast it in a more flattering light.

Thus in applying the new equation of military power, America's current uniformed leaders need to do what their predecessors have consistently refused to do: recognize the reality of the political aspects of international conflict.³⁵ A good beginning would be to develop and systematically employ doctrinal methods intended to influence what Dennis Drew and Donald Snow call the "better state of the peace," the eventual political outcome rather than simply the immediate military result of wars and battles.³⁶ Even when we are fighting with rifles against spears, Clausewitz's admonition remains unchanged: politics rules.

NOTES

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1991-1992* (London: Brassey's [UK], 1991), pp. 212-13.
2. James W. Pardew, Jr., "The Iraqi Army's Defeat in Kuwait," *Parameters*, 21 (Winter 1991-92), 17.
3. Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War. From 2000 BC to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1989); and Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb. The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1962).
4. Jacquelyn-K. Davis, "Technology and Strategy: Lessons and Issues for the 1990's," *The Annals*, 517 (September 1991), 203.
5. Korea and Vietnam demonstrated the superiority of firepower mass over manpower mass and the increasing importance of tactical air power. The Arab-Israeli conflicts, though always indecisive owing to superpower restraints, showcased several features of mid-intensity conflict: high rates of ammunition expenditures and the importance of logistics, timely resupply, and forward-based maintenance. US air confrontations with Libya in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 and the air strikes over Tripoli in 1986 showed the relative ease with which the American military could dismantle a Third-World country's ostensibly modern military at small cost to itself.
6. Daniel Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," *Daedalus*, 116 (Summer 1987), 11.
7. Donald M. Snow, "High Technology and National Security: A Preliminary Assessment," *Armed Forces and Society*, 17 (Winter 1991), 243-58.
8. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973), p. 91.
9. William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, 70 (Fall 1991), 66-82.
10. James Blackwell, *Thunder In the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pp. 215-20.
11. The problems with conscripted troops in the early 1970s are well-known. See, e.g., Shelby L. Stanton, *The Rise and Fall of an American Army. U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1985), p. 350.
12. "Red Flag," USAF Fact Sheet 83-41 (Washington: Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, December 1983).
13. See Perry, p. 78; Blackwell, p. 218; and Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait* (Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 244-45.
14. Perry, p. 68.
15. For a discussion of some of the many current problems facing the Third World, see John Chipman "Third World Politics and Security in 1990: 'The World-Forgetting. By the World-Forgot'?" *Washington Quarterly*, 14 (Winter 1991), 151-68.

16. Friedman, pp. 249-51.
17. US sources indicated that Iraq had over 1000 Soviet "advisors" when Desert Shield began, the bulk of whom were probably maintenance personnel. They were withdrawn prior to Desert Storm. See Graham E. Fuller, "Moscow and the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 70 (Summer 1991), 60.
18. Friedman, p. 251.
19. Though the USSR had substantial capabilities prior to its breakup. See IISS, *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp. 12, 30.
20. Friedman, pp. 85-94, gives an evaluation of some of the advantages conveyed by sea power. In the area of logistics, sea power can be especially critical.
21. Pardew, pp. 18-20.
22. There are some who have argued that the Navy and/or USAF might have been able to win the war by themselves if they had been allowed to prosecute it in their own way. James Blackwell terms this a "bogus debate" (Blackwell, p. 222), while Norman Friedman notes "the air campaign could prepare the battlefield, but it could not end the war" (Friedman, pp. 132-34, 217).
23. See Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "Air Power in Vietnam: The Hubris of Power," in Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn, eds. *The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 69-83.
24. For a detailed discussion of the problems of air power in Vietnam, see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *SETUP: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1991); for an analysis of the differing performances of airpower in Vietnam and the Gulf, see Kenneth P. Werrell, "Air War Victorious: The Gulf War vs. Vietnam," *Parameters*, 22 (Summer 1992), 44-54.
25. Friedman, pp. 169-96, and Blackwell, pp. 114-35.
26. The Soviet-style centralized C³I net like the one Saddam Hussein established in Iraq has two major problems. First, it tends to stifle the individual commander's initiative. Second, it is vulnerable to decapitation strategies which attack and disrupt the communications it depends on to function. See Pardew, p. 22; William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (Winter 1988-89), 124-25; and Friedman, pp. 18-23, 138, 144.
27. Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, and Norman Polmar, *War In the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991), pp. 115-47, contains an excellent description of operations in the Gulf War illustrating how the technology of C³I acts as a force multiplier. Friedman's description of the air campaign on pp. 169-96 and his Appendix B on p. 297 are also instructive. For the USS *Blue Ridge*, see "Amphibious Command Ships," Navy Fact File (Washington: Department of the Navy, Office of Information, October 1987), III-15.
28. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1983), p. 228.
29. See, e.g., Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Appraisal of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).
30. Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 316-31.
31. While it is arguable whether or not the application of military power is appropriate, or can contribute significantly to a political solution, in the Balkans, the reluctance of the United States to employ force as an integral part of its diplomacy demonstrates vividly that the new reality of Spears vs. Rifles has not yet been fully accepted, and the key lessons not yet learned. Although this paper primarily addresses conventional warfare, where an organized Third World military force is pitted against one from the First World, it is the author's contention that the new equation of military power is applicable in Bosnia, and that the US (and West European) military and civilian leadership continues to underestimate its military capabilities.
32. See Strobe Talbot, "Post-Victory Blues," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (1991/1992), 59; and Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (1991/1992), 73.
33. Friedman, pp. 138-39.
34. See Mark Katz, "Beyond the Reagan Doctrine: Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Regional Conflict," *Washington Quarterly*, 14 (Winter 1991), 169-75.
35. Korea and Vietnam are the most notable examples, and many military officers still openly express the opinion that "we could have won if only the politicians had let us." This opinion ignores the key question of national political objectives. Another example of political shortsightedness in a military context is the lack of provision for mitigating the economic damage (including looting) to Panama during and after the invasion.
36. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *The Eagle's Talons: The American Experience at War* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1988), p. 36.

US Policy in El Salvador: Creating Beauty or the Beast?

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On 16 January 1992, the president of El Salvador and Salvadoran communist leaders sat down together in an ornate conference room in Mexico City and signed a peace agreement for their war-ravaged Central American country. The conflict in El Salvador, which began in 1980 and is thought to have cost more than 75,000 lives, was one of the longest episodes of political violence in the Western Hemisphere. The presence of US Secretary of State James Baker at the peace agreement highlighted the American involvement in that Latin American conflict.

Indeed, the military and political role played by the US government was one of the most significant aspects of the Salvadoran war. Shortly after the inauguration of President Reagan, the United States began an ambitious program of security assistance to El Salvador that continued into the Bush Administration. During this period, the United States provided hundreds of military trainers, tons of military equipment, and over \$4 billion in assistance to help ensure the survival of the Salvadoran government. On average, El Salvador received about one million dollars a day in US assistance from 1981 to 1992.¹

American involvement in El Salvador and the results that were achieved have generated a great deal of controversy. One of the most common themes has been the "failure" of US policy in El Salvador. The signing of the Salvadoran peace accord is an appropriate juncture to examine whether that judgment is valid.

For 12 years, the United States walked a policy tightrope in El Salvador. One US goal was to stop communist expansion and defeat the military aims of the leftist guerrillas. To that end the United States generated one of the greatest military force expansions in Central American history. However, the other major US goal was to foster democracy in a country that

had been ruled for most of the 20th century by a repressive military regime. The challenge facing US policymakers was to develop the Salvadoran armed forces in such a way that they became both militarily effective and politically inactive. The primary thesis of this article, contrary to most analyses, is that the United States was reasonably successful in meeting this difficult policy challenge. I will argue that US success was based on the development of a policy that proved to be flexible, effective, and durable.

Additionally, I believe that our role in the transformation of the Salvadoran armed forces may be instructive as we seek to influence the course of political change in other countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States was concerned with authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Now our concern has shifted to political development in the countries of Eastern Europe and what used to be the Soviet Union. As the example of Serbia clearly illustrates, the process of political change is often significantly affected by the behavior of the armed forces. Specifically, the case of El Salvador provides insights into the capability of the United States to foster democratic development and American concepts of military professionalism elsewhere.

The Origins of US Military Policy in El Salvador

The political conflict in El Salvador developed rapidly as a prominent foreign policy issue for the United States government. For most of the 20th century, the United States paid little if any attention to this small Central American country of five million people. The rapidity of the rise of El Salvador as a foreign policy issue is clearly illustrated by examining *New York Times* coverage. During the first year of the Nixon Administration, the *Times* carried seven articles on El Salvador. During the first year of the Carter Administration, the level of coverage on El Salvador had risen to 45 articles. By contrast, during the first year of the Reagan Administration, the *Times* carried 543 articles on El Salvador.

The most important context that shaped Reagan Administration policy in El Salvador was the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foreign policy of the Reagan Administration has been accurately

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"Our role in the transformation of the Salvadoran armed forces may be instructive as we seek to influence the course of political change in other countries."

described as "ideology in search of a policy."² US policymakers felt driven to reassert US influence because of Brezhnev's massive military modernization efforts and because of Soviet ventures in the third world. In a regional context this meant that Administration policy was significantly influenced by the actions of states perceived to be Soviet clients. This would include a newly Sandinista Nicaragua and Fidel Castro's Cuba, both of whom were instrumental in supporting revolution in El Salvador. One of the earliest foreign policy priorities of the Reagan Administration was the desire to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership in arenas such as El Salvador that a newly assertive Administration was in control of US policy. Statements by President Reagan and senior Administration officials made it clear that a very different prism was now refracting Salvadoran reality.³

The Reagan Administration became focused on El Salvador because of the purpose it could serve in US-Soviet relations. However, the military component of Reagan's policy was significantly influenced by the course of events within El Salvador itself. During the 1970s it became clear that the Salvadoran government was incapable of managing internal pressures for political and economic change. By 1980, El Salvador, historically a violent society, had become the killing ground of Central America. The most striking example of this spiraling level of violence was the March 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. It is estimated that the rate of political killings that year was between 700 and 800 a month.⁴

Five different Marxist guerrilla groups emerged in El Salvador during the 1970s. By 1980 they had achieved a loose sort of organization which became known as the FMLN (Frente Marti de Liberacion Nacional). The military evolution of the FMLN was vividly demonstrated by its "final offensive" which erupted ten days before the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in January 1981. Although this offensive was ultimately a failure, the Reagan Administration responded to the crisis with a massive infusion of military assistance. During the eight years of the Reagan Administration, US military assistance averaged \$107.5 million per year. For almost a decade, El Salvador was the recipient of one of the largest US military assistance programs in the world.⁵

As the overall foreign policy framework of the US government began to change in the 1990s, US policy toward El Salvador became less ideological and more pragmatic. Heeding the lessons of the Iran-Contra scandal, the Bush Administration was determined not to get caught in the Central American quagmire that had done so much damage to the Reagan Administration. The lower profile given to El Salvador was also the result of US preoccupation with the transformation of Eastern Europe, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and events in the Middle East. It is not surprising that in his first telephone call to President-elect Alfredo Cristiani, President Bush expressed strong support for a Salvadoran peace agreement.⁶

The interesting thing about the Salvadoran policy of the Bush Administration, however, is the durability of El Salvador as a policy issue. Aid levels for El Salvador displayed remarkable resilience. During the first three years of the Bush Administration (1989-1991), military assistance averaged \$85.9 million per year, which was only a 20-percent drop from the Reagan Administration assistance levels. It took the advent of the drug war, the fall of communism, and the passage of several years for the focus of US regional policy to shift away from El Salvador.

Tangible Results of US Policy

One of the most significant and controversial aspects of US policy in El Salvador was the expansion of the Salvadoran armed forces. This expansion fundamentally changed the nature of the armed forces as well as the nature of the political process in El Salvador.

Long before the United States became entangled in El Salvador, the Salvadoran armed forces had faced two challenges that shaped their sense of mission and their force structure. Their political role was formed by the peasant uprising of 1932. The long-term consequences of this abortive uprising centered on the transformation of the Salvadoran political system. The army gained control of the government, and for the next 50 years military officers ruled the country. The military role of the Salvadoran armed forces was shaped by the four-day war with Honduras in July 1969. During this conflict, which produced approximately 6000 casualties, Salvadoran ground forces invaded Honduras on several fronts. This brief conflict greatly influenced the subsequent size, force structure, and training of the Salvadoran military. During the 1970s, the Salvadoran armed forces consisted primarily of a small conventional army organized into five infantry battalions, an artillery group, and an armored cavalry group.⁷ The rise of a formidable communist insurgent movement in El Salvador by 1979 caught the Salvadoran military off guard and unprepared.

The worsening political situation led to the overthrow of the repressive military government in October 1979 by young, reform-minded officers

and civilian supporters. This new Salvadoran government actively sought the advice and assistance of the United States. In 1981, a small team of American military personnel went to El Salvador and within a short period of time produced a strategic plan that called for larger, better-trained, and better-equipped forces. Over the next ten years, the Salvadoran military establishment would be transformed beyond recognition.

Throughout Salvadoran history, the army has always been the most influential element of the armed forces and, not surprisingly, much of the American assistance effort centered on it. During the decade of the 1980s, the army expanded from 6500 to 38,650 soldiers.⁸ In other words, in a country the size of Massachusetts, with a GNP smaller than the annual sales of Apple Computer, we see the development of an army that was larger than the armies of five NATO countries.⁹

During this period, the Salvadoran armed forces also became a more complex organization. An extensive military construction program was initiated, with airfields, depots, and barracks being built all over El Salvador. A national military training center capable of housing, feeding, and training 9000 recruits a year was rapidly constructed. Regional intelligence centers were built at all six brigade headquarters to provide timely collection and analysis of intelligence. Military hospitals and a medevac system were set up, drastically reducing the mortality rate of wounded Salvadoran soldiers.¹⁰

The Salvadoran armed forces also made progress in their counterinsurgency efforts. It has been pointed out by many military analysts that the struggle for popular support is one of the key elements of a successful counterinsurgency program.¹¹ The armed forces accomplished a variety of tasks that fostered popular support for the government of El Salvador and eroded support for the FMLN guerrillas. First, the military served as the shield of the democratic process in El Salvador during the 1980s. It acted forcefully on occasion to ensure that national election results were honored. It also undertook military operations to minimize FMLN interference with the electoral process. Second, the Salvadoran armed forces served as an extension of the government in providing basic services to the people of El Salvador by developing a sophisticated rural civic action program. Third, the military undercut the popular support of the FMLN by denying it success on the battlefield. The primary evidence of this progress is that the FMLN guerrillas never achieved a significant combat victory after they overran the 4th Brigade Headquarters in Chalatenango on 31 March 1987.

Another striking development has been the fall in the level of political violence in El Salvador. It should be noted that making conclusions based on human rights reports is problematic at best, but it is clear that the human rights atmosphere has been transformed in El Salvador. Until the mid-1980s many members of the Salvadoran armed forces resisted the prospect of evolutionary

political change, and this attitude was a factor in the widespread death-squad activity of the time. Traces of this barbaric behavior have persisted as recently as November 1989 when military officers were implicated in the wanton murder of six Jesuit priests during the battle for San Salvador. In general, however, the human rights situation has improved in El Salvador; the political spectrum has widened, and assassination is no longer the distinguishing characteristic of the political environment.

The Implications of US Policy

American policy in El Salvador has generated a great deal of controversy since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. As noted earlier, if any consensus can be identified in the literature on this subject, it would be the theme of US policy failure in El Salvador.¹² Articles have tended to make liberal use of the terms "quagmire" and "stalemate." One of the more well-known studies of US military policy in El Salvador (written by four US Army colonels) was particularly scathing. It accused the US government of lacking any "overarching strategic vision" and repeatedly asserted that the United States had little impact on contributing to the end of the Salvadoran war. It concluded—this in 1988—that "by most estimates, the war in El Salvador is stuck. Unhappily, the United States finds itself stuck with the war."¹³

A major flaw in most of these analyses is that they failed to take into account the circumstances and nature of the FMLN guerrillas. The lack of a threat-based analysis led some analysts to underrate the precarious strategic position of the FMLN. In addition, an unwarranted emphasis on the cumbersome nature of the US assistance system led many critics (especially the four military authors) to an unnecessarily pessimistic view of the situation in El Salvador. In order to produce a more balanced assessment, two major points should have been taken into account. First, most critics failed to appreciate the unwieldy nature of the process in which two countries, both having different sets of values and interests, attempt to achieve mutually acceptable political goals. The second point is that fighting guerrillas is usually a long-term process. The British fought in Malaya for 12 years. It took almost 19 years before the M-19 guerrillas in Colombia agreed to lay down arms and participate in politics. Peru has been plagued by Sendero Luminoso since 1980. The Salvadoran political system only began to exhibit fundamental reform in 1984 with the election of President Jose Napoleon Duarte. To express criticism of the pace of the war in El Salvador in the late 1980s betrays a puzzling inability to grasp the long-term nature of this political-military process.

In the wake of the January 1992 peace accords, it no longer appears that the war is "stuck," but we still need to reach some conclusions about the impact of US policy on the course of events in El Salvador. The Salvadoran

*"Assassination is no longer the distinguishing
characteristic of the political environment."*

government agreed to peace terms that can only be described as astonishing, occurring as they did in a country that had been dominated by a fiercely anti-communist military establishment for most of the 20th century. In a January 1992 national address, President Cristiani told the Salvadoran people that the armed forces would be reduced by approximately 50 percent over the next two years. The Salvadoran armed forces also agreed to return their units to garrison so that UN peace-keeping forces could help FMLN guerrillas reintegrate into Salvadoran society.¹⁴ During the entire process of negotiating these remarkable terms, the Salvadoran government had the backing of the military leadership. The day after the peace accord was signed, the armed forces Chief of Staff remarked in a public military ceremony that the armed forces were "duty-bound to abide by a political solution."¹⁵

One sign of institutional growth was that the Salvadoran military was able to preserve unity within its ranks during negotiations with the guerrillas. This cohesion occurred in spite of widespread expectations to the contrary. The FMLN leadership was still expressing hopes, as recently as 1989, that political developments would create splits within the armed forces.¹⁶ Another sign of growth was that the armed forces demonstrated the ability to maintain a cooperative relationship with two very different sets of civilian leaders over the last ten years. These relationships, first with President Duarte and then with President Cristiani, have not always been smooth and on occasion have been marked by episodes of strong policy disagreement. However, the most important point is that the Salvadoran government and the armed forces demonstrated a much greater degree of unity than did the FMLN guerrillas and leftist political leaders. The clearest example of this contrast occurred in the 1989 presidential elections. The Salvadoran military, for its part, supported the elections. The result was the first peaceful civilian transfer of power in El Salvador since 1927. This was in sharp contrast to the policy split among the left. After bitter dispute, leftist politicians participated in the 1989 elections while their supposed allies, the FMLN, attempted to disrupt the elections by threatening to kill voters.¹⁷

Many of the actions taken by the US government during the last decade contributed to the vastly improved state of civil-military relations in El Salvador. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations consistently made two

messages quite clear concerning civilian government in El Salvador. The first message was that the US government strongly supported the democratic process. One vivid example was the May 1984 election of President Duarte. Within five days of winning the election, Duarte was on an official visit to the United States and meeting in the Oval Office with President Reagan. The second message was that the presence of a civilian government in El Salvador was an essential precondition for US assistance. The long-term nature of US support for the Salvadoran government gave Salvadoran presidents a powerful source of leverage in their relationships with the Salvadoran military.

The United States also worked to help shape the composition of the Salvadoran military's leadership. US policymakers vigorously supported the moderate officers who emerged in the 1980s, such as General Vides Casanova, the Minister of Defense, and General Blandon, the armed forces Chief of Staff. These officers realized that the Salvadoran armed forces had been badly split by the 1979 coup and by the subsequent course of Salvadoran politics. On several occasions in the early 1980s, military hard-liners sought to undermine the Duarte administration. The actions of Vides Casanova and Blandon during these potentially divisive times demonstrated their commitment to a more moderate and more unified Salvadoran military.

Putting all of these achievements into the context of Salvadoran political history, it would certainly be safe to describe US policy as successful. However, it is not an unqualified success. There are still some potholes on the road to democracy that have to be safely negotiated.

One strategic pothole is that the United States has had great difficulty in fostering a close working relationship between the Salvadoran government and the Salvadoran military. For example, several observers of the war noticed that the Salvadoran government never developed the Salvadoran equivalent of a National Security Council.¹⁸ It is clear that this deficiency hampered the ability of the Salvadoran government to carry out the war. There were several so-called "National Plans" developed during the war, but there was never any comprehensive national strategic plan developed as a result of close coordination between civil and military leaders.

A political pothole is the issue of defense spending. Over the last decade, the Salvadoran government was highly successful in obtaining military assistance from the US government. But during their spectacular military buildup, the Salvadoran armed forces and the Salvadoran government never had to face the problem of sustaining an armed force primarily based on Salvadoran resources. In 1990, El Salvador spent only about 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product on its defense budget. Many developing countries spend much more. By comparison, the United States spent 5.4 percent of its GDP on defense during the same period.¹⁹ There are two certainties concerning the issue of military funding. One is that US military aid to El Salvador

will be substantially reduced or eliminated in the near future. In fact, the handwriting is already on the wall. For over a decade (from 1981 to 1992), El Salvador received more US military assistance than any other Latin American country. That changed in the FY 1993 budget, however, with the Bush Administration providing Colombia more military assistance than El Salvador.²⁰ The second certainty, as noted above, is that the Salvadoran government and the armed forces have no recent experience with making tough budgetary choices about sustaining a military establishment based principally on Salvadoran resources. It is likely that this issue will be a source of friction between civilian and military leaders in the future.

The long-term significance of the development of the Salvadoran armed forces is not entirely clear at the present time. In late 1992, the peace process hit a snag when the FMLN temporarily halted their demobilization program. Guerrilla leaders were reacting to an increase in political tension between the army and the government that occurred over the issue of which officers would be "purged" from the army. According to published reports, the names of the Minister of Defense, General Ponce, and his Deputy Minister were included on the list.²¹ Although the peace process resumed in December, the episode symbolizes the problems that might occur in El Salvador as it faces the political, social, and economic costs of large-scale military demobilization.

Conclusion

Many of the recent political events in Central America would have seemed improbable several years ago. In 1989 the United States invaded Panama with such overwhelming military force that F-17-A Stealth aircraft were used to bomb Panamanian Defense Force barracks. In 1990 the Sandinistas held open elections in Nicaragua and voluntarily ceded power to a 14-party political coalition headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. For sheer political improbability, however, the events in El Salvador rival those of Panama or Nicaragua. Based on recent developments in the relationship between the civilian government and its military leaders, there is reason to be optimistic about this aspect of politics in El Salvador.

The signing of the Mexico City peace accords was a powerful symbol of the success of US policy. Put plainly, what the United States set out to achieve in El Salvador was, in large part, accomplished by January of 1992. Previous attempts to negotiate peace agreements had been strongly opposed by members of the Salvadoran armed forces. This was not the case in 1991 when senior military leaders clearly and publicly supported the peace negotiations. There now exists in El Salvador a much stronger degree of military support for civilian leaders than has existed at any other time in the last half century. Another cause for optimism is that the armed forces have become

more supportive of civilian government without splitting into antagonistic factions. The example of the rebellious *cara pintadas* in Argentina (who staged an uprising shortly before President Bush's state visit in 1990) clearly illustrates the danger of military factionalism during times of political and economic turmoil. This danger was highlighted even more dramatically during the attempted coup in Venezuela last February, when President Carlos Andres Perez barely escaped with his life.

An examination of this decade of American involvement presents some interesting lessons for future US administrations. One is the durability of US policy. US policymakers succeeded in crafting a Salvadoran policy that was both long-term and expensive without the benefit of widespread support from the American public. Another interesting characteristic is the policy's effectiveness. Some may argue that US policy would not have been successful if the Soviet Union had not collapsed, thus reducing US policy from a causal to a coincidental factor. However, as Stalin once said, "Quantity has a quality all its own." There was a great deal of "quantity" in the Salvadoran policy of the Reagan Administration. The US government devoted money, materiel, and the attention of its policymakers to the conflict in El Salvador. The Salvadoran military establishment was transformed. It became more combat effective, and this gave Salvadoran politicians time to become politically flexible. Salvadoran soldiers also stayed out of the Presidential Palace, and this gave Salvadoran politicians room to be politically flexible. It is remarkable, given the context of Salvadoran history and the blunt nature of US policymaking tools, that the US government was able to successfully navigate its policy between the Scylla of a rightist military coup and the Charybdis of FMLN military victory.

With the end of the Cold War, American interest in El Salvador will fade. The United States was willing to help El Salvador confront a communist insurgency and begin the democratic process. The policy objectives that the US government set for itself in January 1981 concerning El Salvador were in large part accomplished by the time of the January 1992 peace accords. The future challenge for US policymakers will be to understand and apply the lessons of El Salvador. The future challenge for the Salvadorans will be to win the long-term struggle of making democracy work.

NOTES

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Colonel Asa Clark and Colonel Dick Norton of the Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy.

1. Data on security assistance are derived from a variety of sources. Data on FY 1981-87 are compiled from Congressional Research Service, *Inter-American Relations*, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 1988, p. 984. Data on later years were provided to the author by the Security Assistance Operations Directorate of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

2. Raymond Aron, "Ideology in Search of a Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (America and the World 1981), 504.

3. For examples, see US Department of State, "Secretary Haig News Conference," *Current Policy*, No. 258, 28 January 1981, and US Department of State, "Central American Review," *Current Policy*, No. 261 (5 March 1981).

4. Richard A. Haggerty, ed., *El Salvador—A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 235.

5. Information on the comparative size of the Salvadoran security assistance program is taken from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 45, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1989), p. 783.

6. US President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1990). George Bush, 1989, I, 299.

7. Howard I. Blutstein, et al., *Area Handbook on El Salvador* (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 198-99.

8. These figures are taken from *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1980* (London: Copley and Associates, 1980), p. 177, and *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1990-91* (Alexandria, Va.: International Media Corporation, 1990), p. 297. For information on force levels of the 1970s see Blutstein, et al., pp. 198-99. For more information on force levels of the 1980s see Haggerty, pp. 213-17 and 268.

9. According to figures in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1991-1992* (London: Brassey's, 1991), the Salvadoran army is larger than the armies of Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. According to "44th Annual Report on American Industry," *Forbes*, 6 January 1992, p. 113, the sales figures for the last 12 months for Apple Computer Company was \$6.3 billion. According to US Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, "El Salvador"* (prepared by American Embassy, San Salvador, July 1987), p. 2, the Salvadoran GDP in 1986 was \$4.58 billion.

10. US General Accounting Office, *El Salvador: Military Assistance Has Helped Counter but Not Overcome the Insurgency*. GAO report to Senator Edward Kennedy, GAO/NSIAD-91-166, April 1991, pp. 22-23.

11. One excellent example is Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism—Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington: Brassey's, 1990).

12. For example, see the following: Charles Lane, "The War That Will Not End," *The New Republic*, 16 October 1989; James LeMoine, "El Salvador's Forgotten War," *Foreign Affairs*, 68 (Summer 1989); Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Things Fall Apart: Trouble Ahead in El Salvador," *World Policy Journal*, 6 (Winter 1988-89); William M. LeoGrande, "After the Battle of San Salvador," *World Policy Journal*, 7 (Spring 1990).

13. A. J. Bacevich, et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 6.

14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, LAT-92-004, 7 January 1992, pp. 11-18.

15. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, LAT-92-012, 17 January 1992, p. 16. Remarks by armed forces Chief of Staff General Gilberto Rubio.

16. In this regard, see Joaquin Villalobos, "Popular Insurrection—Desire or Reality?" *Latin American Perspectives*, 16 (Summer 1989). Villalobos is commander of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), one of the guerrilla groups that comprise the FMLN.

17. Jose Z. Garcia, "Tragedy in El Salvador," *Current History*, January 1990, pp. 9-12, 40-41.

18. See interviews with Colonel John Ellerson, former US MILGP commander in El Salvador, contained in *El Salvador at War, An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present*, ed. Max Manwaring and Court Prisk (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 472-73, and interview with Colonel Oscar Casanova-Vejar, former Second Brigade Commander and subsequently director of the Salvadoran Military Academy, *ibid.*, pp. 478-80.

19. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1991-1992* (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 212-15. For example, Peru spent 3.7 percent of its GDP on defense, the Republic of Korea spent 4.4 percent, and Egypt spent 5.6 percent.

20. US Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1993* (Washington, undated), p. 9.

21. Shirley Christian, "Former Rebels in El Salvador Halt Demobilization," *The New York Times*, 27 November 1992.

Monitoring Road-Mobile Missiles Under START: Lessons from the Gulf War

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Mobile missiles pose a difficult challenge to US intelligence collection capabilities. The use of a mobile launcher, unlike a fixed site or silo, enables a missile unit to employ unique operational practices and exploit natural surroundings in order to elude satellite detection. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, US intelligence capabilities supporting military targeting missions had limited success in detecting Iraqi mobile missiles. This raised concerns in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War that US national technical means of intelligence—the primary arms control verification asset—would be insufficient to satisfy Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification requirements for the SS-25 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in the former Soviet Union. One critic stated, “The intelligence-gathering apparatus that can’t find Scuds in California-size[d] Iraq is the same technology we depend on to enforce arms control agreements.”¹ This implied that the SS-25 force, operating in the expansive landmass of the former Soviet Union, would prove to be even more elusive to US reconnaissance capabilities than did the relatively smaller and less technologically sophisticated Iraqi missile force.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, moreover, raises an important question: will US national technical means be sufficient to verify Russian compliance with START provisions for road-mobile missiles, given the likelihood of changes in the size, deployment, structure, and perhaps operations of the SS-25 force?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the role and functions of intelligence in the mobile missile context. Although Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that mobile targets do pose a difficult intelligence challenge, it is not evident that the problem is linked solely to the capabilities, numbers, or types of reconnaissance assets used to search for missiles. US intelligence performance during the war, moreover, does not serve as a precedent of probable US verification capability under START. Intelligence collection tasks and the types of information required to support mobile missile targeting operations in a wartime environment differ significantly from the requirements for monitoring treaty-limited items in a peacetime arms control context. The Gulf experience underscored the premium that a crisis places on precise and timely intelligence data, and it also demonstrated how limited understanding of a target set can substantially degrade detection capabilities. US efforts to monitor START, however, will be somewhat facilitated by a familiar, less time-urgent collection environment, regardless of the political changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union.

A close study of START mobile missile provisions also reveals that the treaty significantly limits any adverse impact on US monitoring capabilities resulting from the alteration of SS-25 deployments or operations. START tightly restricts mobile-missile basing and deployment practices and mandates notification of certain SS-25 activities and changes in data related to deployed SS-25s and associated facilities. The treaty also includes cooperative measures and inspections that are designed to enhance monitoring confidence. All of these provisions are applicable to the January 1993 US-Russian START II accord, which is directly linked to the START framework. Furthermore, practical considerations beyond START will create disincentives for large-scale changes to the SS-25 force.

In order to evaluate the US ability to monitor SS-25s under START, it is useful to return to the basic issue of the US intelligence capability against mobile missiles, using the Iraqi experience as a case study.

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The Iraqi Mobile Missile Intelligence Challenge

The Iraqi Al Hussein—or Scud—medium-range ballistic missile was a key coalition target during the Gulf War. The Al Hussein is a liquid-fueled system with an approximate range of 600 kilometers and a 500-kilogram high-explosive warhead with a circular error probable of about 1000 meters. The missile's inaccuracy and limited payload restricted Iraqi use of the Al Hussein in both the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars to striking large urban targets and population centers. By comparison, the SS-25 is intended for use against specific military targets.²

The Al Hussein and the SS-25 do share some similarities, however. Both are road-mobile descendants of the Soviet Scud-B, the first modern tactical ballistic missile that dates from the 1950s. The Al Hussein is a single-warhead, Iraqi-constructed missile that is made from the parts of several Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles. The SS-25 also has a single warhead but it is a more modern, technologically advanced strategic system.

Both types of missile are also subject to some similar operational practices that are designed to promote force survivability. For the Al Hussein, these include long-duration field deployments, frequent and prompt relocation following launch, reload and refire capability, and extensive deception techniques including camouflage and concealment. Available information suggests that SS-25 forces operate in a similar manner.³ Iraqi operational practices successfully degraded US intelligence performance during the Gulf War, despite a substantial reconnaissance effort to locate Al Hussein mobile launchers.

The United States used a large number and variety of national and tactical intelligence assets to support the coalition targeting effort against the Iraqi missile force. US reconnaissance satellites reportedly provided extensive support to military operations and bomb damage assessments.⁴ One important asset used to detect Iraqi missile launches was the Defense Support Program satellite, a missile warning vehicle equipped with infrared sensors to detect launch ignition or the rocket plume of a missile's trajectory during flight.⁵ In addition to satellite systems, approximately 15 percent of coalition aircraft were used to search for mobile missile units.⁶ Surveillance of suspected Al Hussein operating and launch areas helped to detect missile activity and launches and passed targeting information to F-111, F-15, F-16, and A-10 fighter aircraft.⁷ Key platforms included the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the TR-1 and RF-4 tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and the E-8A Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).⁸ It also was reported that US and British special operations forces were inserted behind enemy lines to help locate and target mobile missile units.⁹ Special Forces evidently helped to coordinate air strikes against mobile launchers by identifying them with hand-held laser devices.¹⁰

Despite this level of effort, the Iraqi mobile missile forces were extremely difficult targets to locate and destroy. Based on warning and launch impact data received from reconnaissance assets, the US Patriot air defense system was targeted against incoming Scuds in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Yet the US Army believes that only about ten missiles were actually destroyed.¹¹ The use of intelligence assets to support targeting, however, appears to have helped the coalition suppress the missile threat. An initial Iraqi average of four Al Hussein launches per day was reduced to an average of one launch per day after armed reconnaissance patrols were increased in the second week of the war.¹² The coalition's inability to halt Iraqi missile launches completely, however, reflects the difficulties associated with locating the mobile targets. In particular, Iraqi deception practices, communications security, and the desert environment all complicated detection efforts.

The Iraqi deception effort associated with mobile missiles used many Soviet-style techniques.¹³ For example, Al Hussein launches usually occurred at night, under the cover of darkness. The few launches that did take place in the early morning hours were conducted under cloud cover to minimize detection by coalition reconnaissance assets. The Iraqis also adeptly used dummy launch sites and decoy missiles. Some sophisticated dummy sites, for example, used heat generators to simulate active missile engines. The Iraqis also constructed a network of drive-through trenches that might have served as dummy hide positions.¹⁴ These sites, most likely intended to confuse US targeting efforts, were covered by metal plates and a layer of camouflage netting. The metal plates probably were intended to simulate hide positions for missiles or missile-related equipment, thereby attracting and wasting US fire assets.¹⁵

Iraqi use of strict communications security during missile launch procedures might also have complicated coalition targeting efforts.¹⁶ The coalition expected to be able to intercept radar signals during the final stages of launch preparations, which would be tipped off by the release of weather balloons to collect meteorological data for missile calibration. Instead, the Iraqis evidently maintained complete radio silence. The lack of electronic

Iraqi deception practices, communications security, and the desert environment all complicated missile detection efforts.

signatures suggests that the Iraqis might have relied on the use of previous missile launch trajectories instead of balloons for missile calibration.¹⁷

Surprisingly, the desert background also complicated US efforts to detect mobile missiles. A number of Gulf War commentators assumed that the Al Hussein's desert surroundings would facilitate missile detection, especially compared to the problems posed by the forested terrain in which SS-25s operate.¹⁸ While the desert offered a less-canopied terrain in which to hide mobile missiles, the Iraqis successfully complicated coalition targeting efforts by making the most of their surroundings, typically by using broken ground and groves of trees to provide cover. Destroyed vehicles and equipment also complicated detection by providing additional clutter. General Norman Schwarzkopf and others noted that pinpointing mobile launchers in the desert was like the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack.¹⁹

Despite a focused targeting operation that used a substantial number and variety of intelligence resources to detect Iraqi mobile missile launchers, the outcome of the coalition effort was mixed. Iraq continued to launch missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia, albeit at a diminished rate, throughout the duration of the war. One strike against US forces in Dhahran in late February resulted in 28 deaths and 100 injuries.²⁰ Thus, the Al Hussein forces managed to evade even the most sophisticated of US intelligence detection and targeting capabilities.

Wartime Targeting Versus Arms Control Monitoring

Although the Al Hussein and the SS-25 share some similarities, one should not infer from the coalition targeting effort against the Iraqi force that the United States is incapable of verifying Russian compliance with START mobile missile provisions. This is the case for two reasons: First, the United States knew less about Iraqi missiles than it does about the Russian SS-25 force. Second, requirements for wartime targeting and peacetime arms control monitoring differ greatly in terms of the type, specificity, and timeliness of information required.

Comparing Knowledge Bases

The hunt for Iraqi Scuds in the Gulf War represents the first time a modern intelligence infrastructure was used to target mobile missiles in a wartime environment.²¹ By comparison, the US intelligence community has monitored the SS-25 since its initial deployment in the mid-1980s. Before then, the intelligence community had acquired considerable expertise in monitoring the Soviet road-mobile SS-20, subsequently banned under the INF Treaty. Judging from the information released over the past several years in the Department of Defense's publication *Soviet Military Power*, it appears that the intelligence community follows all aspects of the SS-25 life cycle

One should not infer from the coalition targeting effort against Iraq that the United States is incapable of verifying Russian compliance with START mobile missile provisions.

from planning for acquisition, through research and development, to production and deployment.

In contrast to its knowledge of the SS-25 threat, the US intelligence community apparently lacked familiarity with the doctrinal, organizational, technical, and operational details of the Iraqi missile systems. A Pentagon report to Congress on the Gulf War indicated that the intelligence profile on Iraqi mobile missiles and other equipment was prepared from scratch during mobilization for Operation Desert Shield.²² The intelligence community focused on collecting information about Iraqi weapon research programs, missile capabilities and characteristics, and military facilities.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the intelligence community was unable to establish the exact number of Iraqi mobile missiles and launchers. US intelligence agencies estimated that the Iraqis had 30 fixed launchers, more than 20 mobile launchers, and from 300 to 1000 missiles at the outset of the war.²³ General Schwarzkopf, however, remarked that "we went into this with some intelligence estimates [about Iraqi missile forces] that . . . I have since come to believe were either grossly inaccurate or our pilots are lying through their teeth."²⁴

Wartime and Peacetime Requirements

The Iraqi experience also differs from the SS-25 arms control monitoring problem because the intelligence requirements to support an arms control agreement differ substantially from those to support crisis or wartime conditions. During wartime, intelligence collection is focused on the use of mobile missiles on the battlefield. Perishable information about the number of deployed systems, their status, and their locations at any given time must reach military commanders in a time-urgent fashion. Locational data must be accurate enough to support targeting against launch and support units or command and control elements. Moreover, military leaders need timely battle damage assessments and knowledge of changes in the enemy's order of battle.

During peacetime, however, the intelligence problem is broader-based. There is no requirement for precise and timely information about the

exact location of treaty-limited missiles and launchers. Instead, the intelligence community focuses on changes in force status and readiness, force-size estimates, and system characteristics, doctrine, and operations. The intelligence community is able to monitor compliance with arms control treaty provisions, moreover, by observing daily activities at missile production, testing, deployment, training, and maintenance facilities. The objective is to detect anomalous behavior related to the size, capability, and status of the force.²⁵ The purpose of this type of monitoring is to gain confidence over time that a country is not violating the treaty in any militarily significant way.

Monitoring START

The basic START requirements for monitoring the deployed SS-25 force include verifying compliance with numerical limits on road-mobile missiles and launchers and detecting any cheating activity.²⁶ National technical means will play the primary role in satisfying these requirements. Treaty provisions such as mandatory data exchanges and notifications, basing and movement restrictions, inspections, and cooperative measures will support US monitoring efforts and effectively complicate any Russian noncompliance activities. This verification regime will enable the United States to maintain a robust intelligence base on the SS-25 force, even if Russia alters SS-25 force structure or operations.

The SS-25 force will undergo some changes. The May 1992 Lisbon Protocol to START, signed by the four republics with strategic missile forces, designates Russia as the sole nuclear successor of the former Soviet Union and commits Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states.²⁷ The two SS-25 divisions that are deployed in Belarus will be relocated to Russia by 30 December 1994, which will increase Russian SS-25 deployments to ten divisions.²⁸ This probably will involve the construction of new bases and possibly some alteration of SS-25 operations, both of which could temporarily complicate US monitoring efforts. START II's ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs, which include the heavy SS-18 ICBM and the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM, suggests that the SS-25, and an improved SS-25 follow-on, are likely to become the primary elements of the Russian ICBM force. Russia would be able to field many more than the 288 SS-25s it currently has deployed—up to 1100 warheads on 1100 deployed SS-25s. Severe budgetary constraints, of course, could make it difficult for Russia to invest in the production, training, security measures, and building materials needed to make such changes possible. But even if radical changes in SS-25 force structure and operations did occur, several START treaty provisions (that are also applicable to START II) would enable the United States to rebuild its SS-25 intelligence collection base and to preserve a strong monitoring capability.

Data and Notifications

One key treaty provision is a mandatory data exchange that includes detailed information on the number and location of deployed SS-25s. An initial data exchange on strategic forces took place after START was signed. An update will occur 30 days after the treaty enters into force, and regular updates will occur approximately every six months thereafter. The United States will verify the accuracy of SS-25 data with inspections of SS-25 facilities. Russia is obligated to notify the United States of any changes in the Memorandum of Understanding data, including the number of SS-25s and their locations. When the SS-25s in Belarus are relocated to Russia, Russia must provide site diagrams and photographs of any new bases that are opened to accommodate the forces.

Basing and Movement Restrictions

One concern resulting from the Gulf War experience is that the SS-25s are deployed in an area many times larger than the localized regions in which the Iraqi Al Husseins operated.²⁹ A peacetime situation is easier to verify, however, because most of the SS-25 force remains in garrison during non-alert conditions.³⁰ The treaty also facilitates verification by imposing a number of basing restrictions on the force. For example, SS-25s may be based only in identified restricted areas, which may be no larger than five square kilometers and which may contain no more than ten SS-25 missiles and their launchers. The number of fixed structures situated within the restricted area, moreover, may not exceed the number of SS-25s based there. SS-25s may leave the restricted area for relocations or exercise dispersals, but these types of movement are subject to strict requirements including pre- and post-movement notifications, time limits to complete the activity, and annual quotas. In addition, START predefines the areas where SS-25s may be legally located when they depart their garrison for routine activity. This area is known as the deployment area, which surrounds the restricted area. The deployment area may cover up to 125,000 square kilometers per division. Although this is a sizable area, the deployment area does provide the intelligence community with a bounded region within which to search for mobile missiles.³¹ Road-mobile ICBMs may leave the deployment area only for relocations, which require notification.³² The sighting of any missile outside the deployment area boundary without prior notification would provide relatively unambiguous proof of illegal activity.

Inspections and Cooperative Measures

Inspections, another key provision, are designed to help verify the accuracy of data, supplement coverage by national technical means, and complicate evasion activities. Baseline inspections will confirm the initial Memorandum of Understanding data, and 15 annual data update inspections

will help to verify any changes. If new SS-25 facilities are opened to accommodate any divisions moved from Belarus to Russia, for example, then the United States will have the right to conduct new facility inspections as well as close-out inspections to verify the elimination of the old bases. Conversion/elimination inspections are also permitted to confirm the destruction of SS-25 missiles and launchers. Inspections may also take place following an exercise dispersal to ensure that the actual number of SS-25s does not exceed the number of SS-25s declared for the base in question.

Open displays of SS-25 launchers at road-mobile missile bases, a START cooperative measure, will also help the intelligence community to monitor the number of missiles at ICBM garrisons by increasing the visibility of the force. The United States may request an open display of up to 25 launchers or ten percent of the entire force, whichever is larger. During an open display, the roof of the SS-25 single-bay garages must remain open, and the launchers must be located either halfway outside their garages or adjacent to them so that the SS-25s are readily visible to satellite reconnaissance. Concealment measures are prohibited during a display, which could last up to seven hours.

The United States currently possesses a strong intelligence base on the number and deployment practices of SS-25s. Assuming that Russia does not change SS-25 standard operating procedures in peacetime, the United States should be able to successfully verify the quantitative restrictions on deployed road-mobile ICBMs. Changes in deployment practices that might adversely affect US monitoring capabilities—at least in the short-term—include the deployment of SS-25s outside of declared deployment areas, or an increase in the number of SS-25s out of their garrisons at any one time. These types of activities, however, would violate the treaty. In crisis or wartime, of course, it is likely that SS-25 deployment practices would change in order to impede US targeting efforts.

Lessons Learned

One important lesson from the Gulf War is that effective mobile missile monitoring in peacetime or targeting during war requires a long-term collection effort to create a sound intelligence base and improve target familiarity. US knowledge of the SS-25, supplemented with restrictive treaty provisions and inspections, will enhance the role of national technical means in START verification. Although a targeting mission requires more accurate information about the number, status, and location of deployed systems and their support units, a high degree of familiarity with peacetime force size and deployment and training practices can be invaluable during wartime. In Iraq, coalition forces might have fared better against the Al Hussein threat if they

had had a robust knowledge base similar to that developed for Soviet mobile missiles.

Another key factor is time. The speed with which intelligence data must be disseminated to support a targeting operation differs significantly from that needed to support arms control verification. Effective Iraqi use of deception techniques, communications security, and the desert terrain reduced the coalition's ability to detect, and thus target, the Al Hussein units before missile launch. In peacetime, arms control monitoring does not require time-critical data dissemination. Instead, evidence is gathered in a more cooperative environment with the objective of building confidence in force monitoring over an extended period. Thus, even if it were feasible for the Russians to implement significant changes to the SS-25 force, they would not permanently undermine US monitoring capabilities under START.

Mobile technology is spreading rapidly throughout the developing world. The increasing popularity of longer-range mobile systems, in particular, suggests that a dedicated collection effort against Third World missile programs would have considerable utility to preclude problems in a future crisis. Close attention must also remain focused on Russian strategic forces. Changes in the deployment, command and control, force structure, doctrine, and operations of the road-mobile missile force might be inevitable. The United States must continue its monitoring effort to preserve the soundness of its verification capability under START as well as to ensure a timely response in the event of crisis instability.

NOTES

1. Michael R. Boldrick, "The Message of the Scuds," *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 February 1991, p. A14. See also Jesse Helms, Letter to President Bush, 25 January 1991.

2. Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin has stated that US cities are no longer on the Commonwealth of Independent States' strategic target list, he did not mention the status of US military targets. "Yeltsin Drops U.S. Cities as Nuclear Targets," *International Herald Tribune*, 27 January 1992, p. 1.

3. See, for example, Michael Brower, "Targeting Soviet Mobile Missiles: Prospects and Implications," *Survival*, 31 (September/October 1989), 438.

4. US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, July 1991, p. 14-1. See also Craig Covault, "Reconnaissance Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 4 February 1991, p. 25; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity of Iraq's Scuds Complicate U.S. Search," *The Washington Post*, 20 January 1991, p. A31.

5. R. A. Mason, "The Air War in the Gulf," *Survival*, 33 (May/June 1991), 217. See also Vincent Kiernan, "War Tests Satellites' Prowess: Military Space Systems Put to Work During Desert Storm Conflict," *Space News*, 2 February 1991, p. 1.

6. Gene I. Rocklin and Chris C. Demchak, "The Gulf War: Technological and Organizational Implications," *Survival*, 33 (May/June 1991), 260-73.

7. Mason, p. 217.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 171. See also John Boatman and Barbara Starr, "Eyes of the Storm," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 May 1991, p. 735.

9. British Prime Minister John Major publicly acknowledged that Special Forces operations included targeting and destruction of mobile launchers behind enemy lines. See Michael Evans, "How the SAS Took Out the Scuds—By Major," *The Times* (London), 15 May 1991, p. 1.

10. Michael R. Gordon, "Desert Missions By Commandos Aided in Victory," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1991, p. A1. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Special Forces Carried Out Sabotage, Rescues Deep

in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 4 March 1991, p. A15, and Tony Capaccio, "Roving Royal Commandos Fingering Scuds for F-15Es," *Defense Week*, 28 May 1991, p. 6.

11. The US Army maintains, albeit to a lesser degree of confidence, that 70 percent of incoming Scuds in Saudi Arabia and 40 percent of those in Israel were successfully engaged. These figures are somewhat lower than the Army's original claims in early-to-mid 1991 that the Patriot successfully intercepted 80 percent of incoming Scuds in Saudi Arabia and 50 percent in Israel. These statistics were revised downward to the current figures in response to allegations by government officials, industry professionals, and academics that the estimations were not supported by the available data. George Lardner, Jr., "Army Cuts Claims of Patriot Success: Reduced Figures on Missile's Precision During Gulf War Are Ordered," *The Washington Post*, 8 April 1992, p. A1; and John Aloysius Farrell, "Pentagon Reduces Its Success Rate for Patriot in War," *Boston Globe*, 8 April 1992, p. 1.

12. Edward Cody, "Control of the Skies Eases High-Tech Hunt for Scud Launchers," *The Washington Post*, 4 February 1991, p. 13. See also Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm'—Update," *Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review*, 3 (May 1991), 225.

13. DOD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, p. 24-1.
14. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Iraqis Literally Dig In to Fortify Kuwait Defenses," *Washington Times*, 17 December 1990, p. A8.

15. Molly Moore, "Bombing Damage Hard to Assess: Officials Say They Can't Tell All They Know," *The Washington Post*, 7 February 1991, p. 21.

16. Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity of Iraq's Scuds Complicate U.S. Search," p. A31.

17. *Ibid.* It is also possible that the Iraqis were less concerned with maximizing missile circular error probable, given that the Al Hussein was used to attack urban areas.

18. Senator John Glenn of Ohio, for example, stated, "We couldn't even find those Scuds in the desert in a perfect sand background situation. What would we ever do if they were in a jungle or a forested area?" See "Testimony of General Norman Schwarzkopf Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Conduct of the Gulf War," *Federal News Service*, 12 June 1991, p. 9-13.

19. "The U.S. Commanders: Excerpts from Briefing By 2 Generals on War's First 36 Hours," *The New York Times*, 19 January 1991, p. 11.

20. William Claiborne, "Iraqi Scud Kills at Least 12 GIs," *The Washington Post*, 26 February 1991, pp. A1 and A9.

21. Allied intelligence did conduct an extensive search for German mobile missiles during World War II. At that time, however, photo-reconnaissance—the preeminent form of intelligence tasked against the V-2—was in its early stages of development. The hunt for the V-2 using photographic intelligence is documented in Constance Babington Smith, *Air Spy: The Story of Photographic Intelligence in World War II* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

22. DOD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, p. 14-1.

23. Smith, "Compactness, Simplicity of Iraqi Scuds Complicates U.S. Search," p. A31.

24. "Schwarzkopf Answers Reporters' Questions," *The Washington Post*, 28 February 1991, p. A37.

25. Office of Technology Assessment, *Verification Technologies: Measures for Monitoring Compliance with the START Treaty*, December 1990, pp. 7-8.

26. The Soviet Union declared 228 deployed SS-25s and launchers. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *START: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, 1991, p. 123.

27. The Lisbon Protocol, Article V, 23 May 1992.

28. Dunbar Lockwood, "Russia Ratifies START, Ukraine Reaffirms Conditions for Approval," *Arms Control Today*, 22 (November 1992), 32. But see Virginia I. Foran, "Ukrainian Holdout: The Real Problem With the Treaty," *The Washington Post*, 3 January 1993, p. C3.

29. Iraqi mobile Scuds appear to have been launched from three areas: the area in southeastern Iraq bounded by Basrah, Al Amarah, Al Nasiriyah, and Kuwait City; the area in central Iraq around Baghdad and Kirit; and the area in western Iraq bounded by Al Qaim, Al Haditha, and Al Rutba. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm,'" *Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review*, 3 (March 1991), 131.

30. Brower, p. 438.

31. According to a former commander of Strategic Air Command, General Jack Chain, in "But Can it Find A Scud in Russia? B-2 Critics Ask," *Defense Week*, 1 April 1991, pp. 11.

32. Road-mobile ICBMs may also leave the deployment area for an operational dispersal, a rare situation which would occur during a crisis to protect force survivability. See START, Art. VI.9.

Environmental Compliance: Implications for Senior Commanders

WILLIAM D. PALMER

Defense and the environment is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this real-world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns.

— Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 1990¹

Three recent criminal prosecutions of Army personnel for environmental crimes underscore the serious consequences that can attend environmental violations. In *U.S. v. Carr* a Federal jury convicted an Army civilian maintenance foreman at Fort Drum of criminal violations of the Superfund Law for having instructed subordinates to dump and bury cans of waste paint.² The court sentenced Mr. Carr to one year in prison, suspended the sentence, and ordered him to serve one year of supervised probation. Mr. Carr's supervisory chain suspended him without pay for one year pending the outcome of the case, then demoted him to a nonsupervisory position after his conviction. In *U.S. v. Dee*, a Federal jury convicted three Army civilian scientists from Aberdeen Proving Ground of criminal violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for failing to properly identify, store, and dispose of hazardous wastes generated by their chemical weapons laboratory.³ One of the defendants, Dr. William Dee, was the principal architect of the Army's binary chemical weapons program. The court sentenced each defendant to 1000 hours of community service and a suspended sentence of three years probation. In *U.S. v. Pond* a Federal jury convicted the foreman of the Fort Meade wastewater treatment plant of criminal violations of the Clean Water Act for failing to conduct required sampling and tests and for submitting false test reports.⁴ The court sentenced Mr. Pond to eight months

in prison and four months in-house detention to be followed by one year of supervised probation and monetary restitution.

How can Army leaders avoid having these unhappy outcomes visited upon either themselves or their subordinates? This essay will undertake to explain how.

The Army is committed to environmental compliance in its operations to a degree that would have shocked its leaders of 20 or even 15 years ago. The Secretary of Defense's statement at the head of this article demonstrates that this commitment extends to the highest levels in the Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff have been equally direct in their guidance regarding environmental compliance: "Although the primary mission of the United States Army is national defense, we are committed to protecting our environment and conserving our natural resource heritage both for ourselves and future generations."⁵ This commitment to environmental compliance may intimidate many of today's Army leaders who know of environmental law as a strange mixture of ominous acronyms (CERCLA, RCRA, NEPA, TOSCA) and who have heard such stories of the dire consequences of noncompliance as those above.

Environmental compliance obligations arise in many contexts. The installation commander typically runs a number of operations that come complete with a range of environmental compliance obligations. These operations include wastewater treatment plants, boiler plants, drinking water systems, solid waste disposal, range operations, and removal of hazardous wastes such as asbestos, to name some of the more obvious. Perhaps the obligations of the lower-level leader are not so obvious, but they are real. Motor pool operations generate hazardous wastes in the form of used oil and other lubricants and solvents that must be collected, labeled, stored, and disposed of properly. POL supply points require spill prevention and control plans, spill reports, and proper maintenance and record-keeping procedures. Army installations have recycling programs for paper, waste oil, lead, brass, and other materials. Army leaders are responsible for sanitation and waste disposal during field exercises and other deployments. A leader's failure to attend to the details of proper disposal of hazardous wastes can impair installation

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operations, as Fort Polk discovered to its sorrow when JP-4 aviation fuel flushed into the sewage treatment plant, destroyed the plant's ability to treat wastewater, and led to violations of the plant's discharge permit.⁶ Because environmental compliance obligations have become such an integral part of the Army's operational mission, leaders must become familiar with the nature of this system and its requirements.

What Is Environmental Law?

- *It Is a Product of the Legislative Process*

Environmental law is primarily statutory, meaning that a legislative body has determined what needs protection; what kind of protection is required; who ought to be subject to environmental standards; and the penalties for violations. Its statutory nature is the system's strength, since only a broad societal consensus could bring about significant change. But this statutory aspect also entails telling weaknesses since our nation's body of environmental law was passed piecemeal. Over time, Congress has addressed separate problems such as air pollution (Clean Air Act); water pollution (Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act); and hazardous waste sites (the Superfund Law, known formally as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA). This fragmented approach has resulted in a variety of environmental protection laws, each representing a separate set of political and technical judgments that frequently have little relationship to one another.⁷ Thus our existing environmental laws constitute an uneasy alliance, not unlike a coalition government of moderate leftists and centrists. They may share the same ultimate goal, but each represents a slightly or even markedly different approach to achieving that end. Army leaders and their staffs must monitor installation operations according to standards, requirements, and procedures that vary with the type of pollutant each operation is generating.⁸

The several executive agencies charged with implementing and enforcing this system of laws, principally the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state environmental regulatory agencies, further complicate the system as they tend to compartmentalize themselves along the lines of the laws they are implementing.⁹ Thus Army leaders are likely to deal with one regulatory official regarding air quality permits, another regarding wastewater treatment plant operations, and another regarding hazardous waste programs. Unfortunately, our system of environmental laws has made one-stop shopping for environmental compliance impossible in most states.

These same executive agencies have added to the complex nature of environmental law with their own bodies of regulations that further interpret the requirements of the statutes passed by the legislatures. These regulations have the force of law and are as enforceable as the statutes themselves.¹⁰

The system of environmental laws is thus not a coherent whole, but rather a series of legislative judgments and executive interpretations about the appropriate approach to each specific type of pollution. Army leaders as a result confront great complexity in implementing the requirements of this system.

- *Environmental Law Is Recent*

Considering how broadly our system of environmental laws has affected life in the Army and in the nation in general—influencing everything from where we can conduct maneuver training to the contents of our underarm deodorant—one might assume that it has been with us for many years. But this system is very young, with most of our existing federal environmental laws dating back only to the early 1970s.¹¹

The fact that our environmental laws are recent has several significant implications for Army leaders. These laws were in many ways experimental, since they imposed controls for the first time. The same lawmaking bodies that created the statutes and implementing regulations have amended them repeatedly, refining their experimental approaches to pollution control.¹² Army leaders can expect to confront difficulties in managing environmental compliance programs caused in part by regulatory agencies unable to keep up with the changes in their own authorizing statutes or with the state of environmental technology and science.¹³ Army leaders must respond to the flux in environmental laws by creating a command climate that accommodates this constant change in the environmental compliance system. Such a climate will include seeking out and funding training opportunities for the installation's environmental management, legal, safety, and industrial hygiene staff. Likewise, Army leaders must recognize the need for periodic refresher training for members of their commands whose duties include environmentally sensitive operations such as vehicle maintenance, POL handling, and ammunition disposal.

Finally, these comparatively new laws and their implementing regulations can lead to delays in obtaining the approvals required for complying with the law in a particular situation. The often-untested techniques available for responding to a unique pollution prevention situation lead to a predictable institutional inertia. Higher commands may prove unwilling to approve a new approach until they have subjected it to a lengthy staffing and review process. The regulatory agency charged with enforcing the law at the installation level will face the same dilemma through its supervisory chain. If the tried and true methods do not apply in a given situation, Army leaders are likely to find themselves picking their way through a minefield of vague or even conflicting guidance from regulators and higher command and staff elements.

As our system of environmental law matures, and it is doing so quickly, regulatory agencies and the military are developing greater familiarity with the range of issues and options involved in a given pollution control situation. As we confront fewer "first times" in our environmental compliance

issues, we will find the solutions more readily, and the compliance process will become less contentious and frustrating.

- *Environmental Law Is Technology-Based*

Our system of environmental laws relies heavily on science and technology to accomplish its mission. For example, the statutes and their implementing regulations rely on scientific studies to establish standards for acceptable levels of pollutants.¹⁴ The discharge permit a state grants to an installation wastewater treatment plant under the Clean Water Act provides a typical example. The discharge permit will give numeric limits, expressed in seven- and 30-day arithmetic means and amounts per liter, for the constituents of a plant's wastewater discharge. The state will set these limits based on the efficiency of the technology the plant uses to treat wastewater. The permit will also specify monitoring, testing, and reporting requirements. Every one of these numeric limits, tests, and reports constitutes a legally enforceable obligation.

The technical nature of environmental law with its scientific and technology-based compliance standards can cause apprehension. But Army leaders confronting a pollution compliance problem quickly develop a working familiarity with the scientific and technological issues involved in the problem. Every installation has staff officers in the office of the staff judge advocate and environmental management office whose job is to assist commanders to identify and resolve environmental compliance issues. Developing a working knowledge of technical or scientific concepts as they apply to an environmental compliance problem is no different from developing a working knowledge of any other part of an operational mission which needs attention.

- *Environmental Law Is Participatory*

Our system of environmental laws boldly goes where no law has gone before in providing generous public access to military installations and to military decisionmaking. The system frequently opens the front gates of an Army installation and the rationale for installation environmental decisions to public inspection. Congress mandated this openness to generate public support for environmental actions through community input in the environmental decisionmaking process.¹⁵

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Superfund Law are good examples of this legislative tendency. NEPA requires the now-familiar Environmental Assessment/Environmental Impact Statement before any federal action which significantly affects the environment.¹⁶ The regulations governing the impact statement require public notice and encourage public involvement in evaluating the proposed project and its alternatives. This public involvement can include public meetings, correspondence with uniquely affected persons, and opportunities to submit written or oral comments regarding the proposed action.¹⁷ The Army leader responsible for a hazardous waste site

cleanup under the Superfund Law must publish a notice of the proposed Remedial Action Plan the Army intends to use to accomplish the cleanup. The Army must provide a reasonable opportunity for written and oral comments and must hold a public meeting regarding the plan.¹⁸

This potentially high level of public involvement in installation-level decisionmaking can be upsetting to the Army leader who is accustomed to running his command as a personal fiefdom. Success in the public participation component of the Army's environmental compliance mission requires the active and effective involvement of the installation public affairs officer.

Beyond the public participation envisioned in NEPA and Superfund, Congress strongly believes in the effectiveness of permitting citizens to sue to enforce the requirements of environmental laws. Joe Citizen may bring suit against any polluter, including military installations and their leadership, who stands in violation of environmental protection laws.¹⁹ Congress envisioned the citizen's suit as a goad to effective enforcement by regulatory agencies like the EPA and as a direct enforcement tool to be used against polluters.²⁰ This vision has come to pass as concerned individuals and groups file large numbers of citizen suits each year. The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act is particularly popular, generating over 880 lawsuits between 1983 and 1988. And this figure, impressive though it is, doesn't tell the whole story. Just one environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense Council, during 1984 issued 121 notices of intent to sue under the Clean Water Act citizen suit section and ultimately elected to file suit in only 13 of those cases.²¹ In 1989 the council used the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision to send a notice of intent to sue the US Military Academy for previous Clean Water Act violations.²² The council never filed its threatened lawsuit, as West Point was able to convince it that the problems leading to those past violations had been corrected. Army leaders grappling with an environmental compliance issue are thus not insulated from public or judicial review of their decisionmaking and must in many cases expect and provide for meaningful involvement by parties outside the installation.

- *Environmental Law Relies Heavily on State Enforcement*

Although Congress clearly intended to move out smartly in attacking pollution through the flurry of environmental protection legislation it passed in the 1970s, many of these laws placed the enforcement and implementation burden on the states. Commentators have referred to this system of state implementation and enforcement of federal standards, goals, and guidance as Cooperative Federalism or New Federalism.²³

But Congress had to do more than simply assign the enforcement and implementation mission to the states if it wished to give the states regulatory authority over military installations. Congress also waived federal sovereign immunity in every environmental protection statute, enabling states as well

as citizens to sue military installations and their leadership to enforce the pollution laws.²⁴

Congress's message in these waiver provisions is blunt: military installations must comply with all environmental laws just like the glue factory outside the gate. The state or local officials who enforce the environmental laws against the glue factory have the legal authority to enforce the same compliance standards against Army installations. Army leaders must be prepared to open their installations to state and local environmental officials and to cooperate with those officials to resolve any compliance problems their inspections reveal.²⁵ The days when the military could retreat within its reservation enclaves and pursue its national defense mission as it saw fit are long gone. Congress has made the states full partners in a national defense mission which includes environmental protection and preservation.

• *Environmental Law Has Teeth*

As we have seen, our environmental laws have tough enforcement mechanisms which military installations are encountering with greater frequency. Violations of environmental compliance obligations generally expose the violator to civil and criminal penalties and to the possibility of having to cease operations pending resolution of the violation. These legal sanctions, whether civil or criminal, are frequently keyed to each day of violation, making continuing violations especially costly.²⁶

The courses that federal and state environmental regulatory agencies will pursue in their early enforcement efforts against a facility are similar. The agency will first issue a Notice of Violation (NOV), identifying the alleged violation and requesting action to remedy the situation. This should be the commander's call to arms if he is not already aware of and working to resolve the problem. If the agency is not satisfied with his response to the NOV, it will usually issue a proposed Compliance Agreement or Compliance Order which will establish specific objectives the commander is responsible for meeting within specified time frames.²⁷

If the enforcement agency is the EPA and it is unsuccessful in getting the federal violator's attention using the NOV and Compliance Order, it will refer the dispute to EPA headquarters for resolution between EPA headquarters and Department of the Army.²⁸ The EPA will not bring civil suits nor, in most cases, levy civil penalties against noncompliant federal facilities.²⁹

On the other hand, if the frustrated enforcement agency is a state environmental regulatory agency, it will likely escalate its enforcement efforts by filing suit and seeking civil penalties or a court order to enforce its Compliance Order. The states are not subject to the same constraints the EPA imposes on itself and therefore have a wider variety of enforcement actions available to them.³⁰

Prosecutorial authority over criminal violations of environmental laws rests principally with the Department of Justice and the US attorneys in the federal districts.³¹ Each of the three criminal prosecutions discussed at the beginning of this article were litigated by US attorneys. The legal principles arising from these cases and the criteria federal prosecutors consider in deciding whether to prosecute environmental violations are useful to Army leaders. They serve as guides for implementing environmental compliance programs and for responding to reports of violations.

Because environmental laws are designed to protect the public from dangers against which individuals cannot reasonably protect themselves, a prosecutor is not required to prove that violators knew their actions were illegal. The offense is complete so long as the violators act voluntarily, knowing that they are dealing with hazardous materials. The court that convicted the Aberdeen scientists in *U.S. v. Dee* was restating a well-established legal principle when it found that in this context "ignorance of the law is no defense."³² This principle demonstrates that Army leaders who fail to comply with known environmental compliance obligations risk criminal prosecution even when they may be unaware that their action or failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Furthermore, Supreme Court cases from corporate settings imply that if commanders insulate themselves from discovering such violations, the "Responsible Corporate Officer" doctrine may hold them criminally responsible for those violations.³³ Thus Army leaders responsible for environmental compliance ignore or attempt to evade that responsibility at their peril.

What Should a Commander Do?

What course ought an Army leader concerned with environmental compliance pursue to avoid such penalties as have faced other violators? The Department of Justice policy for evaluating environmental violations provides useful guidance concerning behavior the Department wants to encourage. This policy considers a number of circumstances which militate against prosecution. Did the agency voluntarily disclose the violation? Did the agency cooperate in remedying the violation? Does the agency have an active environmental monitoring and compliance program? How pervasive is the noncompliance? Did the agency take disciplinary action itself where warranted?³⁴ Where these factors are positive, the US attorney is unlikely to seek criminal indictments.

The degree of knowledge the government must prove in environmental prosecutions and the factors prosecutors consider in assessing violations suggest that Army leaders must meet two fundamental obligations to avoid sanctions for environmental violations. First, such leaders must act affirmatively to ensure an effective environmental monitoring and compliance program is in place. Second, they must respond promptly and in good faith to any violations uncovered by this in-house program or by environmental

regulatory agencies. The Army has incorporated these obligations into its regulations, making them an integral part of a commander's mission.³⁵

Army leaders have a legal and environmental staff to assist them in implementing an effective environmental compliance program. This compliance program must include periodic environmental audits.³⁶ An installation's most recent audit and the management plan developed to address problems identified in the audit provide a good place for an incoming installation commander to begin. An Army leader seeking specific guidance concerning how to implement a comprehensive environmental compliance program will find it in the *Commander's Guide to Environmental Compliance*, which is available through the US Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency.³⁷ Army Regulations 200-1 and 200-2 contain further guidance in defining a commander's environmental compliance mission. Army leaders who are not installation commanders can use the same professional staff and references to identify their own environmental compliance obligations. They can, for example, call upon the installation environmental coordinator for assistance in identifying the environmental compliance issues in the operations of their subordinate command, tenant activity, or operational directorate.

Environmental compliance is a cooperative effort. This means Army leaders must ensure that staff members and the operational elements they serve communicate with one another concerning environmental compliance issues. This also means reporting violations to environmental regulators and cooperating with them to remedy the problem. Army leaders who treat environmental compliance as an important part of their mission are unlikely to feel the bite of our system of environmental laws.

The Army's commitment to environmental compliance is summarized in the following set of environmental quality goals published as Army policy in AR 200-1.³⁸

- Demonstrate leadership in protecting and improving the environment.
- Minimize environmental impacts while maximizing readiness.
- Integrate environmental considerations into Army decisionmaking.
- Restore lands and waters damaged by past Army waste disposal practices.
- Support recycling programs to conserve natural resources and minimize generation of wastes.
- Actively address environmental quality issues in relations with neighboring communities.

This aggregate commitment is more than just a promise to be good. It obliges Army leaders to be environmentally conscious in their decision-making, in their relations with the civilian community, in field and garrison, and in correcting past mistakes. They must live with and ultimately overcome

a legacy of environmental neglect. Their efforts are typified by the massive restoration projects underway at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and a host of other installations where the Army has seriously damaged the environment in past operations.³⁹ These undertakings indicate that the Army is committed to the proposition that protecting the environment is an integral part of its duty.

Notwithstanding all this, some commanders may yet be tempted to think, "I have a mission to accomplish and being 'environmentally conscious' would just get in the way—I'm going to do what I need to do to get the mission done." But Army leaders cannot disregard environmental compliance in the name of "the mission." Complying with laws and regulations that apply to operations is as much a part of the mission as anything else. Dr. Dee honestly believed he was doing his job and serving the best interests of his nation by accomplishing his chemical weapons development mission at Aberdeen Proving Ground without having to waste time with the petty details of proper labeling, storage, and disposal of hazardous substances. He was wrong, and he and his subordinate supervisors paid a heavy price for failing to recognize their environmental compliance obligations. Prosecuting attorneys will go after the senior responsible official. The next higher official after Dr. Dee wore a green uniform with stars on the shoulders. That commanding general would have been a defendant had the FBI established that he was aware of and failed to act on his knowledge of the sloppy hazardous waste handling and disposal practices at Dr. Dee's facilities.

Our nation's system of environmental laws imposes significant obligations on Army leaders and enforces those obligations with public involvement in environmental decisionmaking and state enforcement authority over federal military installations. The system is complex, but the essential obligations of an Army leader are basic: to ensure environmental accountability in their operations and to respond effectively to violations of compliance obligations. In each case Army leaders can look to the installation-level environmental management cells in the engineering directorate and the office of the staff judge advocate for assistance in sorting out the technical and legal specifics of any compliance obligation.

Every Army leader shares responsibility for meeting the Army's obligations and pursuing the Army's goals in the area of environmental compliance. It's part of the mission. Environmental compliance is not just a good idea for its own sake. It's a good way to stay out of jail.

NOTES

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1. Address by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney at a forum titled "Defense and the Environmental Initiative," September 1990. For a strong statement that the Army is not yet fully awake to its responsibilities in the area of environmental compliance, see Kent H. Butts, "Army Strategy for Environmental Success," Strategic Studies Institute Report (US Army War College), 1 August 1991.

2. U.S. v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989).

3. U.S. v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).

4. U.S. v. Pond, (D.Md. January 24, 1991), described in Information Paper by Gary M. Perolman, Environmental Law Division, US Army Legal Services Agency, "Fort Meade Civilian Employee Conviction," 14 March 1991 (on file with author).

5. Department of the Army, *Commander's Guide to Environmental Compliance* (Washington: GPO, 1989), p. 3.

6. Louisiana sent Fort Polk a Notice of Intent to Sue for violations of the Clean Water Act in 1984. Waste JP-4 jet fuel dumped into the post's sewage system had knocked out the post's wastewater treatment plant by killing the microbes the system used to treat its sewage. Fort Polk avoided litigation by reporting the violations and constructing grease/oil traps and a tertiary treatment facility. Information Paper by Captain William D. Palmer, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 5th Infantry Division and Fort Polk, "Fort Polk's Efforts to Correct Violations of Effluent Discharge Standards," 11 April 1985 (on file with author).

7. Al Alm, "A Dream That Hasn't Come True," *EPA Journal* (September-October 1990), p. 13.

8. The legislative process can also complicate the system of environmental laws by reacting precipitously to a perceived need, creating a statute which is exceptionally obtuse even by the standards of environmental statutes. The Superfund Law is a case in point. Even courts applying CERCLA have been impressed by its unique opacity and have said so: "Rushed through a lame duck session of Congress [Congress patched the law together during the last months of the Carter Administration], CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history." *State of Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff*, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n. 12 (N.D. Ohio, 1983). When it passed CERCLA, Congress bypassed the usual conference committee procedures, which tend to rectify dysfunctional sections of legislative proposals and generate clear expressions of what Congress is trying to accomplish. So Congress left courts and those of us subject to regulation under CERCLA to figure out what Congress intended.

9. Alm, supra note 3 at 13-14.

10. The regulatory agencies promulgating these regulations are acting pursuant to authority delegated to them by either the President or the Congress.

11. Only the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. (U.S. Code) §§ 4321-4370e (1988), predates the 1970s. Other environmental legislation was around prior to the 1970s, particularly in the area of air and water pollution, but it proved singularly ineffective. Congress passed the following major environmental legislation in the ten years from 1970 through 1980: The Clean Air Act in 1970 (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988); The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (The Clean Water Act—CWA) in 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1972 (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act in 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988); The Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988); The Endangered Species Act in 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988); The Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976 (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988); The Solid Waste Disposal Act as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988); and The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act in 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).

12. Congress has significantly amended the major federal environmental statutes numerous times: FIFRA, 5 times; TSCA, 2; CZMA, 3; ESA, 3; FWPCA, 5; MPRSA, 3; NEPA, 1; RCRA, 3; CAA, 2; CERCLA, 1.

13. On more than one occasion while the author was assigned as the Post Judge Advocate at Sierra Army Depot and involved in negotiations with California environmental regulators, the command confronted the difficult situation of the California legislature amending California's environmental laws faster than the regulatory agency could respond with appropriate implementing regulations. When the command asked for regulatory approval for a specific action or procedure the response was the institutional equivalent of a shrug of the shoulders. The regulators did not know whether they could approve the request, yet the Army had a clear legal obligation to act in response to an environmental problem.

14. The Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988), orders the Administrator of EPA to prepare and periodically revise a list of air pollutants which endanger public health and welfare. He has accomplished this in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which establish the maximum concentrations of such pollutants consistent with human health, 40 C.F.R. (Code of Federal Regulations) § 50.1 and following. The principal goal of the Clean Air Act is to achieve these concentrations or lower concentrations in every part of the United States.

15. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d sess. 90 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2872.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
17. Army Regulation 200-2, *Environmental Effects of Army Actions*, Chapter 7, (23 December 1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9617 and 9620(f) (1988), implemented in Army Regulation 200-1, *Environmental Protection and Enhancement*, para. 9-11 (23 April 1990) (hereinafter AR 200-1).
19. The only major federal environmental laws not containing a citizen suit provision are The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988); The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988) (a research- and grant-oriented law); and The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
20. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, supra note 13 at 2965 and 3206.
21. Sygmunt J. B. Plater, Robert H. Abrams, William Goldfarb, *Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law and Society*, at 857 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1992).
22. Letter, Nora J. Chorover, Project Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, ca. March-April 1989 (on file with author).
23. See Frederick R. Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock, *Environmental Protection: Law and Policy*, at 357 (2d ed.; New York: Little, Brown, 1990), and Laurent R. Hourcade, *Environmental Law for the Air Force*, at 20 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1987).
24. The waiver language in the Clean Water Act is typical: "Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive . . . [branch] of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, and employee thereof in the performance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and comply with, all federal state, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. . . . This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of law." 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); and 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988) (CERCLA).
25. The President further emphasized federal facilities' environmental compliance obligations in Executive Order 12088, first signed by President Carter in 1978 and subsequently adopted by each succeeding President. This Order directs agency heads to comply with applicable pollution control standards and mandates an environmental planning process within each agency which includes pollution control plans, consolidated funding requests, interagency cooperation, and dispute resolution procedures. Exec. Order No. 12,088, *Federal Compliance With Pollution Control Standards*, 403 *Fed. Reg.* 23,478 (1978).
26. The Clean Water Act's penalty provision at § 309 is typical. It authorizes temporary or permanent injunctions; criminal penalties of up to \$25,000 per day of violation and one year in prison for negligent violations; criminal penalties of up to \$50,000 per day of violation and three years imprisonment for knowing violations; civil penalties of up to \$25,000 per day of violation; and administrative penalties of up to \$10,000 per day of violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988).
27. US Environmental Protection Agency, *Federal Facilities Compliance Strategy*, at VI-4 through VI-9 (Washington: GPO, 1988).
28. *Id.* at VI-9 through VI-12.
29. *Id.* at VI-3.
30. *Id.* at VI-1.
31. Headquarters, Department of the Army Message, 162004Z Mar 89, Subject: Environmental Liability (on file with author).
32. *U.S. v. Dec.* 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), quoting *U.S. v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp.* 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
33. *U.S. v. Park*, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
34. Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, Memorandum to all US Attorneys, "Exercise of Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion for Environmental Violations," 3 June 1991 (on file with author).
35. AR 200-1, paragraph 1-25a.
36. AR 200-1, paragraph 12-8.
37. Commander, US Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency, ATTN: CETHA-EC, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. 21010-5401 DSN 584-4714 (410) 671-4714.
38. AR 200-1, paragraph 1-38.
39. The EPA has listed 36 Army installations or sites on the National Priorities List, which identifies the most dangerous hazardous waste sites in the nation. 40 C.F.R. § 300 App. B.

Domestic Disturbances and the Military: The Canadian Experience

JOEL J. SOKOLSKY

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In April 1992, the Canadian government issued its first comprehensive post-Cold War statement on defense policy.¹ The revolutionary changes in the international strategic environment, combined with domestic budgetary pressures, necessitated new approaches to national and international security. Although the 1992-93 defense budget of CDN\$12.3 billion² represents an increase of \$230 million over the previous year, this will cover only expected inflation. Combined with the cuts of \$2.2 billion instituted in the February 1992 budget, the Department of National Defence has lost nearly \$6 billion from previously planned funding levels since 1989.³ The strength of the Canadian Forces⁴ will be reduced from approximately 84,000 regulars to 75,000 by 1995-96. Greater reliance will be placed on reserves, with the Primary Reserves increasing from the present 29,000 to 40,000.⁵

All Canadian forces will be withdrawn from Europe over the next two years, ending a 40-year presence. Nevertheless, Canada will retain a commitment to international collective defense and security. The April 1992 statement reaffirms Canada's commitment to European security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North American security through the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and international stability through the United Nations. Consistent with what Ottawa views as the new NATO strategy of mobility and flexibility, Canada will commit home-based ground and air forces for allied contingencies as well as for continued participation in NATO naval operations and the Airborne Early Warning System. The new policy attaches particular importance to UN peacekeeping roles, which have increased over the past year. By October 1992 nearly 2000 Canadian Forces personnel were serving and another 2200 have been pledged.

This includes 1200 troops for Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they will escort humanitarian convoys, joining 1157 Canadians already deployed near the Croatian town of Daruvar and 750 to be sent to Somalia.⁶

While the new policy thus preserves Ottawa's traditional internationalist approach to Canadian defense policy, it also places special emphasis on domestic tasks for the forces. As the Minister of Defence remarked, "At home, threats other than of a military nature have appeared....[that] will necessitate the armed forces to provide to the civil authority support which is liable to assume critical importance."⁷ This includes supporting other government departments with surveillance and control of Canadian air and maritime space, including off-shore fishing grounds, assisting in search and rescue, and helping in environmental protection. In cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the national police force), Canadian Forces are employed in drug enforcement. More recently, the forces were directed to create an anti-terrorist team to replace the Mounties' soon-to-be disbanded Special Emergency Response Team.⁸ In a country with too much geography, with too few people living in widely separated population centers, and where political power and responsibility are fragmented between federal and provincial governments, the forces perform a number of essential domestic functions.

As part of the new emphasis upon domestic roles, the forces will also be relied upon to perform tasks "in aid of the civil power." The new defense statement observes:

Throughout Canada's history, it has been the practice to employ the armed forces to reinforce or supplement the civilian law enforcement agencies in preventing, suppressing, or controlling real or apprehended riots, insurrections, and other disturbances of the peace, whenever it was considered that civilian resources were inadequate or insufficient. Disciplined, well-trained, well-commanded troops employing well-established military doctrine are necessary to accomplish such tasks.⁹

Mention of this role in the new policy statement is itself neither surprising nor novel. In the late 1960s, when the forces were also being assigned new domestic tasks by the Trudeau government, the capability for

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low-intensity conflict, including the ability to deal with domestic disturbances, became an important mission, especially for Mobile Command.¹⁰ This role for the forces was brought vividly to the attention of the Canadian public in the summer of 1990 when nearly 5000 troops were called out to deal with tense situations at two native peoples' reserves in the province of Quebec following the shooting death of a provincial police officer. After a standoff of over two months, the forces were able to end the confrontation without further loss of life. The experience highlighted the continuing importance of the Canadian Forces in aid of the civil powers. It also raised questions about the internal security role of the military in a country where one of the standard historical works is subtitled *The Military History of an Unmilitary People*¹¹ and where being unmilitary has become a popular symbol of national identity.

Calling Out the Troops

There are two principal ways in which the Canadian Forces can be authorized to deal with civil unrest. First, the federal government may call out the troops under the Emergencies Act, which specifies several types of civil and military national emergencies where the federal government is authorized "to take special temporary measures that may not be appropriate in normal times" (Preamble). This act replaced the War Measures Act, originally written to deal with situations involving external hostilities. Since the War Measures Act permitted denial of basic legal rights, it was viewed as inappropriate in peacetime. Its shortcomings were brought to light in October 1970, when le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) abducted a British diplomat and a Quebec cabinet minister, the latter eventually being murdered. Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act on the grounds that the actions of the front constituted a real or apprehended insurrection. The military deployed widely, rounding up and detaining members of the FLQ, as well as some innocent citizens. Partly as a result of what were seen as such unjustified abuses, the older act was replaced by the Emergencies Act in 1988, which provides for better safeguards against arbitrary actions.

A second legal mechanism for calling out the troops is the National Defence Act. In the United States, state governments have the responsibility to maintain law and order, including dealing with riots and disturbances of the peace. States maintain a National Guard to back up the local police when its resources prove inadequate. In Canada, the provinces have no comparable force. (Indeed, only three provinces have their own police forces; the rest rely upon local police forces or, where there are none, on the Mounties.¹²) The National Defence Act gives a provincial attorney general the power to "requisition" elements of the Canadian Forces "in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the power of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of

an attorney general, considered as likely to occur."¹³ The requisition is made in writing to the Chief of the Defence Staff who must, under the law, comply. However, it is left up to the Chief, "or such officer" as the Chief may designate, to "call out such part of the Canadian forces as the Chief of the Defence Staff or that officer considers necessary."¹⁴

This authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff has created an unusual situation in that once the troops are called out under the National Defence Act, it would seem that the provincial and federal governments have surrendered some of their control over the military. When the federal government invokes the Emergencies Act, it must convene Parliament and obtain approval, thus making the military action subject to parliamentary supervision. However, when troops are called upon by a provincial government under the National Defence Act, the federal Parliament does not have to approve the response by the Chief.

This was the situation in the summer of 1990. When the Quebec government requested troops to deal with armed Mohawks at Oka and Kahnawake, the military had to respond. It was up to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, to decide on the extent of the military's support and how the operations would be undertaken. As the standoff continued, both the federal and Quebec governments adopted a hands-off policy, giving the Canadian Forces "full rein to handle the stalemate."¹⁵ As one commentator put it: "A Premier called for the Army and a Prime Minister confirmed the need for it. Both then promptly disappeared for the rest of the summer."¹⁶ It appeared that the military was fully in control and made all the crucial decisions.¹⁷ The military went further and assumed responsibility for media relations and informing the public.¹⁸ From de Chastelain to Mobile Command commander Lieutenant General Kent Foster to an array of colonels and majors, it was the military who took the lead in issuing press releases and holding briefings about what was taking place and why. This led to charges of censorship against the Canadian Forces by the media, particularly when the forces cut communications between reporters who stayed behind the barricades and those outside.¹⁹

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, reviewing the crisis, heard witnesses who suggested that the Prime Minister acted illegally because the Mohawk actions constituted an "armed insurrection" and therefore troops should have been dispatched only after parliamentary debate.²⁰ In its report, the committee also noted a number of concerns regarding the way in which the aid to the civil power provisions of the National Defence Act had been implemented, especially as regards the mandatory nature of the response and the lack of reporting and consultation with Parliament. The provincial governments needed to be more specific about the need for military action, it was claimed. Attention was drawn to "the discretion given the Chief of Defence Staff to decide the size and nature of the forces to be provided."²¹

Another concern raised by the committee was the "financial responsibility for use of armed forces in aid of civilian police forces."²² Under the old War Measures Act, the municipal government and then the provincial government had to reimburse the federal government when armed forces were requested. But when this act was replaced by the Emergencies Act in 1988, the cost of all aid to civil power operations was shifted to the federal government's Consolidated Revenue Fund, meaning all Canadian taxpayers. The direct and indirect costs of the Oka-Kahnawake operations amounted to some \$83.5 million. Desmond Morton suggests that the shift in cost responsibility may have "removed one practical deterrent to deploying troops in a police role. A free service is likely to be used" by provincial governments.²³ The Committee on Aboriginal Affairs included as one of its seven recommendations on the Mohawk crisis that a Commons committee be tasked with reviewing the National Defence Act "in light of concerns about the need for stronger review mechanisms and additional reporting requirements respecting the use of the armed forces as an aid to the civil power."²⁴

While the Canadian Forces did distinguish themselves during the Mohawk crisis, the experience had its bitter aftertaste, particularly with regard to relations with native groups and rights questions. Included in the report of the Commons Committee on Aboriginal Affairs was the suggestion of several witnesses that "there should be provision to ensure some independent human rights body has jurisdiction to hear and deal with complaints and human rights violations made against the military." Questions were also raised concerning "the ability of the Armed Forces to deal with conflicts involving native rights and whether Armed Forces personnel receive proper training in race relations."²⁵

Cautions for the Future

As the Canadian Forces enter a new era in which domestic tasks are likely to become more important, the military would do well to heed the concerns and recommendations of the Aboriginal Affairs Committee with regard to aid of civil power operations. This is particularly true in view of the military's natural temptation to seize upon the trend toward greater domestic involvement in order to better justify itself in an era of disappearing external threats.

Some voices in the Department of National Defence have suggested that military measures may be needed to help cope with domestic "political crises."²⁶ Other commentators have warned that future disturbances involving native groups could be larger, of longer duration, and more widespread and sophisticated than those of the summer of 1990. John Thompson, the Director of the Mackenzie Institute and a former member of the Army Reserve, argues that Ottawa has not learned the lesson "confirmed" by the events of the summer of 1990 about the "ancient role of the Army as the final instrument available to preserve the authority of the government."²⁷

A similar warning was recently sounded by Colonel K. T. Eddy, director of Land Studies at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Colonel Eddy laments the lack of operational training within the Canadian Forces. He argues that this deficiency could affect the ability of the forces to deal with a major internal disturbance through conduct of an actual military campaign:

While the Canadian Forces, especially the army, are capable of dealing with minor internal security threats by means of aid to the civil power, it is simply not capable of sustained operations against any large-scale threat. Of equal concern, the Canadian Forces are not capable of managing multiple threats, internal or external, simultaneously. A more sophisticated and responsive operational doctrine is required than now exists.²⁸

While the Canadian Forces may well require greater education in operational doctrine, it would be injurious to the standing and reputation of the Canadian military among the people of Canada if the prospect of widespread domestic unrest were to be overly emphasized as a justification for such training. Canadians view the primary role of their military as protection against external threats and as an instrument of foreign policy. Canadians are proud and supportive of the peacekeeping role their forces play around the world; they would not want to have domestic peacekeeping become the military's *raison d'être*.

Thus too much emphasis upon aid to the civil roles and the need for greater domestic capabilities could backfire on the Canadian Forces and undermine their standing with the Canadian public. General Dan Loomis wrote of the FLQ crisis that there was "not much glory" in that experience.²⁹ As much as the forces are necessary and can be counted upon to come to the aid of the civil power in a thoroughly professional and disciplined manner, there are really "no victors in civil disorder."³⁰ Nothing could do more to further alienate the military from the people of Canada than for it to come to be regarded as the Canadian equivalent of the notorious national guard forces found in some Latin American countries.

The Armed Forces and the Constitutional Crisis

Recent discussion of the proper role for the Canadian Forces in cases of domestic violence has become particularly sensitive in light of Canada's on-going constitutional crisis. An effort to finally solve the crisis was made in August 1992 when the federal government, the provincial premiers, and native leaders reached a complex agreement on revising the constitution. It was put to a national referendum on 26 October 1992. Most Canadians rejected the agreement (54.5 to 45.5 percent), with majorities in six of ten provinces, including Quebec, voting against. Because the agreement was

rejected across the country, not just in Quebec, its defeat has left the future of that province in confederation still uncertain. (Although, ironically, support for sovereignty within Quebec declined slightly in the wake of the referendum.) The Mulroney government has stated that it will not reopen constitutional talks. The next crucial event is therefore likely to be the provincial elections in Quebec expected within a year. If the separatist Parti Quebecois wins, it has said it will quickly hold another referendum—in Quebec only—on sovereignty, thus heating up the unity crisis again.

General de Chastelain has stated that it is not the role of the armed forces to maintain the unity of the country. The forces would be used only to maintain law and order.³¹ The fear in some quarters is that should the people of Quebec vote in a referendum for separation, there might be civil unrest involving Anglophones and native groups who do not wish to be part of an independent Quebec. The federal government may have to call upon the military to protect lives and restore order.³²

In Quebec, such fears have been dismissed as “sabre-rattling” by Anglophones trying to frighten Francophones into rejecting sovereignty.³³ Minority and native groups, it is argued, have nothing to fear and will not have to call upon the Canadian army to protect them. As one recent editorial observed, Canadians will settle their constitutional crisis “with words and ballots, not bullets. . . . Canada faces a referendum, not a civil war, on its continued existence. That fact alone goes far to show why this much-blessed country is worth preserving and celebrating for at least another 125 years.”³⁴

However, as a national institution the Canadian Forces could well be torn asunder by a breakdown in national unity. Not only are there major military installations located in Quebec, but the forces themselves have long ceased to be an Anglo-Canadian bastion. Beginning in the late 1960s, a policy of bilingualization was adopted throughout the federal government, including the armed forces. The percentage of Francophones, mainly from Quebec, gradually rose until by 1990 they constituted 27.1 percent of the Canadian Forces, nearly equal to the percentage in Canada. In addition, French-speaking units were created. This policy has generally been regarded as a success, making the forces more reflective of the bilingual nature of the country and helping to promote national unity. Francophones have served with distinction and held numerous senior appointments, including that of Chief of the Defence Staff.³⁵

The loyalty to the federal government of the vast majority of Francophone members of the Canadian Forces is unquestioned. Overall, it would appear that most would prefer that Canada remain united. Yet, in a situation where the majority of the citizens of Quebec had indicated a preference for sovereignty, and Quebec declared unilateral independence, there would then exist two democratically elected national governments. Many Francophones would be under tremendous pressure and might find it difficult to serve the

government in Ottawa rather than the new sovereign government in Quebec City. The latter would then have at its disposal a well-trained and disciplined military.³⁶ Jocelyn Coulon, though discounting the prospect of civil violence, stipulates that "Quebec separatists have to be ready to deal with all scenarios and that one of the best means to assure Quebec security would be to build a dissuasive force to deter any violent outcomes."³⁷ All of this raises the nightmarish specter of the Canadian military splitting in two with each side coming to the aid of opposing civil powers.³⁸

One hopes that Canada will be able to solve its constitutional crisis and remain a united country. If, unfortunately, this proves impossible, then at least new arrangements with Quebec should be made with a view to precluding violence and having to resort to fragmenting Canadian Forces to maintain law and order. There are good reasons to expect that this will be the case. As heated as the constitutional debate became, there was never even the faintest hint of violence throughout the recent referendum campaign and after. Ideally, the terms and conditions of Quebec independence could be settled through negotiation before legal separation actually takes place. At the same time, an element of uncertainty and danger exists. Thus there can be no absolute assurance that this peaceable kingdom of unmilitary people will be immune to domestic strife if the 125-year-old confederation begins quickly to unravel. The world today is full of examples of political change gone out of control and turned violent. It is because of the violence now plaguing other parts of the world that the new Canadian statement on defense policy places such particular emphasis upon peacekeeping on foreign shores. How tragically ironic it would be if Canada's overseas forces had to be recalled to perform a peacekeeping role in their own country. Perhaps some consideration of this chilling prospect will help Canada's political leaders solve the national unity crisis which continues to hover just over the horizon.

NOTES

1. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy* (Ottawa: 1992).

2. This is out of a total budget of \$159.6 billion or approximately 7.7 percent. In terms of Gross Domestic Product, Canada has spent about two percent on defense for most of the past 20 years.

3. *Canadian Defence Policy*, p. 14.

4. During the 1960s, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Canadian Army were unified into a single body, the Canadian Forces. Unification of the three services involved two steps. The first, in 1966, involved the integration of the three service headquarters into a single National Defence Headquarters under a single Chief of the Defence Staff. The CDS presided over a unified staff, although the three services continued to exist and had their own chiefs. In 1969 the services themselves were abolished and all forces adopted the same uniform. Since then, although unification has been retained, some of the distinctive service identities, as well as different uniforms, have been reintroduced, with Air Command, Maritime Command, and Mobile Command inheriting the roles and traditions of the air force, navy, and army, respectively.

5. *Canadian Defence Policy*, p. 14. The Supplementary Ready Reserve remains at 25,000.

6. John Ward, "Troops Stretched, Analysts Warn," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 2 September 1992, p. A4; "Canadian Peacekeepers Being Sent to Tense Northern Bosnia," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 September 1992, p. A10.

7. Tom Naumetz, "Army Issues Warning: Military May Be Needed At Home," *The Ottawa Sun*, 28 February 1992, p. 19.

8. David Pugliese, "Armed Forces to Replace RCMP Anti-terrorist Team," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 6 March 1992, p. A3.
9. *Canadian Defence Policy*, p. 6. See also Desmond Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets: The Canadian Experience of Aid of the Civil Power 1968-1990," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 20 (April 1991), 30.
10. Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets," p. 33.
11. George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1954).
12. The three provincial police forces are the Surete du Quebec, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary.
13. *National Defence Act* (1985), Section 275. See also, H. A. McLearn, "Canadian Arrangements for Aid of the Civil Power," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 1 (Summer 1971), 28; Brian Cuthbertson, *Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), pp. 243-52.
14. *National Defence Act*, Section 278.
15. Rheal Seguin, "Armed Forces Left in Charge of Oka Crisis," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 September 1990, p. A1.
16. John Thompson, "There Are None So Foolish," *National Network News*, 1 (15 July 1992), 10.
17. This might have been a wise move since it was reported that the Canadian Forces refused several requests from the Quebec government that troops attack the Mohawks and that several senior officers threatened to resign "rather than do what the Quebec cabinet wanted." See "Army Wouldn't Attack Mohawks," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 13 March 1991, p. A4.
18. Patricia Poirier, "PR Role at Oka Won Army Over," *The Globe and Mail*, 25 October 1990, p. A5.
19. Bruce Ward, "Censored," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 November 1990, p. 2. For the military's account of the operations see, J. A. Roy, "Operation Salon," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 20 (April 1991), 15-19.
20. Geoffrey York, "P. M. Ignored Rule of Law During Mohawk Crisis, Panel Told," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 November 1990, p. A3.
21. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, *The Summer of 1990* (Ottawa: May 1991), pp. 26-27.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
23. Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets," p. 34.
24. Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, *The Summer of 1990*, p. 32.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
26. Naumetz, "Army Issues Warning," p. 19.
27. Thompson, "There Are None So Foolish," p. 10.
28. K. T. Eddy, "The Canadian Forces and the Operational Level of War," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 21 (Spring 1992), 22.
29. Dan G. Loomis, *Not Much Glory: An Account of the Canadian Forces Adaptation to the FLQ Crisis and Other Low Intensity Conflicts* (Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, 1974).
30. Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets," p. 34.
31. "Le role de l'armee n'est pas de se battre pour l'unite du pays, soutient Chastelain," *La Presse* (Montreal), 7 December 1991, p. C3; "Le general de Chastelain affirme que 'ses' soldats n'auront pas a intervenir," *Le Soleil* (Quebec), 11 December 1991, p. 1.
32. Paul Gessell, "Quebec Media Take Aim at Sabre-rattling Anglos," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 23 December 1991, p. A3.
33. Gessell, "Quebec Media Take Aim," p. A3.
34. "Something Worth Celebrating," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 30 June 1992, p. B2. See also Jocelyn Coulon, "The Quebec Dimension," in *Divided We Fall. The National Security Implications of Canadian Constitutional Issues*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 81.
35. See J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 244-48; Claude Manzagol, "Les Forces Armees Canadiennes. Fiche Signalétique," *Cahiers de Geographie Du Quebec*, 34 (December 1990), 356-57; Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces, Vol. 1. The Fear of a Parallel Army* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986).
36. Jocelyn Coulon, *En Premiere Ligne: Grandeurs Et Miseres Du System Militaire Canadien* (Montreal: Le Jour, 1991), p. 265.
37. Jocelyn Coulon, "The Quebec Dimension," in Morrison, *Divided We Fall*, p. 81.
38. For a discussion of this pessimistic scenario, see Desmond Morton, "The Canadian Security Dimension," in Morrison, *Divided We Fall*, pp. 69-75.

Commentary & Reply

ON TRAINING THE RESERVE FORCE

To the Editor:

The article "Reserve Force Training After the Gulf War" by Colonels Lawrence D. Richardson and Abbott A. Brayton (*Parameters*, Summer 1992) was informative and thoughtful.

The authors identified the reason for the Army Guard's success in Desert Shield and Storm as "collective or unit mission training." Peacetime collective training provided the Army with mission-capable Guard units at the time of mobilization; that's unprecedented for reserve force mobilizations. Yes, leaving retraining of individual skills for post-mobilization was the intent; those skills are quick, easy to teach, and not equipment-intensive, which permits major items to be deployed early, before actual troop deployment. As a matter of fact, many if not most Guard units could have been deployed directly from home station with no loss of unit efficiency.

Richardson and Brayton mentioned certain individual survival training that needed to be conducted at the mobilization stations. These training shortfalls were not "war stoppers" and could have been achieved incident to deployment either in or out of the United States. As the article states, using the short period between mobilization and deployment for improving individual soldier skills "was probably the correct approach." It was indeed the correct approach and could and should have been applied to both combat and support units.

Does collective training prioritize the NCO out of the individual training business? I think not. Collective training vitalizes the NCO's responsibilities and provides a realistic environment in which to train and mentor subordinates. Of course, the key to success is the NCO knowing his business. Ergo, the Guard's Battle Skills Course, service schools, NCO education, Keep UP, and Overseas Deployment Training become essential ingredients to effective collective training. Collective training in the Guard afforded time and opportunity to train and retrain individuals and small teams as well as senior commanders and their staffs. The result of the Guard's collective training was the validation of the confidence placed in the Army Guard by the war plans of the Cold War era as demonstrated in Desert Shield and Storm.

The only variance I might have with the authors' views is that they appear to believe there is a current desire for the Army to have ready Guard units. It appears to me the intent is, with the exception of some support units, to focus the Guard on long periods of post-mobilization training. Given the nature of the threat, this may be desirable.

Lieutenant-General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., ARNG Ret.
Arlington, Virginia

The Authors Reply:

We are pleased that Lieutenant General Temple, former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is in general agreement with us. While we feel the reserve components have come a long way since the early 1970s, all is not perfect. Those important individual skills which were found wanting during the Desert Shield mobilization can be improved within present resources through better and more intensive use of the limited training time available. Initiatives recently fielded under the Bold Shift program, such as live-fire lane training for platoon-size units, operational readiness exercises, and revitalized Directed Training Associations, may help improve soldier survival skills and squad/platoon operations. We believe that it is unrealistic to expect each unit to train itself; external training resources must be used more extensively to attain higher levels of proficiency.

Unfortunately, the emphasis on individual training and small-unit tactics will most probably result in a degradation of the unit mission competencies gained over the past 20 years. We continue to believe the real solution lies with improving the quality and intensity of each and every one of those 39 available training days. The NCO does not have to be prioritized out of business, and collective training does not have to stop. We must, however, do a better job of managing training time. This would sharply improve individual training and would also permit substantial collective training as well.

That a lower standard of readiness is acceptable for National Guard combat units may be a reality, but we should strive to have all our reserve force units as ready as they can possibly be all of the time. Our proposals are offered to help improve current combat capability by achieving the maximum possible readiness within the allotted resources.

Colonel Lawrence D. Richardson
Colonel Abbott A. Brayton, USAR

MORE FRIENDLY FIRE

To the Editor:

I enjoyed Charles R. Shrader's article, "Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price," in the Autumn 1992 issue of *Parameters*. His allusion to the friendly fire incidents at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (page 36) deserves elaboration.

On the night of 7 December 1941, six Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats from Fighting Squadron Six—which had been launched into the gathering darkness that day as the escort for a strike launched at Japanese ships purportedly lurking off Oahu—were instructed to land on Ford Island, the fleet air base located in the center of Pearl Harbor. Apparently, a warning that incoming planes were friendly failed to reach all hands, and antiaircraft fire—principally automatic weapons and rifles—erupted from all over the harbor area. Of the six planes, four were shot down.

A full accounting of friendly fire shoot-downs would not be complete without mention of a Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless of Scouting Squadron Six that had been one of 18 launched on the morning of 7 December in advance of aircraft carrier *Enterprise's* projected return to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. The Dauntless was shot

down by antiaircraft fire from Fort Weaver and ditched in the shallows off Hickam Field. An Army crash boat, sent out from Hickam, soon rescued the two crewmen and headed ashore for treatment, with boat crew and rescued aviators alike enduring a brief flurry of more friendly rifle fire (from edgy soldiers ashore) en route to the dock! Several other Dauntless's from the morning flight experienced friendly fire as they attempted to land at Ford Island as the Japanese attack unfolded.

Robert J. Cressman
Naval Historical Center
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

I read with great interest Charles R. Shrader's article "Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price." I thought he provided excellent groundwork establishing among other things that friendly fire is not a new war phenomenon.

Concerning the incidents on 7 December 1941, the only people not shocked apparently were the Japanese. For the next 24 to 72 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was mass confusion and little or no coordinated American communication throughout the entire Pacific Region. This resulted in countless unconfirmed Japanese "invasions" from Singapore to San Francisco. American and Allied forces took up what defensive positions they could and adopted the motto "If It Flies, It Dies!" Time after time Americans and Allies shot up (and down) their own aircraft. They were convinced the Japanese were just over the horizon and coming back again.

Although the losses from Pearl Harbor and the Pacific were not as horrific as some of those Dr. Shrader discusses, they confirm that (1) friendly fire is not new, and (2) lack of proper coordination and communication will do you in every time.

Major James P. Holland, USAF
University of Pittsburgh

The Author Replies:

I am most grateful to Dr. Cressman for filling in the very interesting details regarding the various occurrences of friendly fire at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Major Holland also provides an important reminder regarding the role of poor fire discipline as well as inadequate coordination and communication in bringing about friendly fire incidents of the very types encountered at Pearl Harbor.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader, USA Ret.

THE MOVING FINGER WRITES...

To the Editor:

I appreciated having my book, *Strategic Surprise and the Age of Glasnost*, reviewed in the Autumn 1992 issue of *Parameters*. However, I wish to alert your readers that the reviewer, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett, did not address the book's central thesis, namely, that an inadvertent or accidental missile launch may

ignite a larger conflagration due to the inherent fear of surprise attack. The passing of the Soviet Union does not negate this thesis. While the likelihood of a deliberate Soviet (now CIS) attack may be practically zero, the *possibility* of an accidental launch by other state or non-state actors remains a valid concern. Beyond this, the proliferation of missile technologies, particularly in the Middle East, and continued weapons development by shadow nuclear and near-nuclear powers have led the United States to explore the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system, and other defensive measures.

While the early pages of the book discuss medical care and other relevant contextual matters, the volume also chronicles the end of the Warsaw Pact and Mikhail Gorbachev's role as a historic transition leader. The celebrated "missile gap" that Senator John F. Kennedy alleged during his successful candidacy for President deliberately receives scant treatment in my book because recent revelations in Moscow have cast new light on this topic, which necessitates a more fundamental re-look.

History may be a moving stream of consciousness that knows no end, but military professionals and strategists need to monitor the flow. The threat of surprise attack is a universal phenomenon little affected by the Soviet Union's demise, and *Strategic Surprise in the Age of Glasnost* continues to be relevant to this key issue.

Colonel David T. Twining
US Army War College

The Reviewer Replies:

I am surprised to learn I "did not address" Colonel Twining's central thesis as in rereading my review I discover I not only acknowledged that central thesis but noted it to be "particularly satisfying." I do not regard *Strategic Surprise* as irrelevant, merely badly timed. Those very watershed events which now offer the Soviet Union a future have robbed this book of one. That is a conclusion, not a criticism. It is very difficult to write about the present when the future keeps interfering.

As Colonel Twining points out, "recent revelations in Moscow" promise new analyses and interpretations of events already on the shelf as history. But if the past is undergoing reevaluation, so is the future. *Strategic Surprise* provides a notable start point from which to weigh the central problem that an inadvertent or accidental missile launch could ignite a nuclear war. Events since this book's publication—the Ukraine's nuclear weapons stance, American efforts to assist in the accounting and safeguarding of Soviet nuclear weapons regardless of who claims entitlement, and even our recent election—demand even heightened concern for that possibility and careful consideration of even newer, more-complex options for the future.

Because *Strategic Surprise and the Age of Glasnost* was written before the Soviet Union's disintegration, much of it is simply dated. That does not mean, nor does my review claim, this is an unworthy book. World events just moved too quickly, strategically surprising us all. Even in the Age of *Glasnost*.

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett

Book Reviews

Kissinger: A Biography. By Walter Isaacson. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 893 pages. \$30.00. Reviewed by Kenneth L. Adelman, former director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1983-87), and coauthor of *The Defense Revolution*.

"Now Henry is devious. Henry is difficult—some people think he's obnoxious—but he's a terrific negotiator," said Richard Nixon about Kissinger years after they worked together in triumph. Nixon's characteristically cutting praise was spoken during a rare television appearance on "Meet the Press," as he urged then-President Ronald Reagan to appoint Kissinger as a "heavy-weight negotiator" on the Middle East. The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger—sidekicks, rivals, co-conspirators, colleagues, and competitors—is among the most bizarre of personal-official relationships. Kissinger's gifted biographer Walter Isaacson writes, "As each of them acquired the power he had long sought, they retained the personal insecurities that they found reflected in each other."

Kissinger is a marvelous bigger-than-life biography about a bigger-than-life figure. While it intrigues by delving into personalities—a *Time* magazine editor like Isaacson naturally injects *Time*-like color and verve—the book also instructs us on a critical period of postwar foreign policy.

Nixon and Kissinger did not know each other well—they had met just once—when the President-elect selected the Harvard professor as his National Security Advisor in 1968. After that, they fawned over each other when together and bad-mouthed each other when apart. After leaving the White House, Kissinger liked to tell of Pat Nixon's question to Kissinger when he initially told her how brilliant her husband was: "You haven't seen through him yet?" she reportedly replied. As Isaacson points out, Kissinger was brilliant in capturing the essence of both a person and a problem. Kissinger wrote later how Nixon "had set himself a goal beyond human capacity: to make himself over entirely. But the gods exacted a fearful price for this presumption." Kissinger believed. "Nixon paid, first, the price of congenital insecurity. And ultimately he learned what the Greeks had known: that the worst punishment can be having one's wishes filled too completely." Kissinger caught the "titanic struggle" that ensued within Nixon's being: "Most men mature around a central core; Nixon had several. That is why he was never at peace with himself."

Still Kissinger was so sickeningly sycophantic toward Nixon—documented throughout this biography—that it dilutes any admiration for Kissinger's insightfulness. Indeed, one may—and *should*—admire Kissinger for his foreign policy analysis and skills at enunciating and executing policy. Future historians will rank him as among the best US diplomats of this century. Yet no one can admire Kissinger for his character.

Isaacson's 800 pages force the reader to confront that character as Kissinger allows wiretaps to be placed on journalists, on his own staff, and on personal friends. This led to the Nixon White House establishing the Plumbers "dirty tricks" unit, which in turn led to the Watergate break-in. Page after page recounts Kissinger's duplicity,

back-channels, secrecy, and intrigue. While an exciting story—and an inspiring one, of a Jewish boy in Germany who fled Nazism to make good in America—it is not a pretty picture of personal decency.

Walter Isaacson writes: "Napoleon once said of Metternich that he confused policy with intrigue. Kissinger was a master at both." That certainly sounds true, but is it? Was he a master at policy? Specifically, how do the Nixon-Kissinger policies stand up nearly 20 years later? Spectacularly well on one-fourth of their major policy moves. Kissinger's step-by-step disengagement negotiations on the Middle East *were* spectacular. They allowed the 1973 Yom Kippur War to end by paving the way to peace between Egypt and Israel. That agreement has withstood the test of time. For it, Kissinger deserved though did not receive a Nobel Peace Prize.

His dealings on Vietnam—for which he *was* awarded the Nobel Prize—lie at the other end of the spectrum. They were a dismal failure. Vietnam was, of course, the premier issue when he took office and throughout nearly all of his eight years with Nixon and President Ford. Their failure was painful for the United States Army, as for the United States.

From the start, Kissinger viewed our involvement in Vietnam as a test of our commitments everywhere. That was the lofty explanation. Less noble, though, was his notion of creating a "decent interval" between the time when US ground forces (and then all US forces) withdrew and when South Vietnam either was overrun or collapsed. The key decision Nixon and Kissinger made, relatively early on, was to allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South during a cessation of hostilities. This was finally agreed to by Hanoi in the summer of 1972, as the North Vietnamese dropped their demand for an immediate toppling of the Saigon government. That government, realizing the danger of North's regulars staying on its territory, fiercely resisted Kissinger's "peace is at hand" pre-1972 election statement. This led to the post-election "Christmas bombing," a phony peace accord (which Hanoi failed to implement, even under its undemanding terms), and the loss of so many more Vietnamese and American lives. The poignancy of Vietnam lives on, much to our shame and horror.

As for the other two major foreign policy preoccupations—relations with the USSR and China, forming the Kissingerian triangular diplomacy—these are harder to judge. Personally, I give low marks on his approach toward the Soviet Union and higher (though not laudatory) grades on the China opening. "Detente" with Moscow initially seemed great. It produced a greater comfort level regarding the threatened nuclear holocaust, plus lots of visuals of champagne glasses clicking. But detente's real benefits have become harder and harder to see. SALT I and the ABM Treaty were both glaringly deficient, the latter becoming positively harmful to President Reagan's push for a genuine SDI program of missile defense. And despite Kissinger's longing for linkage, Moscow never helped where we most needed it, on extracting us from Vietnam.

More fundamentally, Kissinger's views toward Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev et al. rested on what many of us conservatives thought at the time—and what we positively know now—was a false premise: that US policy should focus on Soviet behavior abroad and not on its behavior within. Yet any Soviet cooperation on foreign problems was marginal as long as it remained a totalitarian communist regime at home. Soviet leaders were never going to treat their neighboring and other states with greater

decency than that with which they treated their own people. Once the communist rule ended, fundamental changes in foreign policy flowed forth—Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, a halt to support for communists from Cuba to Afghanistan to Africa, an end to the Soviet military buildup, the demise of the Soviet Union itself, and the emergence of normal democratically inclined states in place of the Evil Empire. We now know that detente postponed that blessed development, however unexpected that surely was in the 1970s. To be fair, Kissinger can contend that detente helped get us through a bad patch of history and opened the way to this marvelous ending. But that view will remain contentious.

On China, nearly everyone thought Nixon and Kissinger's opening was a great historic event. I certainly did at the time, in 1972. Yet there now seems to have been a certain inevitability about it, and the Chinese government never did do much for us in return. Sure, they tied up 43 Soviet divisions on their border, but that happened before our normalization and continued afterwards. On Vietnam, the Chinese never cooperated; at least whatever efforts they made (probably none) yielded no results in North Vietnam.

Regardless of how history finally judges Kissinger's four key foreign policy moves, each was planned and executed with duplicity. This was related to Kissinger's and Nixon's personalities, and to their specific policies. "Diplomacy based on the moral idealism of international law is easy to wage openly," as Walter Isaacson rightly sums up, "but a realistic approach involving ambiguous compromises and power ploys lends itself to covert acts and deception, since it is likely to arouse popular disapproval if publicly articulated." The best judgment on Kissinger was made by his family friend, Nahum Goldmann: "If he were ten percent less brilliant and ten percent more honest, he would be a great man." In any case, this *is* a great book.

Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power. By Peter Paret. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992. 229 pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Professor Edward M. Coffman, author of *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898*.

During the last three decades, military history has expanded and prospered much more than anyone would have predicted in the 1950s. A survey of 376 colleges in 1958 indicated that only four percent offered courses in the subject. While there was significant interest in the American Civil War and World War II at that time, the historians who worked in those fields tended to be either non-academics or employed in official history programs. Within the Army, there had been a falling back from the pre-World War II years when military history was a prominent offering at the senior service schools. Today, the teaching of this subject is widespread throughout academe, with excellent graduate programs at several major universities, and there are substantive offerings at the service schools.

Peter Paret is a prominent figure in the revival of this field; hence, the publication of his collected essays is a matter of import to those who are interested in the subject. Over the last 30 years, he has taught at the University of California-Davis, Stanford, and, most recently, Princeton, where he is a member of the Institute of

Advanced Study. A prolific author, the topics of his publications span periods from the Napoleonic era to the post-World War II guerrilla wars. His most prominent work, however, focusses on Carl von Clausewitz. In 1976, he published a masterly biography of this greatest of military thinkers (*Clausewitz and the State*), and he and Sir Michael Howard brought out their edited translation of Clausewitz's great work *On War*. In *Understanding War*, Paret has collected 16 previously published essays. For the reader's benefit, he introduces each essay with a few comments on how it came about and how it fits into the context of his work. To use a metaphor from the art world in which he grew up in Berlin, he presents these essays in the form of a triptych—a three-panelled work of art. The central panel is of course concerned with Clausewitz while the side panels are devoted to War and Its Institutions and to the History of War. To be sure, there is a numerical imbalance in that there are nine essays about Clausewitz and six on War and Its Institutions but only one on the History of War, but then, of course, all are essentially on the History of War. It should be added that one of Paret's hallmarks is his insistence that the history of war is an integral part of history.

The first group of essays ranges over such topics as military power; nationalism and the military obligation of the populace; how European military thinkers and people used or, to be more accurate, did not use the experience of the American Revolutionary War; a comparison of conscription in France and Prussia; how his enemies viewed Napoleon; and a study of the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. In academe, where specialism reigns, it is refreshing to see such command of a broad range of topics and the skillful use of the comparative method.

The nine essays in the group about Clausewitz would serve well as appendices to his biography of that great figure. They include, among the several topics covered, further explorations into some political aspects of Clausewitz's career and his relationships or comparisons with such personages as Alexis de Tocqueville and the writer Heinrich von Kleist. Then, Paret analyzes a hitherto unknown letter written just days before Clausewitz's death. Finally, in the sole essay in the last section, he combines parts of essays he did in 1971 and 1991 on the New Military History which he characterizes as well as any historian—"a partial turning away from the great captains and from weapons, tactics, and operations as the main concerns of the historical exploration of war. Instead, scholars and students are asked to pay greater attention to the interaction of war with society, economics, politics, and culture."

There is much in this small book for the soldier as well as the historian. For the latter, what better advice could he get than Paret's warning about the dangers of creating a "muddle" if one attempts to put in too much, hence the necessity for careful delimiting of both description and interpretation. Every commander would profit from reading the essay "Napoleon as Enemy" in that it explains how this great captain differed from his military contemporaries. In his analysis of Jena and Auerstädt, the author returns to this point. After listing flaws in the French conduct of the battles, he points out: "But such flaws were made good by a pervasive energy, by the intuitive understanding of thousands of veteran soldiers led by a man who recognized the essentials of the problem he faced and who would allow no side issue to distract either himself or his subordinates from its solution."

Finally, the value of this book is enhanced by an elegant style that often delights the reader with such thoughtful turns of phrase as the author uses in describing

the result of the French Revolution: "New possibilities emerged, but at the cost of old certainties." This is, indeed, a valuable book.

JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. By John M. Newman. New York: Warner Books, 1992. 506 pages. \$22.95. Reviewed by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1963-64; author of *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?*

This is an interesting and important book. It begins with John F. Kennedy's decisions on Laos and ends with Lyndon B. Johnson's first decision on Vietnam, made on 24 November 1963, two days after Kennedy's assassination.

But it is also a very difficult book to review. The author provides such a flood of extraordinary detail that the reader—and occasionally even the author—loses sight of the big picture. Newman gives meticulous attention, for example, to proposals for US intervention with combat troops in the very early days of the Kennedy Administration. None of these ever got to first base, and giving them such prominence obscures some of the more central issues. Another factor complicating review of the book is that Newman's judgments on the players—principally Kennedy himself—are extremely complicated. Newman leaves no doubt that Kennedy was absolutely determined not to send American combat forces to Vietnam. But he argues that Kennedy did give in to pressure to make a commitment short of using American troops in the hopes that "American technology and know-how would work a miracle." This made his eventual decision to disengage more difficult. "Although he [Kennedy] would not accept the recommendations of his advisors for combat troops—an act of great moral courage—neither would he accept defeat." It is not that Newman's judgments are unsound, only that they are sometimes hard to follow.

While one can make no major criticisms of Newman's account of events, a few quibbles are probably in order. Newman's account of Vice President Johnson's trip to Asia and the disagreements about that trip between the President and the Vice President leaves the reader with the impression that Johnson did not want to go on the trip and Kennedy ordered him to go. In fact, the trip was Johnson's idea. What made him angry was that news of it leaked before Johnson himself could make the announcement, so he toyed with the idea of canceling the trip entirely. In later years, Johnson actually reversed some of his decisions about high-level appointments solely because the news leaked before he could make the announcement himself.

Newman correctly describes the various JCS proposals for American intervention in Vietnam in the early days of the Kennedy Administration. No quibble here. But what does not come through is the Chiefs' determination not to let themselves be snookered into fighting a war in Asia "with one hand tied behind their back" as had happened in Korea—a determination that President Johnson eventually found a way to get around. It was because of this determination that the JCS came to be called the "Never Again Club"—never again a limited land war in Asia.

The controversy about the so-called 24 August 1963 cable concerning the Vietnamese generals' plan for a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem was rather thoroughly discussed in the Autumn 1992 (pp. 115-16) and Winter 1992-93 (pp. 104-05) issues

of *Parameters*. The quibble to be made of Newman's account is that he does not make it entirely clear that the 24 August plot was aborted and that the successful coup of 1 November included a number of different players.

One final quibble relates to the subtitle of Newman's book and the fact that Newman sees many of the events in precisely these terms—deception, intrigue, and the struggle for power. Certainly the struggle over policy was often concerned with a struggle for power. Certainly, too, most players held their cards as close to their chests as they could and did not tip their hands until they had to. But it would be a mistake to think that deception and intrigue were central.

The tragedy of Vietnam was not that the American military in Vietnam lied to Washington about how the war was going or tried to keep vital information from reaching Kennedy, or that people in the State Department skewed the facts or schemed against the other players to bring about Diem's downfall. The real tragedy was different. Part of the tragedy was that the different participants in the policy debate were looking at completely different aspects of the problem. The point is illustrated by the story that Newman tells of the trip to Vietnam just after the Buddhist crisis by General Victor Krulak, representing the JCS, and Joseph Mendenhall, representing the State Department. Krulak visited the military commands in the field and reported to Kennedy that things were going exceedingly well. Mendenhall visited the civilian leaders in the cities and reported that things were going from very bad to very much worse. After hearing them out Kennedy had only one question: "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?"

Another part of the tragedy was that all participants in the policy debates wanted so badly to win the battle against the communists that they came to believe what they desperately wanted to believe—on one side, that by going ahead full steam militarily, or on the other side, by changing the prime minister and his inner circle—then all the messy and intractable problems would be solved.

Given the difficulty of the problems, it was inevitable and even desirable that the participants in the policy battles disagreed in their judgments. Given the importance of the stakes involved, it was entirely appropriate that they fought hard and passionately—indeed, it would be cause for dismay if it had been otherwise. But anyone who has been involved in such battles knows that these matters are never black and white, that there are persuasive arguments on both sides, and that the final judgments are always close. So the motives of both hawks and doves on Vietnam policy cannot really be questioned. In the case of Vietnam, as in most others, the people on both sides of the arguments were honest, intelligent, reasonable, and patriotic men and women, struggling as best they could with mean and intricate problems of the highest importance. There may have been no heroes in the policy battles over Vietnam, but there weren't any villains, either.

Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864. By Albert Castel. 665 pages. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992. \$29.95.
Reviewed by Stephen W. Sears, author of *To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign*.

Albert Castel's Civil War studies have dealt primarily with the western theater of operations, and this book on the Atlanta campaign has the look of his

magnum opus. It is deeply and imaginatively researched, exhaustively detailed, and authoritative on every point great and small. It is a book crammed with valuable lessons on the making of war.

Mr. Castel is no shrinking violet of an author. He is present on virtually every page, explaining just what went right and (more often) what went wrong, who did it right and who did not, peppering us with asides and exclamation points. Indeed, he knows so much about the Atlanta campaign that sometimes he grows impatient with its participants. General So-and-So "should have done this . . ." General Such-and-Such's "greatest mistake was to. . ." Blunders are labeled and ineptitude made plain. In these pages the fog of war is seldom a valid excuse.

Sherman's advance from Chattanooga toward Atlanta starting in May 1864 was the western half of Grant's grand (and grandly direct) strategy for ending the war. "He was to go for Lee and I was to go for Joe Johnston," Sherman explained. "That was his plan. No routes prescribed. . . ." Castel carefully explains the shifts in this strategy as they applied to Sherman. First it was his task to so pressure the Confederate Army of Tennessee under Johnston (afterward under John Bell Hood) that it could not reinforce Lee in Virginia. After Grant's bloody offensive bogged down in the trenches of Petersburg, it became essential for Sherman to win a major victory in Georgia so as to secure Lincoln's reelection in the fall. Finally, to gain that victory Sherman determined to make Atlanta itself the objective rather than the Army of Tennessee.

Sherman's reputation as a battlefield commander derives from this Atlanta campaign. Before Atlanta he served under Grant and did nothing outstanding; afterward, marching through Georgia and the Carolinas, he faced no credible opposition. Castel thinks Sherman's reputation to be overblown, especially by the eulogistic British military theoretician Basil Liddell Hart, and he quotes with obvious relish a Union general's observation that Sherman was "a splendid piece of machinery with all of the screws a little loose." Castel argues that "Sherman's preference for raiding over fighting" gave him Atlanta well enough but not the enemy's army. In the final operations against Atlanta he lists six occasions when Sherman "did not close his fist" on Hood. Indeed, Castel insists that had Sherman's chief lieutenant, George H. Thomas, been in command of the campaign, he would have promptly accomplished "the elimination of the Army of Tennessee from the war."

Sherman's opponents do not come off very well, either. While Johnston's Fabian tactic of retreat before a superior foe offered the best chance of saving Atlanta, "to the extent that there was any chance at all," Castel finds that defects in Johnston's military character made him "a foreordained loser." Hood he finds unthinkingly aggressive. As a veteran Tennessee soldier put it in his diary, "The plan Genl Hood has adopted of charging breastworks . . . will soon leave him without an army if continued as hitherto." By the time he abandoned Atlanta, Hood had so drained his army that it was incapable of offensive operations.

Castel is especially good at depicting the infighting and backbiting that characterized the high command of both armies, and how often the machinery of both armies sputtered because of it. It is equally clear how dramatically the nature of the war had changed by 1864: "I cannot move the troops 100 yards without their stopping to intrench, though I have not seen an enemy," Sherman complained. Another general carefully timed how long it took his division to dig in sufficiently to repel an infantry

attack. It took just 15 minutes. So skilled at field fortification had the Civil War soldier now become, and so willing to work at it, that the defense utterly dominated the offense, and many attacks degenerated into an ineffectual groping for an unguarded flank. It was perhaps this fact that caused the excess of caution Castel finds in his cast of generals.

I know of few Civil War campaigns that offer the student of military affairs more rewarding study than the Atlanta campaign. That Albert Castel agrees is evident in the care he has lavished on *Decision in the West*. I did wish, however, for maps showing the maneuvering of forces that so characterized the campaign. The engagement maps are fine; showing graphically the movements between battles would have enhanced my understanding.

At War in the Gulf: A Chronology. By Arthur H. Blair. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1992. 124 pages. \$9.00 (paper).

Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East. By John K. Cooley. Washington: Brassey's (US), 1991. 257 pages. \$19.95.

On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. By Harry G. Summers, Jr. New York: Dell, 1992. 302 pages. \$4.99 (paper).

Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War. By the Staff of *U.S. News and World Report*. New York: Times Books, 1992. 477 pages. \$25.00.

Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson (LTC, USA Ret.), Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, coauthor of *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East*.

The obvious purpose of Colonel (USA Ret.) Arthur H. Blair's *At War in the Gulf: A Chronology* is to provide a reference work based upon unclassified sources. One of the principal contributors to this book, Colonel Joseph P. Engelhardt, was the Army War College's Middle East subject-matter expert at the time of the war. His self-generated effort to keep US Army War College students abreast of events during the crisis resulted in the chronology that forms the base of this book, accurately reflecting events as they became known to the reading public. The prologue and the three-page summary prelude to the war provide a succinct review of the most important factors driving the course of events. There is one error here in the sum Iraq owed Kuwait from loans during the Iran-Iraq War. The quoted figure is \$4 billion; it is generally acknowledged that the correct figure is more like \$10 billion. Despite the relatively early publication of the book, the summary comments in Chapter 5, "End and Aftermath," although subject to some debate, are as sound as one is likely to find for some time. This is a valuable reference work to be kept at hand for anyone working on the war.

For those of us whom Colonel Art Lykke (USA Ret.) describes as "Clausewitz Nuts," Colonel (USA Ret.) Harry Summers' *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* is delightful reading. Clausewitz aside, most professional military readers will feel comfortable with Summers' work because it uses the same frame-

work—the principles of war—as did his familiar *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Summers has provided us a very good analysis of the Gulf War. There are a few errors of fact in this book, however, as in all the others under review. For example, Summers states that Lieutenant General John Yeosock was the ground component commander (p. 244), when it is now known that General Schwarzkopf reserved that role to himself for a variety of reasons. In an arguable passage on the same page, Summers gives great credit for the success of the campaign to the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. There is considerable merit to this position, but it should never be advanced without two accompanying caveats: first, there was only one war and, therefore, only one “supported CINC,” a situation in which Goldwater-Nichols is somewhat irrelevant. It did serve to insure that all knew who was in charge, but that may well have been a more direct function of personalities than the legislation.

The second caveat is that the chemistry of the personalities at the top is best described as a unique gift from God. In an interview at the Army War College, General Donn A. Starry (USA Ret.) said, “Thank heaven for George Herbert Walker Bush!” He then went on to draw comparisons between the key figures of the Bush Administration and several combinations of those who had gone before. His conclusion was that Goldwater-Nichols aside, the United States was absolutely blessed by the personalities at the top for this operation. Readers may find some difficulty in dealing with Summers’ constant Vietnam reprise. Summers was the first professional officer to truly come to grips in print with the trauma of that war. It is understandable that much of what he writes in *On Strategy II* would reflect his deeply held feeling that the United States must never commit the errors of Vietnam again. Summers has been adamant that if the American people do not support the cause, American soldiers should not be sent to fight. It should be recalled that he made his case directly on *Larry King Live*, 13 August 1990, declaring that until the 48th Georgia National Guard Brigade was called up, the United States was “just kidding.” Consequently, the thrust of much of the book is really “how we licked the Vietnam syndrome.” After all, President Bush himself declared on 1 March that “we’ve licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” Various readers will disagree with some of Summers’ formulations, but professional soldiers will be comfortable with the language, format, and general line of reasoning. This is an easy read, an important book, and certainly worth the paperback price.

One can criticize John K. Cooley’s book *Payback: America’s Long War in the Middle East* for some of its factual errors and its not-too-well-handled combat portions, but this too is an important book. What Cooley has done, and in artful fashion, is recount the history of US involvement in the Middle East over the last decade. *Payback* is compelling reading and, inaccuracies aside, should be read by every professional soldier and most Americans. The information presented in this book, surprisingly, has drawn little media attention, although much of it is the stuff that would have generated a furor in the security community and among the “right to this or that” groups of the 1960s. One example of tidbits that seem to have gone unnoticed is the recounting of locations and activities of remote US monitoring stations in northern Iran and in China. Cooley even speculates that the importance of the stations in China may have been instrumental in the Administration’s relatively gentle handling of the post-Tiananmen Square relations with that nation.

Cooley pursues two principal theses. One is that the old law of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" dominates relations at all levels in the Middle East. The revenge motif, of course, provides the book title, but it does not reveal the theme beneath the theme—Iran's attempt to extirpate all vestiges of Western thinking and influence from the Middle East. This serves to explain many of the attacks upon the American University in Beirut. The second thesis is that during the period of the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the United States had chosen to play a game in a distant arena without knowing the rules, without a game plan, and without the required talent or tools. While the principal antagonists in the book are the United States and Iran, the book concludes with the US-Iraqi antagonisms.

It must be said that Cooley is at his worst dealing with combat operations, mistaking, for example, the 3d Cavalry Division for the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. In contrast, he is impressive at piecing together events on the diplomatic stage, and is equally impressive in detailing the contributions, positive and negative, of the intelligence community. Cooley conducted, and duly recounts, the details of numerous personal interviews with prominent Middle East players. These interviews provide significant insights.

One conclusion drawable from this book is that the United States ought to get back into the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) business in the Middle East. There is considerable risk in attempting that, but Cooley makes it clear that we have been blind and have been led astray, on occasions, by our willingness to let the Israelis do our dirty work for us and by assuming they know a good deal more than they do.

In dealing with Operation Desert Storm, Cooley is relatively conventional, repeating some simplistic conventional wisdom in the recounting of that campaign. His description of the diplomatic events leading up to the campaign, however, are more plausible than those described in *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War*. Payback is well worth a two-day read.

If the U.S. News and World Report book *Triumph Without Victory* were to be the basis for subscribing to the magazine, I would say, "Save your money." The book is useful in that it is relatively comprehensive, but it is uneven and is badly flawed in several areas. Beginning with what has come to be the expected journalist's whine about lack of access to information and sources, there follows a list of personalities interviewed that would seem utterly to belie the opening whine. The next unfortunate portion is in the "Prologue," where one finds a list of things previously "unreported" and now "revealed." Yet almost nothing listed had gone unreported; in short, this is not the "Unreported History" by a long shot. Interestingly, this book and several others, as well as several news articles, would have been set on the correct footing had the authors deigned to read the various service journals. There is a plethora of first-person, professionally useful and thought-provoking articles in these journals, evidently *terra incognita* to mainline publications.

One of the more distressing aspects of *Triumph Without Victory* is where knowledgeable sources were interviewed by interviewers ignorant of the material. The writers then produce a summary of the interview that makes no sense. There is little evidence of cross-checking of material, with the consequence that really silly comments pop up from time to time, giving the reader cause to wonder about other material. As an example, there is an absurd passage where the Marines' M-60A3 is

described as a "lightweight and small-gunned" tank. In the passage where this occurs, the writer is in the process of commenting upon the fact that the Marines are essentially a light force. The appropriate reference would have been to the Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) which the Marine Corps has in considerable numbers. Any tank, and especially a T-72, will eat a LAV for lunch. But as those same Marines demonstrated on the second and third days of the war, the M-60 tank was perfectly capable of bashing the T-55s and T-62s against which it was designed to fight, and it can deal with T-72s under the right circumstances.

Another example is the authors' failure to read the map. They make reference to the two "tiny" islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Warbah is a large island which is, in reality, nothing but a mudflat—a large mudflat about ten kilometers in length. Bubiyan is a huge island, roughly 20 by 40 kilometers in size, partially developed and occupied. Warbah could be dredged out of existence over a period of several years if the capable Iraqi engineers were directed to do that. Even atomic demolitions could do little to budge Bubiyan, however, and a cursory glance at almost any map would reveal that fact. It is such sloppiness that seriously degrades this book's usefulness.

The redeeming part of *Triumph Without Victory* is its first-person accounts of combat. For those who continue to believe that the Iraqi army simply rolled over and quit en masse, here is a sharp corrective. Between the stories recounted here and in the *Army Times'* 14 "Desert Storm After-Action Review" articles (10 June 1991 through 2 March 1992), there should be no doubt that this was war for the soldiers involved.

The most problematic part of *Triumph Without Victory* is the title itself. Much of the book is devoted to the military campaign and there can be no doubt whatsoever that the coalition accomplished its military objectives and in doing so accomplished the UN-approved political objectives. It is bad scholarship but probably good press technique to stir up a tempest by raising the cry "but not enough!"—which is heard all too often in the land. Operation Desert Storm was a resounding military victory, as the accounts reported in this very book attest.

The American Military Ethic: A Meditation. By James H. Toner. New York: Praeger, 1992. 266 pages. \$49.95.

The Sword and the Cross: Reflections on Command and Conscience. By James H. Toner. New York: Praeger, 1992. 186 pages. \$45.00.

Reviewed by Colonel Anthony E. Hartle, author of *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*.

At the beginning of *The Sword and the Cross*, James H. Toner notes that "like Sisyphus, we must spend our lives making decisions the full consequences of which are hidden from our eyes; but we must move ahead. We must do the very best we can." In these two books, Toner makes clear what he believes should guide men and women in uniform as they try to do their best.

Toner's books provide particularly interesting commentary in comparison with two other new books, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's *The Autobiography: It*

Doesn't Take a Hero (reviewed in this issue of *Parameters*, pages 20-26), and *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*, the story of the Ia Drang Valley campaign in what is now the long-ago Vietnam War. In the latter, retired Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway have given us a detailed, engrossing narrative of the four-day battle with North Vietnamese troops that signaled the change from a small-scale guerrilla war to a major confrontation for the United States military. General Schwarzkopf's view of Desert Storm, framed by the autobiographical details of his life and education, provides an authoritative perspective on the political and strategic aspects of our most recent major military campaign. Toner's books provide yet another perspective on military affairs. He is now a professor of international relations at the Air War College, but from 1968 to 1972 he served as an Army officer in Germany, becoming a Vietnam-era veteran who never served in Southeast Asia. Instead, he served as a nuclear weapons officer in an ordnance unit, struggling with the drug, alcohol, morale, and discipline problems that plagued understrength military units serving far from the battlefields of Vietnam and receiving scant attention from senior military leaders.

In the first half of *The American Military Ethic*, we find the story of Toner's military life, from basic training, which started about three years after the Ia Drang battle, through OCS and his years in Europe. Toner shows us, through his personal experiences as a junior infantry officer, what led to his beliefs about the nature of military service, much as General Schwarzkopf does. What follows in Toner's book, however, is a searching examination of the principles that guide the conduct of military leaders.

A sizable portion of *The American Military Ethic* describes through narrative the process by which basic training and OCS provided us with young soldiers during the Vietnam War era. Because Toner relates his experiences with a keen eye for humor and tells us a story, the first half of the book moves quickly. Without doubt, anyone interested in that period of our military history or concerned with the means of developing combat-ready troops will find the reading informative. Besides advocating tough training, Toner maintains that the "officers of the future cannot know what to do unless they first know what to be."

That presentation provides his point for departure in the second half of the book, which analyzes the foundations for the military ethic and explains how the ethic should be developed and applied. He focuses in particular on the importance of character and the role of liberal education in developing persons of both competence and conscience. In the author's view, military leaders should have a broad-based liberal education with an emphasis on history, which he argues must be continued through the existing military education system. He describes that system, largely approvingly, in considerable detail.

Professor Toner devotes only one chapter specifically to the American military ethic. While readers familiar with the subject will find little new insight here, the author does have a talent for articulating bedrock ideas. He explains that the ethic incorporates a moral commitment to values that transcend both particular organizations and particular societies. The transcendent values provide the foundations for and shape the institutions of our nation, to include the military services.

In *The Sword and the Cross*, Toner explores on a more elevated plane. While we can relate the subject matter of *The American Military Ethic* to Moore's book

(basic soldiering) and to Schwarzkopf's book (autobiography and subsequent reflection), *The Sword and the Cross* moves into a different realm. Here Toner examines the confrontation that so often occurs between the demands of individual conscience and the demands of role responsibilities, most particularly those weighing on military and political leaders. He indicates his primary concern in this book in the following passage: "To maintain and, where possible, to enlarge the intersection between the ethics of the cross and the politics of the sword is our burden and our glory and is the true test of the civic virtue to which we are called as Christians and as citizens."

This book is difficult to classify. It is not history, despite historical examples, and it is not autobiography, despite the presence of personal experiences. At the same time, it does not qualify as a work of philosophy in terms of intellectual rigor. Toner states that the book is simply the reflection of a quarter century of thought on the subject of command and conscience.

The reflections provide an educated conservative view of the causes, initiation, and conduct of war, emphasizing that "survival of the nation alone makes no sense unless it is in service of fundamental values that imbue the nation's existence with meaning and purpose." But the book goes considerably further in analyzing the role of religion in the process of command decisionmaking. Though he tells us that while the sword serves an indispensable function, the cross is paramount, Toner nonetheless concludes: "Religion, then, does not solve the ancient problem of command and conscience, of sword and cross." If the two claims seem to conflict, the resolution for Toner appears to lie in a commitment to religious belief. Still, he holds that "our twin duties, sacred and secular, *must* be merged into a civic virtue, enabling us to know how we should act for the common interest as well as for our own."

Toner examines with considerable care a question that has troubled many when they donned a military uniform: Do Christ's teachings permit military service and the slaying of the enemy? He also studies pacifism, Christian realism, and just war theory. Throughout he intersperses extensive quotations, which he weaves into his discussion quite effectively. Toward the end of the book, however, the quotations, though always apt, become so numerous that Toner hardly appears on the pages at all, seemingly becoming more editor than author. One further weakness is the author's repeated failure to cite the original sources of quoted material.

In the end, *The Sword and the Cross* becomes an extended development of existential angst, a call for conscience but an admission that conscience does not always provide rational answers to some of the perplexing problems of military responsibility.

These brief descriptions of Professor Toner's two books suggest that they aim at somewhat different audiences. Those unfamiliar with the military will find much of *The American Military Ethic* enlightening. People in uniform will find material for reflection concerning the nature of the professional military role and professional military education. *The Sword and the Cross* presents a variety of major issues concerning the systematic use of violence and the killing of fellow human beings for political purposes, with emphasis on the restrictions imposed on pursuing such activities in our society. Professor Toner's observations here are those of a practical person committed to the Christian faith. The discussion in this book will appeal most to academics, though they may be irritated by a certain lack of scholarly precision, and to those given to serious reflection on matters religious.

Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. By Bard E. O'Neill. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1990. 171 pages. \$19.00. Reviewed by Professor John M. Gates, author of *Schoolbooks and Krag's: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902.*

As Bard O'Neill notes in his preface, "The study of insurgency is fraught with perils, because of the zealotry and partisanship that surrounds the subject." As a way of overcoming the all-too-prevalent biases, O'Neill provides "a systematic, straightforward format for comprehensively analyzing or comparing insurgencies" for the use of "participants, journalists, students, government analysts, and scholars." The goal is laudable, and the approach described in the book is clearly a useful one.

O'Neill urges his readers to base their study on a set of questions designed to focus attention on important aspects of insurgency. What are the insurgents' *goals* and what *means* are they using to accomplish them? What is the insurgent *strategy*? What is the physical and human *environment*, and how can it be expected to influence the insurgency? What kind of *popular support* do the insurgents have, and what techniques are they using to develop it? What form of *organization* does the insurgency have, and how great is its *unity* or cohesion? How extensive is *external support*, and what kind of support is being received? Other, more specific questions exist within each category, and O'Neill encourages readers to add questions of their own to make his analytical framework even more useful.

When employed by thoughtful individuals interested in minimizing their biases, O'Neill's framework will provide valuable insights. It is neither rigid nor dogmatic, and the systematic approach to analysis that it provides can help analysts identify what they do and do not know about an insurgency.

In presenting his framework O'Neill makes numerous generalizations about insurgency, citing a wide variety of cases to support them, and a number of his observations are quite astute. He notes, for example, the fallacy of attempting to lump together many dissimilar types of conflict under the low-intensity-conflict rubric, and more than once he draws attention to the tendency of governments to misunderstand or falsely portray insurgencies and the negative consequences that result. O'Neill notes also that although external support is often important, it is much more precarious than commonly assumed.

O'Neill's conclusion that reform is often a crucial element in a successful governmental response to insurgency highlights a significant problem facing counter-insurgents. Privileged groups are rarely willing to abandon their privileges without a fight, and the very reforms indicated by the use of O'Neill's framework are not likely to be implemented by the people with the power to make them.

At times O'Neill's attempts at generalization weaken rather than strengthen his argument. He presents examples in such abbreviated form that they provide evidence only by implication rather than by demonstration, making the acceptance of many conclusions difficult for skeptical readers. Readers familiar with the general topic or specific cases will undoubtedly question a number of O'Neill's generalizations.

Nowhere, perhaps, are O'Neill's views more debatable than when he assesses the use of terror. He claims that its long-term effect is negative, but the fact is that in a number of countries, most notably in Latin America in the 1970s, torture and other

forms of terror were very effective in destroying leftist insurgencies while protecting the interests of local elites. Although O'Neill rightly emphasizes the importance of good police work, intelligence-gathering, and judicial sanctions in counterinsurgency operations, his claim that "civilian governments stand a better chance of success than military governments" is not sustained by the evidence.

Fortunately O'Neill recognizes the difficulty inherent in any attempt to generalize about insurgency, and he often identifies exceptions to his own generalizations. In many places where he fails to note exceptions, readers familiar with the topic will no doubt supply their own, seeing, for example, the way in which generalizations supported by references to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are undermined by the example of South Africa.

O'Neill himself admits that "no one model can be applied to all cases," and he makes clear in the book that one can understand a specific insurgency only by studying it in detail. Unfortunately, his frequent attempts to generalize about insurgency may obscure the heuristic value of his approach and make *Insurgency & Terrorism* a less-than-adequate vehicle for conveying O'Neill's method to many of the groups identified in his preface. The book surveys the topic at such an elementary level that it contains little substance for readers who have already done substantial reading in the field. The book's major contribution to the study of insurgency is the framework for analysis it contains, and that might have more impact on all but students if presented in either a tightly written article in a policy-oriented journal or a longer book in which the method is demonstrated by application to one or more detailed case studies.

Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. By John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991. 506 pages. \$29.95.
Reviewed by Dr. Paul F. Braim (Colonel, USA Retired), who served four tours in Vietnam.

This book is a selection and refinement by John Prados, a writer on contemporary history, of a huge collection of notes and interviews by Ray Stubbe taken while Stubbe was a Navy chaplain during the siege at Khe Sanh. The result is an interesting tale of fighting and living in the cauldron of Khe Sanh, a major confrontation between US and North Vietnamese forces during the period January-March 1968. With the emotional sweep of a novelist, Stubbe carries the reader through to the apogee and denouement of the fighting. The buildup of fire on the base and the increasingly debilitating existence of the besieged are sympathetically described. Stubbe does not discuss the concomitant debilitation of personal and unit discipline and order among the Marines, a condition which many military visitors to Khe Sanh observed. I am sure that there were few Marines who "openly wept" when ordered to Khe Sanh, but those who did would likely have sought a chaplain like Stubbe. Stubbe accepts uncritically the opinions of interviewees, providing a "chaplainsque" view of the daily miseries and tribulations of the Marines subject to the siege. Their justification for stopping patrols (to facilitate fire support) is a lame excuse for surrendering the approaches to the base to the encroaching enemy—an excuse repeated in other accounts of the siege.

Prados provides the big picture, generally reflecting the view of the Marine Corps concerning the commitment and the results. The III Marine Amphibious Force

command opposed this tasking to Khe Sanh, insisting that the war should be fought primarily by small-unit Combined Action Platoons among the people of the hamlets. That program had been successful in winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese earlier in the war. By 1967, however, the entry of North Vietnamese army divisions into the struggle for the northern provinces of South Vietnam had overwhelmed the CAP effort. III MAF Headquarters also cited disturbing similarities between the Khe Sanh commitment and that of the earlier French debacle at nearby Dien Bien Phu. Their boss, General William Westmoreland, Commander of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, argued that the huge firepower differential between US forces and the French made such a comparison faulty.

III MAF didn't give Khe Sanh the command attention that the dangerous situation deserved; they reinforced that garrison only reluctantly. The Marines suspected that General Westmoreland wanted to establish a base at Khe Sanh for an offensive into Laos, another plan for which they had little enthusiasm. Westmoreland later stated that that was exactly what he had wanted to do. Such an offensive would have been a good strategic thrust, but it would have been politically unacceptable at that time. Lack of III MAF commitment caused Westmoreland to send his Deputy, General Creighton Abrams, to take command of all US forces in the region, though in this book the command relationship between Abrams and III MAF is described as "coordinate." Westmoreland was concerned, rightly so in my opinion, about less-than-aggressive senior leadership then in III MAF; he wanted to insure that the Marines at Khe Sanh were fully supported and properly employed. The MACV historian, Colonel "Hap" Argo, had heightened Westmoreland's concern by reporting history's verdict: the defeat of most besieged forces that surrender the initiative to the besiegers.

As the US firestorm around Khe Sanh decimated the besieging North Vietnamese army, enemy pressure gradually subsided. One can sympathize with the Marines at that point, resenting "rescue" by the Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division (which had been directed to open a corridor into Khe Sanh) in Operation Pegasus. Whether the Marines could have reestablished and maintained ground access to Khe Sanh without Pegasus is less clear, but it is true that major North Vietnamese army forces had withdrawn by the time the 1st Air Cav launched its operation. To this division must go credit for employing a uniquely effective combination of airpower and helilift in relieving Khe Sanh. The ultimate withdrawal of the Marines from Khe Sanh throws into question the reason for establishing the base in the first place, despite claims by MACV that an important task had been accomplished.

Although the preface claims that the book benefits from the discovery of hidden records, there is little new in this rendition of the siege of Khe Sanh. Some historians argue that the siege was not decisive (contrary to the title of this book). But I agree with the authors that Khe Sanh was a mutually accepted test of the power and the will of North Vietnam and the United States—and its indecisive results added to the pressures on our government to withdraw from Vietnam. The Marines at Khe Sanh deserve credit for engaging the North Vietnamese army in fiery combat and for holding the enemy to a draw. It is not, however, a bright page in American military history. The Marines in Vietnam were just too far inland for too long. And at Khe Sanh they were committed to a ground-holding operation which was outside their arena of professional expertise, which was seaborne assault and amphibious operations.

The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II. By Robert Bruce Sligh. New York: Praeger, 1992. 187 pages. \$45.00. Reviewed by Major Samuel J. Newland, ARNG, Ph.D., author of the USAWC Strategic Studies Institute Report *The Militia's Role in National Defense: A Historical Perspective*.

Bookshelves of libraries are becoming increasingly burdened by books on the Second World War. Due to both the scholarly and popular interest in this subject, the number of volumes can only continue to increase. Yet despite the number of books produced on the subject, the number of professionally written works on the National Guard and its role in the conflict remains small. Robert Sligh's short but scholarly book offers to fill part of this void by presenting a study of the mobilization of the Guard in 1940 and its role in the defense of the nation.

As Sligh correctly notes, mobilizing the Guard in 1940 was no small task, considering that the nation was not at war and was unconvinced that participation in a European war was in its best interests. Thus, it is the political process for mobilization that concerns the author. The book focuses on the politics necessary to mobilize the Guard and "the importance of the political situation between these two defense establishments" (the Guard and the Active Army), to include the impact of the dynamics between these two groups on later defense policy and legislation.

To fulfill this stated purpose, the writer begins by giving a brief synopsis of the degenerating world situation in 1939-40 and then launches into a history of the complicated political maneuvering necessary to bring the National Guard, a force of 18 divisions, into federal service. That this action was necessary now seems obvious since the Active Army had a combat strength of only 187,893 officers and men in mid-1939 and was facing an increasingly hostile world. Still, in 1939 and early 1940, neither the American people nor Congress were convinced that the nation should mobilize its reserve forces for possible commitment overseas. It is against this backdrop that Sligh describes the halting efforts to mobilize the Guard and expand the nation's defense capabilities.

Perhaps the key value of this work lies in its detailing of the interplay between General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Major General Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant General of Maryland and chief lobbyist of the National Guard Association. Using the Marshall papers, the records of the National Guard Association, and the National Archives, Sligh traces the difficult problem that Reckord faced, that is, fulfilling the Guard's desire to have an effective role in the defense of the nation but at the same time avoid erosion of state controls by the federal government. In addition, while he portrays Reckord as an astute lobbyist for the National Guard, Sligh finds him to be a realist who knew the Guard needed more equipment and training before it went to war. Thus, Reckord fought perceived attempts to ignore the Guard's combat role; he also worked to preserve the state character of the Guard and, at the same time, to maintain support of the Association's program by the Adjutants General from the 48 states.

Sligh's portrayal of Marshall as a man who understood both the political process and the Guard is significant as well. Due both to his wisdom and to the three years he had spent as a Guard advisor, Marshall understood the Guard far better than

most active-duty officers of his rank. With a knowledge of the Army, the Guard, and the American political process, Marshall was able to work successfully with both the legislative and executive branches in achieving the National Guard's mobilization for one year's training and then extending that period until the United States entered World War II.

Still, this book has some noticeable faults as it attempts to assess the impact of the mobilization on the Guard's larger role. According to the author, the Guard's desire to play a prominent part in national defense and receive federal funding undercut an additional prime goal, that of avoiding additional federal controls. Sligh asserts that the mobilization of the Guard in 1940 spurred increased control over the Guard, and that this battle for control culminated in 1990 when, through two separate court cases relating to overseas training, a "last battle for control" was waged and lost by the Guard.

In reality the battles over state vs. federal control continue even today, involving such issues as force structure and numbers, and they will likely continue as long as there are constitutional provisions for a distinctly separate militia/guard and an Active Army. And while the 1940 mobilization certainly affected the Guard's future, the National Defense Act of 1933 was actually responsible for establishing the Guard's legal structure as it exists today and by far overshadows the effects of the 1940 mobilization.

In short, the body of the book centering on the politics of mobilization is well done and worth reading for the information on that overlooked period. The introduction and conclusions, however, which attempt to convince the reader that the mobilization of 1940 hastened the Guard to a final and last battle between state and federal control, are at best dubious and should be read with considerable caution.

Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat. By Archer Jones. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 338 pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Professor James Kirby Martin, currently engaged in a comparative study of the generalship of Robert E. Lee and Benedict Arnold.

Civil War buffs and students of military strategy will relish the consumption of this delectable new study by respected historian Archer Jones. The author begins with certain assumptions, the central concept being that neither the Union nor the Confederacy had major advantages at the war's outset. With the playing field thus rendered so level, "much would depend on the quality of each's command and strategy," declares Jones. Both the North and the South demonstrated considerable sophistication in the organization of their command structures and the execution of their strategies, the investigation of which represents the principal task of this book.

The combatants, according to Jones, each constructed a command structure that effectively integrated military and political decisionmaking, and each had solid wartime presidents. Stated differently, Jones does not rate Abraham Lincoln as superior to Jefferson Davis, whose "mastery of strategy and . . . management of it [are] deserving of high praise." Davis comprehended the advantages of the strategic defensive in utilizing the immense reach of Southern space to neutralize the superior

numbers of Union armies. Northern armies would have to reckon with maintaining their ever-lengthening supply lines, which would reduce their manpower advantage as well as constrict their ability to maneuver in timely fashion. Taking advantage of a low ratio of armed force to space, the Confederates also pursued a raiding strategy, constantly hacking away at their opponent to disrupt Union supply lines.

Northern planners, by comparison, knew they would have to take the war to the enemy, but they realized the futility of a combat strategy designed to reconquer the vast Southern territory. Instead they chose a persisting logistic strategy that emphasized the depletion of Confederate resources. Elements included the Union naval blockade, which Jones argues was porous at best, and simultaneously advancing armies, whose combined goal was to reduce the Confederate base support area of food supplies and war materiel. By the end of 1863 Ulysses Grant called for a major modification of this approach. What emerged was the raiding logistic strategy, which entailed the avoidance of major battles in favor of ravaging the enemy's base of supplies. The most spectacular example of this altered emphasis was Sherman's march.

In the end, the results of particular clashes were not as important in determining the war's outcome as the "relatively high frequency of battles" over a four-year period and the "comparatively heavy combat casualties" sustained by both sides. By October 1864 the South was reeling, and Northern voters could "see victory looming ahead," at least clearly enough to "encourage them to vote to continue the war," thereby undermining the Confederacy's central political strategy of seeing Lincoln ousted in favor of Northern peace Democrats. Southerners could no longer find evidence of God's divine favor in their cause, and they reluctantly accepted the futility of continuing the war.

Any brief description of this volume will miss much of its valuable content. Jones moves from battle to battle without getting bogged down in details, and he discusses the profound influence of Napoleonic strategy and tactics—the utilization of turning movements and interior lines. Throughout he synthesizes and refines the arguments presented in such earlier volumes as *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War* (Jones with Herman Hattaway, 1983) and *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Jones with Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, and William N. Still, Jr., 1986). Most of all the author establishes his central proposition that warfare and its outcomes cannot truly be appreciated without a careful reckoning with command and strategy. Thus while students of military history may reasonably argue with Jones's assessments of Jefferson Davis, Henry Halleck, and the Union naval blockade, for example, and while they should question how the North could have ever won the Civil War without having superior resources at the outset, they should not miss the larger point. Archer Jones has written a challenging, indeed thought-provoking, and useful book.

Off the Press . . .

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From the Archives

MacArthur and the Politics of Promotion

For those in today's Army, where politicking for promotion assumes subtler forms than in days past, it is sometimes instructive to revisit historical instances of particularly crass efforts to prejudice the legitimate operation of the promotion system. Take the letters of Mrs. Arthur MacArthur, mother of Douglas MacArthur, to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and AEF commander General John J. Pershing. On 12 June 1918, for example, Mrs. MacArthur sent the following letter to Pershing regarding the promotion of her son, who as a colonel was chief of staff of the 42d "Rainbow" Division in France:¹

My dear General Pershing: I am taking the liberty of writing you a little heart-to-heart letter emboldened by the thought of old friendship for you and yours, and the knowledge of my late husband's great admiration for you. First allow me to assure you that my son, Colonel Douglas MacArthur, knows absolutely nothing whatsoever of this letter and its purport to you. I understand there will be made, in the near future, approximately 100 new appointments to General Officers and that all appointments for the Expeditionary Forces in France will of course be made upon your recommendations. I am most anxious that my son should be fortunate enough to receive one of these appointments, as he is a most capable officer and a hard working man. . . .

I know the Secretary of War and his family quite intimately, and the Secretary is very deeply attached to Colonel MacArthur and knows him well, as he served for two years as his Military Secretary at the same time that he was the War department's Censor, both positions which he asked to be relieved in order to go to France. . . . As much as my heart and ambition is involved in this advancement, neither my son or I would care to have a Star without your approval . . . as we both feel so loyal to you and the cause you are defending. . . .

I am free to confess to you that my hope and ambition in life is to live long enough to see this son made a General Officer, and I feel I am placing my entire life, as it were, in your hands for consideration, and I trust you can see your way clear, dear General Pershing, to give him the recommendation necessary to advance him to the grade of Brigadier General.

With best wishes for yourself, I remain with great esteem, Very cordially yours,
Mary P. MacArthur

MacArthur was unaware that his mother had written Pershing, and in any event it is unlikely the letter could have reached the AEF commander in France in time to influence the promotion, which occurred on 26 June 1918. However, despite the fact that with hindsight we can see the inevitability of MacArthur's eventual rise to high rank, biographer D. Clayton James concludes that his elevation in this instance was likely "instigated by Baker and reluctantly approved by Pershing."²

NOTES

1. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Volume I, 1880-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 169-72. For a letter to Pershing regarding the promotion of another famous American soldier, see "From the Archives—George C. Marshall and Military Ambition," *Parameters*, 22 (Spring 1992), inside rear cover.

2. James, pp. 169, 171-72.